Grants Pass v. Johnson
No. 23-175
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/28/2024
Public order: Camping ordinances
Win |
Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court to review a decision of the Ninth Circuit blocking a city from enforcing an ordinance against camping on public property.
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in Martin v. City of Boise that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prevents a city from enforcing a prohibition on camping on public property whenever the number of shelter beds in a city is less than the number of homeless people. This simplistic holding overlooks the complex nature of the homelessness problem and removes an important tool for getting addicted homeless persons into the treatment needed to turn their lives around. The problem of encampments in cities has only grown worse in the years since Martin.
CJLF initially filed a brief to support the city's petition to take the case up for full briefing and argument. The Supreme Court granted that petition. We then filed another brief to argue for reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision. We argue that the Ninth Circuit has seriously misinterpreted the Eighth Amendment, extending a dubious old Supreme Court precedent to new territory completed outside the proper scope of that amendment. The Ninth Circuit's decision is bad constitutional law and interferes with the cities' efforts to deal effectively with a difficult problem.
The Supreme Court agreed. The Eighth Amendment has nothing to do with this issue. Local governments can address the homelessness problem with appropriate regard for other constitutional rights but without the crude, high-handed obstruction of the injunctions issued under Martin.
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Smith v. Arizona
No. 22-899
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/20/2024
Evidence: Confrontation, laboratory
Draw |
U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the testimony needed to present crime lab results in court. Jason Smith was arrested during a search authorized by a warrant. He was inside a shed on his father's property that was reeking of marijuana. The officers seized six pounds of marijuana, another substance later confirmed to be methamphetamine, and various paraphernalia. Testing at the state crime lab confirmed that the substances were marijuana and methamphetamine.
The analyst who performed the test no longer worked at the lab at the time of trial, so another forensic scientist reviewed the spectra produced by the gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer and gave an expert opinion that the spectra confirmed the substances. The witness relied on lab notes for information on the tests that were run. Long-established federal and state rules of evidence allow an expert witness to rely on outside sources of information that are routinely relied on in the field.
Smith claims that the reliance on lab notes violates the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution and that the state must produce the now-departed analyst as a witness in order to introduce the expert's opinion as evidence. In a "friend of the court" brief, CJLF argues that the term "witness" as understood at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted does not extend so far as to cover the author of the lab notes. The expert who testified is the witness for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment, and the defendant's right to confront him was honored.
The Supreme Court chose not to decide the issue that CJLF briefed, stating that it had not been sufficiently considered in the lower courts. The Supreme Court reversed the state court on another point and sent the case back for consideration of this issue, among others.
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People v. Hardin
No. S277487
California Supreme Court
Decided: 3/4/2024
Equal protection clause: Youth offender parole hearing
Win |
California Supreme Court case to review whether excluding 18- to 25-year-old inmates who were convicted of special circumstances murder and sentenced to life without the possibilility of parole (LWOP) from being eligible to receive a youth offender parole suitability hearing violates the equal protection clause. When Hardin was 25 years old he murdered his elderly neighbor in her apartment. He was convcited of first degree murder with the special circumstance that the murder occured during the commission of a robbery. He was sentenced to LWOP. Despite being statutorily ineligible (Penal Code, § 3051, subd. (h)), Hardin filed a motion for a “Franklin hearing” seeking to develop a record for a future youth offender parole suitability hearing. In his motion, Hardin argued that allowing a parole hearing to inmates sentenced to 25 years to life for first degree murder committed between the ages of 18 and 25 while denying the same hearing to inmates, like him, sentenced to LWOP for first degree special circumstances murder committed between the ages of 18 and 25, violates the equal protection clause. The Court of Appeal agreed with Hardin and held that it was unconstitutional to exclude murderers like him from parole eligibility. CJLF joined the case to argue that parole-eligible young adult murderers are not similarly situated to non-parole-eligible young adult murderers and it was rational for the Legislature to expressly exclude the latter group from receiving a youth offender parole suitability hearing.
The Supreme Court agreed. Hardin and other young adult murderers sentenced to LWOP will remain ineligible for parole.
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People v. Rojas
No. S275835
California Supreme Court
Decided: 12/18/23
Gangs: Unconstitutional amendment of Prop. 21
Loss |
California Supreme Court case to review whether the Legislature unconstitutionally amended the statutory provisions of Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, when they significantly redefined the terms "criminal street gang" and "pattern of criminal gang activity" without the requisite concurrence of two-thirds of the membership of both houses as dictated by the initiative. Rojas was convicted of first degree murder with gang murder special circumstances and active gang participation with gang and firearm enhancements. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life, plus three years for the firearm enhancements. While Rojas' appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 333, which made significant changes to the definitions of "criminal street gang" and "pattern of criminal gang activity." Rojas argued that the changes applied retroactively to him and required his convictions for active gang participation, the gang murder special circumstance, and his gang and firearm enhancements to be reversed. CJLF joined the case to argue that the definitions of "criminal street gang" and "pattern of criminal gang activity" were integral to the entire comprehensive statutory scheme as enacted by the voters via Proposition 21. Proposition 21 only authorized legislative amendment of its statutory provisions if two-thirds of the membership of both houses concurred in the vote. The Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 333 without a two-thirds concurrence in either house and is unconstitutional. However, the court took a narrow view of the purpose of Proposition 21 and held that the narrowing of these terms was not an amendment.
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CJLF v. California Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation
No. 34-2022-80003807-CU-WM-GDS
Sacramento Superior Court
Decided: 12/13/2023
Prisons: Credits
Win |
Sacramento Superior Court case challenging regulations issued by the Newsom Administration that will speed up the release of 76,000 prison inmates. Although Proposition 57 was sold to the public as a way to be more lenient on nonviolent convicts, the new regulations issued under it greatly expand the system of credits, shortening the sentences of all but a few of California's prisoners. Robbers, rapists, and even most murderers are eligible for the expanded credits. CJLF, along with individual victims of crime and victims' family members, challenged the regulations on the ground that they conflict with statutes enacted by the Legislature and that Proposition 57 does not authorize CDCR to contradict statutes.
The Superior Court held that Proposition 57 does not authorize CDCR to use these credits to move up the minimum eligible parole date for felons sentenced to life in prison with a possibility of parole. This group includes murderers and third-strikers. The court did not strike down the regulations that authorizes CDCR to issue credits above the maximum allowed by statute for felons sentenced to a fixed term of years. We count this decision as a win because it makes a net change in the status quo in favor of our position, even though the court did not go as far as we asked.
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Counterman v. Colorado
No. 22-138
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/28/2023
First Amendment: Threats
Draw |
United States Supreme Court case in which the defendant, Billy Raymond Counterman, was convicted of stalking and was sentenced to 4.5 years in prison for sending thousands of private Facebook messages to a local singer/songwriter ("C.W."). C.W. found the private messages to be "weird" and "creepy" and did not respond to any of them. She blocked Counterman from her Facebook accounts, but he created new accounts and continued to message her. As time went on without response from C.W., Counterman's messages became more angry and alarming, causing C.W. to become extremely fearful and scared. Counterman also alluded to making physical sightings of C.W. in public. Because C.W. was worried that Counterman would show up at her scheduled concerts, she cancelled several shows and obtained a protective order against him. C.W. also discovered that Counterman was on probation for two prior threat convictions. Counterman was arrested and charged with stalking under Colorado Revised Statute 18-3-602(1)(c). Under that statute, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Counterman "knowingly" followed, approached, contacted, placed under surveillance, or made any form of communication with C.W. in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer severe emotional distress and did cause C.W. to suffer from severe emotional distress. Counterman argued that because he did not subjectively intend to threaten C.W., the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his messages because they were protected under the First Amendment. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed and held that his messages were unprotected "true threats."
CJLF joined the case to argue that the "true threats" doctrine does not depend on what the speaker's inner subjective purpose was in making a communication. Rather, evaluating a speaker's mental state under an objective knowing standard is all that is constitutionally required. Stalkers cause significant harm to their victims regardless of whether they subjectively intend to induce fear. A stalker's detachment from reality is the prime reason why an objective standard is necessary to punish those who inflict harm on their victims. CJLF further argued that because the Colorado statute of which Counterman was convicted did not include a "credible threat" element, Counterman's conviction did not depend on his communication being a "true threat." Because Colorado has a substantial interest in protecting stalking victims, the law at issue is a valid content neutral, time, place, or manner regulation, and is constitutional.
The Supreme Court partly agreed with CJLF's first argument. The Court held that a reckless disregard of the threatening nature of the speech was sufficient, rejecting the claim that a specific intent to threaten was required. The Court did not reach the "manner" argument.
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Jones v. Hendrix
No. 21-857
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/22/2023
Habeas corpus: Successive § 2255
Win |
U. S. Supreme Court case in which a habitual felon who illegally possessed a gun sought to make one more challenge to his conviction, after multiple challenges have been rejected over 20 years. Career criminal Marcus Jones had been convicted of 11 prior felonies in 1999 when he bought a gun at a pawnshop and lied about his priors. The circumstances leave little doubt that he knew he could not legally buy a gun, but the jury was not instructed to make that specific finding because the law was not understood to require it at the time. Jones filed one unsuccessful challenge after another for 20 years until the Supreme Court changed the interpretation of the federal statute to require knowledge of the condition that made purchase and possession illegal. In 1996, Congress sharply limited the circumstances in which a convict can make repeated challenges to a criminal judgment under 28 U.S.C § 2255. A clear case of actual innocence is one of the exceptions allowing a repeat attack, but Jones does not qualify for that exception. He now claims that the 1996 act does not really preclude challenges such as his but merely requires that convicts revert to an earlier procedure in a different court. That is, he claims he can file a habeas corpus petition instead of a motion under the law that replaced habeas corpus for these kinds of collateral challenges by federal prisoners. He further claims that the 1996 act would be unconstitutional if it really cut off challenges such as his, despite a Supreme Court opinion the same year that rejected that argument for state prisoners. CJLF had entered the case to argue that there is no real constitutional issue here, and Congress's limit on repeated attack on criminal judgments should be enforced as it was intended. The Supreme Court agreed.
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Schubert v. CDCR
No. 34-2021-00301253
Superior Court of California
Decided: 5/16/2023
Prisons: Credits
Draw |
Sacramento Superior Court case challenging regulations issued by the Newsom Administration that will speed up the release of 76,000 prison inmates. Although Proposition 57 was sold to the public as a way to be more lenient on nonviolent convicts, the new regulations issued under it greatly expand the system of credits, shortening the sentences of all but a few of California's prisoners. Robbers, rapists, and even most murderers are eligible for the expanded credits. The suit challenging the regulations was begun by a group of 44 of California's 58 district attorneys. CJLF represented two victims' organizations, Crime Victims United and Citizens Against Homicide, who joined the suit after the judge expressed doubt that the district attorneys had legal standing to make the challenge. The suit claimed that the regulations were illegally adopted and conflict with multiple California laws. It sought an injunction against their enforcement.
The court removed the district attorneys from the suit for lack of standing on March 8, 2022. After further delays, the remaining plaintiffs dismissed their suit on May 16, 2023, so that another case, which was a better vehicle for these claims, could go forward. See CJLF v. CDCR, filed in 2022.
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People v. Collins
No. LA009810
Los Angeles County Superior Court
Decided: 8/22/22
Sentencing: Resentence PC § 1170.03
Draw |
Los Angeles Superior Court case regarding resentencing of a murderer despite the lack of an error in the original sentencing. Scott Collins was convicted in 1993 of murdering Fred Rose and was sentenced to death. In 2022, LA District Attorney George Gascón agreed with the defendant to resentence Collins to life without parole under a provision of the Penal Code that permitted such resentencings in some cases. CJLF joined the victim's family as "friend of the court" in opposing the resentencing, arguing that this provision did not apply to sentences of death or life in prison. Apparently aware that this argument would succeed, opponents of just punishment convinced legislative leaders to ram a new law through the Legislature as a "budget trailer" bill with virtually no notice and an immediate effect, undercutting our argument. As a result, the court had no choice but to grant the resentencing.
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Peterson v. Board of Parole Hearings, et al.
No. 34-2022-80003792
Superior Court of California
Decided: 6/3/2022
Juveniles: Life without parole
Win |
Sacramento Superior Court case challenging the constitutionality of a law that authorizes parole eligibility during a prisoner's 25th year of incarceration for prisoners who were convicted of aggravated murder prior to turning 18 years old and sentenced to LWOP. CJLF filed suit on behalf of Laura Peterson, whose father, Alan Peterson, was murdered in 1996 by then 16-year-old Lawrence Cottle. Under California's 1990 Proposition 115, state judges were given the discretion to sentence juvenile homicide offenders to either 25 years to life or life without the possibility of parole. Cottle was sentenced under that law to life without the possibility of parole. In 2017, the California Legislature passed and former Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 394 into law. Subject to few exceptions, that law authorized parole eligibility during the 25th year of incarceration for prisoners, like Cottle, who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole prior to turning 18 years old. Cottle received a parole hearing under this law and was found suitable for parole. Proposition 115 specified that its statutory provisions could only be amended by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the California Legislature. Senate Bill 394 was not passed by the required two-thirds vote in the State Assembly.
CJLF filed a lawsuit on Laura Peterson's behalf to prevent Cottle from being released on parole. Judge Boulware Eurie of the Sacramento Superior Court agreed that Senate Bill 394 unconstitutionally amended Proposition 115 without the required legislative majority, and issued a Writ of Prohibition preventing the Board of Parole Hearings and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from releasing Cottle on parole.
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Nazir v. Superior Court
No. B310806
Court of Appeal, 2nd Appellate District
Decided: 6/2/2022
Courts: Dismissal of pending enhancements
Win |
California Court of Appeal case to review whether the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, George Gascon, has the unilateral authority to dismiss sentencing enhancements from pending criminal cases. In December 2020, Gascon replaced Jackie Lacey as District Attorney. On the day he took office, he issued a series of Special Directives. Special Directive 20-08, entitled "Sentencing Enhancements/Allegations" required all Deputy District Attorneys to orally amend the charging documents in pending cases to dismiss previously alleged sentencing enhancements based solely on the new office-wide blanket policy. The trial court refused to dismiss Nazir's firearm enhancement allegations because the only reason for doing so given by the prosecuting attorneys was the Special Directive. In the trial court's opinion, dismissal was unwarranted because California law requires an individualized consideration of a defendant's case and therefore the Special Directive alone was insufficient in and of itself to justify dismissal of Nazir's firearm enhancement allegations. CJLF joined the case upon the request of the Court of Appeal to argue that prosecutorial discretion, albeit broad, is not without limit. Once prosecutors invoke the jurisdiction of the court by filing charging documents, California law prohibits prosecutors from unilaterally dismissing those charges. The decision whether to dispose of previously alleged charges and/or enhancements is purely a matter of judicial discretion. Because the sole basis given by the prosecuting attorneys in this case was the Special Directive, the trial court properly utilized its statutory discretion when it denied their motion to dismiss due to a lack of case specific reasons that would justify such a dismissal.
The Court of Appeal agreed and held that the decision to dismiss a previously alleged sentencing enhancement is a matter of judicial discretion. The Court of Appeal sent the case back to the trial court for an individualized determination of whether this is an appropriate case to dismiss the enhancements in light of Special Directive 20-08 among other factors.
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Peterson v. Board of Parole Hearings, et al.
No. 34-2022-80003792
Superior Court of California
Decided: 6/3/2022
Juveniles: Life without parole
Win |
Sacramento Superior Court case challenging the constitutionality of a law that authorizes parole eligibility during a prisoner's 25th year of incarceration for prisoners who were convicted of aggravated murder prior to turning 18 years old and sentenced to LWOP. CJLF filed suit on behalf of Laura Peterson, whose father, Alan Peterson, was murdered in 1996 by then 16-year-old Lawrence Cottle. Under California's 1990 Proposition 115, state judges were given the discretion to sentence juvenile homicide offenders to either 25 years to life or life without the possibility of parole. Cottle was sentenced under that law to life without the possibility of parole. In 2017, the California Legislature passed and former Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 394 into law. Subject to few exceptions, that law authorized parole eligibility during the 25th year of incarceration for prisoners, like Cottle, who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole prior to turning 18 years old. Cottle received a parole hearing under this law and was found suitable for parole. Proposition 115 specified that its statutory provisions could only be amended by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the California Legislature. Senate Bill 394 was not passed by the required two-thirds vote in the State Assembly.
CJLF filed a lawsuit on Laura Peterson's behalf to prevent Cottle from being released on parole. Judge Boulware Eurie of the Sacramento Superior Court agreed that Senate Bill 394 unconstitutionally amended Proposition 115 without the required legislative majority, and issued a Writ of Prohibition preventing the Board of Parole Hearings and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from releasing Cottle on parole.
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Shinn v. Ramirez
No. 20-1009
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 5/23/2022
Habeas corpus: Facts not developed in state court
Win |
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases involving murderers who seek to relitigate their claims in federal court after the state courts reasonably rejected their claims as presented there.
David Ramirez stabbed to death his girlfriend and her 15-year-old daughter. Witnesses reported hearing the victims scream and cry for help for 20-30 minutes. He was convicted and sentenced to death. The state courts rejected his claims, including a claim that his lawyer was ineffective in presentation of the mitigating evidence. In federal court, Ramirez wanted to present additional evidence on mitigation, none of which has any demonstrable connection to the crime. After the federal district judge rejected the claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sent the case back for a full evidentiary hearing on this evidence.
Barry Jones was seen hitting his girlfriend's 4-year-old daughter. He then refused to take her for medical attention as her condition obviously worsened, falsely telling concerned visitors that she had already been seen by paramedics. The little girl died of a bowel laceration. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, and a later claim that his lawyers had been ineffective was denied. In federal court, he sought to introduce evidence disputing whether the girl's injuries had been caused by the blow he was seen inflicting or by an earlier injury. The evidence did not dispute that he effectively caused the girl's death by not taking her to the hospital when she was obviously and gravely ill.
CJLF has joined the case to argue that in these circumstances a second hearing in federal court, after defendants have already had the chance to present their evidence to the state courts, is blocked by an Act of Congress, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The law has an exception for defendants with strong claims of actual innocence, but that exception does not apply to these cases. ...
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Brown v. Davenport
No. 20-826
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 4/21/2022
Habeas corpus: Harmless error
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court case involving the standard of review federal habeas courts must apply when reviewing a state court’s determination of harmless error. Ervine Lee Davenport was partially shackled during his trial for first-degree murder. On direct appeal, the state appellate courts found that his partial shackling was unconstitutional, but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard announced in Chapman v. California. Davenport subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Davenport’s partial shackling claim had been addressed by the state appellate courts, the federal habeas judge analyzed his petition pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court judge denied habeas relief after finding that the state court’s harmless error determination was neither contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the District Court applied the incorrect standard for addressing harmless error. The majority found that Brecht v. Abrahamson, not AEDPA, supplies the correct standard, and based on Brecht alone, the shackling error was not harmless.
CJLF joined the case to argue that AEDPA requires federal courts to give great deference to a state court’s resolution of federal law, which includes a finding of harmless error. Because AEDPA was enacted to reduce delay, and is a prerequisite to habeas relief, a federal habeas court must review the state court’s harmless error determination for reasonableness under its provisions first. If a habeas petitioner satisfies the demands of AEDPA, then Brecht is applied. CJLF’s brief argues that if a federal habeas court is going to grant habeas relief, both AEDPA and Brecht must be addressed, and the “Brecht-only” approach taken by the Sixth Circuit was erroneous. The Supreme Court agreed and held that when a state court has ruled on the merits of a state prisoner's claim, a federal habeas court must apply both tests when granting habeas relief.
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Ramirez v. Collier
No. 21-5592
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 3/24/2022
Death penalty: Religious exercise
Loss |
U. S. Supreme Court review of a Texas murderer’s lawsuit that claims the state is violating his rights by refusing to allow a minister to touch him and pray aloud in the execution chamber while he receives a lethal injection. Ramirez was convicted of the 2004 stabbing murder of a man and the robbery of a woman at knifepoint.
At issue is what limits there are to last-minute litigation over religious accommodations for condemned murderers. CJLF argues that there should be limits, and the Court should settle on what they should be. The Foundation also notes that raising this type of claim at the last minute after decades of review on direct appeal and habeas corpus is an abuse of the legal process. The Foundation's brief argues that the Court should apply it’s 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris to limit civil lawsuits in criminal cases to “unusual circumstances.” The absence of clergy holding hands with a murderer does not meet this standard.
The Court held that Ramirez was likely to prevail on his claim and sent the case back to the lower courts without expressly discussing the limits noted in CJLF's brief. The opinion did note that last-minute litigation could be avoided if states had clearer procedures for deciding these kinds of claims. CJLF will continue to argue for limits on federal court intervention in cases where the state decision process is more clearly defined. |
United States v. Tsarnaev
No. 20-443
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 3/4/2022
Jury: Voir dire re publicity
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Boston Marathon Bomber challenged his death sentence. Defendant Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, along with his brother, set off bombs at the Boston Marathon. Three people died and hundreds were gravely injured. Tsarnaev can be seen on camera carrying his homemade bomb, which he intentionally placed near a group of children watching the race. On appeal, Tsarnaev claimed that the trial judge's questioning of potential jurors regarding pretrial publicity violated his rights, even though the judge followed the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as found in a 1991 Supreme Court case from a state court. Tsarnaev also claimed that the trial judge erred in excluding marginally relevant evidence that his brother committed an unrelated murder earlier. The Court of Appeals agreed on both points and overturned the sentence.
CJLF entered the case to argue that the constitutional requirements clarified in 1991 apply equally in state and federal courts, and neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals should invent additional requirements for federal courts. CJLF also argued that the judge's ruling on evidence was well within his discretion under the Federal Death Penalty Act, and that provision of the act is constitutional. The Supreme Court on both points, 6-3, and reinstated the sentence. |
In re Mohammad
No. S259999
California Supreme Court
Decided: 1/3/2022
Parole: Prop. 57 & violent offenders
Win |
California Supreme Court case to review whether Proposition 57 precludes early parole consideration for inmates currently serving a sentence for both violent and nonviolent felony offenses. Proposition 57 permits early parole eligibility for state prisoners "convicted of a nonviolent felony offense" after completing the full term of their primary offense. The CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) promulgated regulations that excluded from early parole consideration inmates currently serving a sentence for a violent felony. Mohammad pled no contest to nine counts of robbery (violent felonies) and six counts of receiving stolen property (nonviolent felonies). The sentencing court designated one of the nonviolent felonies as the principal term and ordered him to serve three years in prison. The court then ordered consecutive one-year terms on each of the nine violent offenses, and consecutive eight-month terms on each of the remaining five nonviolent felonies. After completing the full three-year term for the nonviolent primary offense, Mohammad requested an early parole consideration hearing. CDCR denied his request. On appeal, the Court of Appeal granted relief, finding that because he had completed the full term of his primary offense, he was eligible for early parole consideration even though he was currently incarcerated for the violent offenses. The Court of Appeal interpreted the measure to mean that an inmate who is serving an aggregate sentence for more than one conviction will be eligible for an early parole hearing if only one of those convictions was for “a” nonviolent felony offense. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Court of Appeal's erroneous interpretation of the measure would essentially sweep the entire state prison population into its purview and is contrary to voter understanding and intent. Such an interpretation would also lead to the absurd result that inmates convicted of more crimes would be eligible for early parole consideration whereas inmates convicted of less crimes would not. The California Supreme Court agreed and held that inmates who are currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony are excluded from early parole consideration. |
In re Alexander
No. 19-70232
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: 9/16/2021
Death penalty: Stay after change in method
Draw |
U. S. Court of Appeals case challenging the stays of execution that have prevented enforcement of the California death penalty since 2006. This case became moot when the state adopted a new execution protocol, yet the Attorney General failed to move for dismissal or appeal the grant of new stays to intervening death row inmates. CJLF filed the petition on behalf of families of murder victims asking that the stays be vacated.
Two years after our petition was filed, Governor Newsom issued a reprieve for all death row inmates and rescinded the state's execution protocol. The federal court action was then dismissed. This action made our petition moot, as there was no court stay to challenge. The Ninth Circuit finally dismissed the petition as moot on September 16, 2021. |
People v. McDaniel
No. S171393
California Supreme Court
Decided: 8/26/2021
Death penalty: Jury requirements
Win |
California Supreme Court case in which a convicted murderer asks the court to overturn 40 years of settled precedent regarding how juries decide whether to sentence a murderer to death, a change which could overturn every sentence of every murderer currently on death row. McDaniel was a gang member who embarked on a revenge hit to kill a person who had stolen drugs from a member of McDaniel’s gang. Three other people happened to be in the apartment with the suspected thief. McDaniel and his accomplice broke in and shot all four of them. Two died. and two were permanently disabled. California’s structured process for deciding whether a murderer will be sentenced to death includes several steps. The murderer must be convicted of first-degree murder. At least one special circumstance in addition must be found. The jury must consider a wide variety of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Finally, the jury must decide if the aggravating outweighs the mitigating and if death is the appropriate punishment. From the beginning, the law has been understood to require that the jury must be unanimous as to degree, special circumstances, and the ultimate penalty, and further that degree and special circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. McDaniel’s lawyers now ask the Supreme Court to declare that the jury must also be unanimous as to what aggravating factors have been proved, ignoring any that even one juror disputes, find them proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and find that the final penalty decision “proved” beyond a reasonable doubt. These claims have been considered and rejected dozens of times by the same court in the past, but now the court has asked for briefing on them. CJLF’s brief explains that neither the history nor the text of the California Constitution or the relevant statutes supports such a disruptive change. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed. The opinion's analysis largely tracks CJLF's argument, and our brief is expressly cited for one point. |
In re Friend
No. S256914
California Supreme Court
Decided: 6/28/2021
Habeas corpus: Successive petitions
Loss |
California Supreme Court case in which a convicted murderer seeks to effectively nullify one of the key reforms of California's death penalty implementation initiative, Proposition 66. One of the reasons that California's death penalty was not being enforced prior to 2016 was that convicted murderers were allowed to file an unlimited number of collateral attacks on their judgments in habeas corpus petitions. Although almost all of these claims were rejected as too late, clearly meritless, or both, the time needed to decide those issues introduced great delay. Proposition 66 decreed that only claims by prisoners with a substantial claim of actual innocence (which almost none have) would be considered. Although this requirement is clearly stated both in the text of the initiative and the analysis by the Legislative Analyst, the prisoner in this case asks the Supreme Court to declare that the provision actually means something very different. He asks that the strict test of actual innocence apply only to cases where the petitioner cannot justify his late presentation of his claim, an issue that would take time to decide, reintroducing the delay that Proposition 66 sought to eliminate. Remarkably, instead of opposing this misinterpretation of the law, the California Attorney General has joined the murderer in supporting it. CJLF's brief stands alone in asking the court to uphold the law as written. Equally remarkably, the court accepted this invitation to rewrite the statute rather than give it a fair interpretation. |
Borden v. United States
No. 19-5410
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/10/2021
Mental state: Recklessness
Loss |
U.S. Supreme Court case on the "three strikes" provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act. That provision requires a 15-year minimum sentence for a violation by a felon who has three prior convictions for violent felonies. Charles Borden was found to be illegally in possession of a gun under circumstances indicating he was involved in drug dealing. He had three prior convictions for aggravated assault. Borden claims that a prior conviction does not count as "violent" if the statute defining the crime permits a conviction on a showing that it was committed recklessly rather than intentionally, regardless of how clearly the actual crime was intentional. The Model Penal Code provides that a defendant can be convicted of most violent offenses upon a showing that the crime was purposeful, knowing, or reckless, and the bulk of states have followed this pattern. Acceptance of Borden's argument would prevent application of the "three strikes" provision to a great many crimes that are clearly violent. CJLF entered the case to argue that recklessness is a well-established mental state for violent crimes, and statutes following the standard definition come within the intent of this law. The Supreme Court was divided and unable to agree on a single rationale. However, the result of the case is that prior offenses that can be committed with a reckless mental state will not be counted for the ACCA. |
Jones v. Mississippi
No. 18-1259
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 4/22/2021
Juveniles: Life without parole
Win |
United States Supreme Court case regarding the requirements for sentencing a murderer under the age of 18 to life in prison without parole. Bertis and Madge Jones took in their 15-year-old grandson, Brett Jones, after Brett had a violent confrontation with his stepfather. Brett later had an argument with his grandfather after the elder Mr. Jones discovered Brett's girlfriend secretly living in his room. Later, Brett stabbed his 68-year-old grandfather eight times, using a second knife after the first one broke. The trial judge described the killing as "particularly brutal." The jury rejected Jones's claim of self-defense and convicted him of deliberate-design murder. His sentence of life in prison without parole (LWOP) was later vacated after the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama that sentencers must have discretion to consider the defendant's youth in such cases. Following a new sentencing hearing, the judge decided that notwithstanding Jones's youth LWOP remains the appropriate sentence for this brutal crime. The decision was affirmed on appeal. Jones appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. He claims that under a later decision, Montgomery v. Alabama, the trial judge's consideration of his youth is not enough. He claims that he cannot be sentenced to LWOP unless the judge makes a further finding that he is "permanently incorrigible." Acceptance of this claim would require resentencing in the cases of nearly every juvenile murderer sentenced to LWOP in the country, even though they have already had the discretionary sentencing hearings Miller requires. CJLF has written two "friend of the court" briefs in this case. The brief for CJLF makes the legal argument that the Supreme Court's precedents do not require the finding that Jones claims, and the sentencing "fact" that he wants found is so vague that it would be unconstitutional. A second brief, for the National Organization of Victims of Juvenile Murders and Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, tells the stories of families of victims murdered by under-18 murderers to ensure that the Supreme Court understands the impact of the crimes and the endless proceedings that these families endure. The Supreme Court agreed that a hearing in which the judge has discretion to choose a lesser sentence is all that the Constitution requires. |
In re Humphrey
No. S247278
California Supreme Court
Decided: 3/25/2021
Bail: Ability to pay
Loss |
California Supreme Court case to review a lower court decision that granted Kenneth Humphrey a new bail hearing in which inquiry must be made on his ability to pay money bail. If unable to pay money bail, non-monetary alternatives must be addressed. Humphrey, a repeat offender, was charged with robbery and burglary. Bail was initially set at $600,000, then later reduced to $350,000. Humphrey's request for pretrial release on his own recognizance without financial conditions was denied. Humphrey was unable to post bail and remained detained pretrial. Humphrey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court's failure to inquire into his financial circumstances and to not consider less restrictive alternatives to money bail was a violation of his constitutional rights. CJLF joined the case to argue that public and victim safety are the primary considerations to be evaluated by a court when initially deciding whether an arrestee is eligible for pretrial release, and, if eligible, what type of pretrial release is appropriate under the circumstances—money bail or release on own recognizance without financial conditions. The trial court found that Humphrey was ineligible for release on his own recognizance because of his danger to public safety and as a "flight risk." To release Humphrey on an amount that he could afford, or on other less restrictive alternatives, would essentially permit his release on his own recognizance, which is contrary to the trial court's findings regarding his danger to victim and public safety. The California Supreme Court held that trial courts must consider an arrestee’s ability to pay when setting the amount of money bail. |
O.G. v. Superior Court
No. S259011
California Supreme Court
Decided: 2/25/2021
Juveniles: Unconstitutional amendment of Prop. 57
Loss |
California Supreme Court case to review whether the California Legislature unconstitutionally amended the statutory provisions of Proposition 57 when it enacted Senate Bill 1391. Proposition 57 gave sole authority to juvenile court judges to decide whether a juvenile age 14 and older should be transferred to adult criminal court. Proposition 57 expressly authorized the Legislature to make amendments to the measure so long as they are "consistent with and further the intent" of the act. Senate Bill 1391 repealed a district attorney's authority to seek a transfer of 14- and 15-year-old offenders to adult court. O.G. was 15 years old when he murdered two people. The Ventura County District Attorney's Office sought to prosecute O.G. as an adult. O.G. objected and argued that Senate Bill 1391 prohibited the transfer. CJLF joined the case to argue that repealing a district attorney's authority to seek the transfer of a violent and dangerous 14- or 15-year-old offender to adult court is not consistent with and does not further the intent of Proposition 57. Senate Bill 1391 significantly altered the statutory provisions of Proposition 57. The Legislature exceeded the limited authority they were given and unconstitutionally amended Proposition 57 when they enacted Senate Bill 1391. The California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391 as a permissible amendment to Proposition 57. |
Deck v. Jennings
No. 17-2055
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: 10/19/2020
Death penalty: Delay in resentencing
Win |
Federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case to review a lower court decision that overturned Carman Deck's death sentence and directed that he be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In June 1996, Deck robbed and murdered an elderly couple, Jim and Zelma Long, in their home. Deck was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in June 1998. His sentence was subsequently reversed and remanded for a new penalty phase trial. In April 2003, Deck was again sentenced to death by a new jury. The U. S. Supreme Court again reversed the death sentence finding that Deck's visible shackling in the presence of the second jury denied him a fair trial. A third penalty phase trial was held in September 2008. A jury again sentenced Deck to death for the two murders. The judgment was affirmed and state post-conviction relief was denied. Deck then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Deck argued that the delay between his conviction in 1998 and his third penalty phase trial in 2008 violated his constitutional rights and that his attorneys were ineffective for not raising this unconstitutional delay argument. The U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri agreed with Deck, finding that his third penalty phase trial was fundamentally unfair because of delay not attributable to him and that counsel's failure to pursue the unconstitutional delay claim in the state courts was ineffective. CJLF joined the case on behalf of the murder victims' family members, arguing that the delay between Deck's conviction and final sentencing did not violate his constitutional rights. Deck was found guilty of murder over 20 years ago. He has since then pursued every avenue of relief available to him by the state and federal governments. This was not due to attorney error or government delay. Furthermore, Deck's claims were procedurally defaulted in state court and it was error for the District Court to address the claims and grant relief. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversed the District Court's holding, and reinstated Deck's death sentence. |
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam
No. 19-161
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/25/2020
Habeas corpus: Recent illegal alien
Draw |
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a citizen of Sri Lanka who was apprehended at the border almost immediately after surreptitiously crossing into the United States from Mexico. He lacked the documentation required for entry into the United States, was determined to be excludable, and was placed in expedited removal proceedings. He claimed a fear of returning to Sri Lanka and was referred for an interview with an asylum officer. The officer determined that he had not established a credible fear of persecution. This finding was affirmed by the officer's supervisor and an immigration judge. An expedited removal order was entered. Thuraissigiam filed a habeas corpus petition. Because 8 U.S.C §1252(e)(2) limits judicial review of expedited removal orders to three narrow factual determinations, none of which were applicable to Thuraissigiam, the District Court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. The question before the Supreme Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(2), removing habeas corpus jurisdiction as to some alien removal cases, violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution as applied to an excludable alien apprehended immediately after illegal entry. CJLF joined the case to argue that
Thuraissigiam is not a holder of the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus because his only connection with the United States was stepping a few yards inside of the border. Because he is not a holder of the privilege, he has no rights under the Suspension Clause. The Supreme Court upheld the statute. The majority decided that because petitions such as Thuraissigiam's are not about entitlement to release they do not fall within the core right protected by the Suspension Clause, and Congress can decide whether to provide judicial review of DHS's decision. A concurring opinion adopted a version of CJLF's argument in part, indicating that persons with minimal connection to the country are not entitled to the full protection afforded citizens and permanent residents. |
Mathena v. Malvo
No. 18-217
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 2/26/2020
Juveniles: Life without parole
Draw |
U.S. Supreme Court case involving one of the notorious D.C. sniper’s claims that the four life without the possibility of parole sentences imposed upon him in Virginia as a teenager were unconstitutional and must be overturned. In the fall of 2002, 17-year-old Lee Boyd Malvo and his adult accomplice, John Muhammad, embarked upon a weeks long sniper shooting crime spree that terrorized the Washington D.C. metropolitan area. Over a 20-day period, the pair randomly hunted down and killed 12 unsuspecting victims as they stood in parking lots, pumped gas, or innocently walked down the street. Malvo was charged as an adult and subsequently convicted of four counts of capital murder for the Virginia slayings. He was sentenced to four terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. After Malvo’s convictions became final, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases involving the constitutionality of juvenile sentencing practices. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the automatic imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. The sentencing court must provide the juvenile with the opportunity to present mitigating evidence of “youth and attendant characteristics” that may justify a lesser sentence. Montgomery v. Louisiana later held that Miller applies to cases retroactively. Malvo argues that because he never received a proceeding in which mitigating evidence of his youth was considered, his sentences must be reversed. CJLF joined the case to argue that Miller’s holding is limited to sentencing schemes that mandate life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Under Virginia law, the trial court had the discretion to order a lesser sentence for Malvo. State court judgments should not be reopened when a state’s sentencing scheme at the time of sentencing gave the trial court the opportunity to impose a less severe sentence. While the appeal was pending, the Virginia Legislature enacted a law making juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison eligible for parole after serving 20 years of their sentence. The new law rendered the case against Malvo moot. Because of the new law, counsel for both sides filed a Rule 46.1 Stipulation of Dismissal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. |
Hernández v. Mesa
No. 17-1678
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 2/25/2020
Civil rights suits: Bivens extraterritoriality
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a lawsuit arising from the cross-border shooting of a Mexican citizen by a U.S. Border Patrol Agent. The family of Sergio Hernández, a juvenile with no ties to the U.S. who was likely participating in an illegal alien smuggling operation, seek to force an agent of the Border Patrol into litigation over an incident that had already been investigated by the Department of Justice and found to be a use of force consistent with the policy and training of his agency. Congress has not created a remedy for cross-border shootings by federal officials. The question before the Court is whether it should invent a remedy where Congress has not. In 2017, CJLF filed a brief in this case (No. 15-118) arguing that the judicial branch should not step in, but rather should leave the matter to Congress. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to decide the issue under new precedent (Ziglar v. Abbasi, No. 15-1358) that was decided earlier in the term. On remand, the Fifth Circuit refused to fashion a new remedy and affirmed the District Court's dismissal of all claims against the Border Patrol agent. CJLF joined the case again to argue that Congress, not the judiciary, is the proper branch to decide if noncitizens can recover for torts committed by federal law enforcement officers causing damage in a foreign country. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. |
McKinney v. Arizona
No. 18-1109
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 2/25/2020
Death penalty: Apprendi and weighing
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court case reviewing the death sentence of a serial robber and double murderer. The case involves an issue of how a state court can repair a problem in a capital sentence that had been found by a narrowly divided federal court. After the Ninth Circuit held 6-5 that the state courts had not fully considered James McKinney's mitigating evidence when weighing it against the properly found aggravating factors, the Arizona Supreme Court reweighed the evidence itself and affirmed McKinney's death sentence. McKinney claims that once the proceedings were reopened his case was no longer "final," Supreme Court precedents established after his initial appeal now fully apply, and he is entitled to a full resentencing before a jury. CJLF argues that regardless of whether the new decisions apply, McKinney is not entitled to full resentencing. The new cases only entitle a defendant to have a jury make the finding of an aggravating circumstance needed to make him eligible for the death penalty. Other, long-established Supreme Court precedents which have not been overturned permit the Arizona Supreme Court to repair and reinstate a death sentence by reweighing in the manner that it did. The Supreme Court agreed and upheld the sentence. |
Ellis v. Harrison
No. 19-70232
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: 1/15/2020
Counsel: Prejudiced lawyer
Draw |
U.S. Court of Appeals case asking whether a murderer’s conviction should be overturned many years after the crime merely because his lawyer held prejudiced attitudes, without any showing that the lawyer did not provide good representation or that the defendant’s rights were prejudiced. After the California Attorney General switched sides and supported the murderer on this point, the Court of Appeals invited CJLF to brief the issue in support of affirming the judgment. However, on January 15, 2020, the court disposed of the case in a two-paragraph order without resolving the legal issue presented. The court decided that the Attorney General’s change of position alone was sufficient to reverse the decision of the district court. Although this decision is contrary to long-established practice, only the Attorney General can ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review it, and he has not done so. |
People v. Arredondo
No. 19-161
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 12/16/20
Confrontation Clause: Victim view blocked
Draw |
California Supreme Court case in which the defendant was convicted of 14 sex offenses against four young girls, three of which were his stepdaughters. The eldest of the three stepdaughters had been repeatedly sexually molested by the defendant from age 8 to age 16. At the time of trial, she was 18 years old and in the 11th grade of high school. When she was called to the witness stand to testify against the defendant, she was extremely emotionally distraught. A small computer monitor that is normally affixed to the witness stand was slightly elevated so that it blocked her view of the defendant. The minor modification to the witness stand eased her emotions and enabled her to testify without further incident. The defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated because he could not see the witness "face to face" as she testified in his presence. CJLF filed a brief to argue that the state has a compelling interest in protecting crime victims of all ages and that easing a physically present victim witness's anxiety with a minor modification to the witness box has little impact on a defendant's confrontation rights. The California Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that an accommodation can never be made for an emotionally traumatized sexually abused witness. The trial court can make findings on the record that a victim of sexual abuse needs an alternate procedure for testifying or needs modifications made in the courtroom to prevent him or her from having to directly face his or her abuser. Because the record was insufficient in this case to support the modification made by the trial court, the court reversed three of the defendant’s convictions pertaining to the eldest victim, and it affirmed the remainder. |
Johnson v. Ferguson
No. 16-1697
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/17/19
Search & seizure: Seizure
Win |
Federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case to review lower court decisions that would allow Dorian Johnson, the 22-year-old companion of Michael Brown, to sue
the city and Officer Darren Wilson for violating his rights. In August 2014, Officer Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown, who had just robbed a convenience store when
Officer Wilson saw the pair walking down the middle of a street in Ferguson,
Missouri. Johnson claims that when Officer Wilson ordered them to the sidewalk,
he had unlawfully seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although both
federal and grand jury investigations of the incident found that Johnson had lied
about the events leading up to the shooting and the shooting itself, motions to
dismiss the lawsuit have been rejected by the federal district court and a divided
Eighth Circuit panel. When the circuit agreed to reconsider the panel's ruling en
banc, CJLF joined the case on behalf of the National Police Association arguing that
by Johnson's own admission he was not ordered to stop or prevented from leaving,
which he did when he eventually ran. Citing its 1991 U. S. Supreme Court victory
in California v. Hodari D., CJLF argued that the facts Johnson
describes, of his encounter in the middle of the street with Officer Wilson, do not
constitute a seizure. Because of this, the lawsuit should be dismissed. The Court of Appeals agreed. |
Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill
No. 18-281
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 6/17/19
Jurisdiction: Standing to appeal
Loss |
U. S. Supreme Court case involving the question of who has standing to appeal a decision blocking enforcement of a state law when the governor of the state chooses not to appeal. The case involves a reapportionment battle, but the question of standing comes up often in cases where CJLF is representing the rights of victims of crime. In some cases, a governor who does not want to enforce a law he disagrees with has blocked that law simply by "taking a dive" in litigation brought by a third party. In this case, CJLF argued that allowing the governor alone to decide whether a federal court injunction against enforcement of a law violates the important state interest in its constitutional separation of powers. Our brief urges that the standing requirement be interpreted widely enough to ensure that such decisions can be reviewed at higher levels of the federal court system. The Supreme Court held that the House of Delegates did not have standing, but its ruling was narrow enough that it is not likely to damage the cause of remedies for crime victims. |
Nielsen v. Preap
No. 16-1363
United States Supreme Court
Decided: 3/19/19
Immigration: Detention of felons
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the detention of aliens who have committed aggravated felonies. Federal law says that certain categories of aliens, including those who have committed "aggravated felonies," must be arrested by federal immigration authorities upon their release from prison or jail and held pending deportation. Aliens subject to this law sued the Secretary of Homeland Security, claiming that the detention provision only applied to those who actually were arrested immediately upon release from state custody. Those who avoided federal arrest for any reason (such as a "sanctuary" law that prevents the federal government from knowing when they will be released) are exempt, they claimed. CJLF filed a "friend of the court" brief to oppose this illogical misinterpretation of the law. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed a contrary decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. |
Hernandez v. Chappell
No. 11-99013
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: 1/14/19
Counsel: Standard for prejudice
Win |
U.S. Court of Appeals case involving a California murderer who committed horrible sex crimes against a young woman and a teenage girl and murdered them both. The verdict of guilt was affirmed on appeal, on state habeas corpus, and by a federal district judge on federal habeas corpus, but then a three-judge panel of the court of appeals reversed in a decision that was supposedly two-to-one, even though one of the two judges in the majority had died before the final decision. The “majority” held that defense counsel had been ineffective in not raising a diminished capacity defense, contrary to decision of every judge who previously looked at the case. CJLF filed a brief in support of the state’s petition for rehearing, arguing that the "majority" had applied the wrong standard for judging whether a lawyer’s decision undermines confidence in the result. The petition was granted, and the case will be reheard by three living judges. |
San Francisco v. Trump /
Santa Clara v. Trump
Nos. 17-17478, 17-17480
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: 8/1/18
Separation of powers: Sanctuary executive order
Loss |
On January 25, 2017, the President directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to withhold government grants from jurisdictions that refuse to comply with a federal law regarding the immigration status of jail inmates. The order was expressly limited "to the extent consistent with law," and the Department of Justice subsequently issued an interpretation that the limitation was restricted to law enforcement grants conditioned on certifying compliance with federal law, consistent with the interpretation of the law governing those programs issued during the Obama Administration. Despite this, a federal district judge interpreted the order to cover all federal grants and then declared the order with this bloated interpretation to be unconstitutional. CJLF entered the case to argue that this interpretation is contrary to well-established principles. The Department of Justice interpretation is correct, and as so interpreted the order is unquestionably valid. On August 1, 2018, a three-judge panel split 2-1 in favor of San Francisco's and Santa Clara's position. We expect the federal government to seek further review in this case, either from the full court of appeals or the Supreme Court, and we will file additional argument as needed. |
United States v. California
No. 2:18-CV-00490-JAM-KJN
U. S. District Court
Decided: 7/5/18
Immigration: Employer Cooperation
Win |
U.S. District Court case in which the federal government challenges a package of three "sanctuary bills" passed by the California Legislature to hinder enforcement of federal immigration law. CJLF filed a brief supporting the federal government’s challenge to one of the three bills—the one that penalizes employers for cooperating with federal law enforcement. The District Court struck down this law while upholding the other two. Both sides will likely appeal.. |
People v. Farwell
No. S231009
California Supreme Court
Decided: 6/21/18
Guilty pleas: Boykin/Tahl
Win |
California Supreme Court case involving a habitual felon’s claim that his conviction of driving without a license should be overturned because the judge failed to instruct him that admitting his guilt to that offense would waive some of his constitutional trial rights. Randolph Farwell was convicted of vehicular manslaughter after his reckless driving resulted in his car hitting a tree at high speed, killing a female passenger. At the time of the crash, Farwell’s license had been suspended after an earlier reckless driving arrest. Farwell also had a previous conviction for burglary. At trial, Farwell and his attorney agreed to admit guilt on the suspended license charge to prevent jurors from hearing the details of the earlier driving arrest. On appeal, Farwell argued that the law required his conviction to be overturned because the judge did not instruct him on the consequences of his admission of guilt. CJLF joined the case to oppose Farwell’s claim, arguing that the law actually allows a review of the entire trial court record to determine if he knowingly and intelligently waived his trial rights when he admitted guilt on the driving without a license charge. The applicable test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived certain trial rights. This test is applicable to all cases in which a trial court fails, either partially or completely, to advise a defendant of these rights. A reviewing court can look at the entire record, not just the record at the time of the plea or stipulation, to determine if a defendant’s waiver was voluntarily and intelligently given. The California Supreme Court agreed with our position. |
Hays v. Vogt
No. 16-1495
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 5/29/18
Self-incrimination: Fruits
Draw |
U. S. Supreme Court case involving a civil lawsuit filed by a police officer against his former employer for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Matthew Vogt was employed by the City of Hays Police Department. While interviewing for a new job with the City of Haysville Police Department, Vogt disclosed that he had kept a knife he acquired during an investigation while working as a Hays officer. During a subsequent investigation, Vogt was required to report on the circumstances of this incident. Later, Haysville withdrew its job offer and Vogt was charged with two felony counts relating to the knife. Vogt’s statements and the evidence collected were introduced as evidence at a probable cause hearing. Due to a lack of probable cause, the trial court dismissed the two felony counts. Vogt then filed a civil suit against Hays alleging that his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination was violated when his statements about the knife and the evidence collected were introduced against him at the probable cause hearing. The district curt granted Hays’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Vogt did not establish a valid Fifth Amendment claim. The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, holding that a probable cause hearing is part of a “criminal case” as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination has been interpreted more broadly than the words of the amendment provide. Neither the use of Vogt's statements to locate additional evidence about the knife, nor the introduction of that derived evidence in the probable cause hearing violated the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court decided it should not have taken this case up at all and dismissed it. The issues will have to be decided in another case. At oral argument it became apparent that other problems in the case muddied the issues, and on May 29, 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the case "as improvidently granted." We will brief the issue again in another, appropriate case, when the high court takes it up again. |
Sims v. CDCR
No. CIV1004019
Superior Court, Co. of Marin
Decided: 3/28/18
Death penalty: Security protocol
Win |
Superior Court case to remove the state-court injunction against executions that has been in place since 2012. In 2008, a California Court of Appeal held execution protocols needed to be established through the cumbersome regulation-creating mechanism of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), even though they never needed to before. In 2012, after the CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation attempted to comply with the APA, the Marin County Superior Court held that CDCR had not met all the requirements and enjoined any further executions in California. Proposition 66, passed by the voters in the November 2016 election, eliminated the legal basis for this injunction by exempting execution protocols from the APA. The California Supreme Court delayed its effective date for a year. Three months later, after CDCR still had not moved to lift the injunction, CJLF made the motion on behalf of Kermit Alexander, a family member of murder victims and the proponent of Proposition 66. On April 9, 2018, the court agreed with CJLF's argument and lifted the injunction. The plaintiffs did not appeal. |
People v. Cervantes
No. S241323
California Supreme Court
Decided: 2/28/18
Juveniles: Retroactivity of Prop. 57
Loss |
California Supreme Court case to review whether Proposition 57 applies retroactively to juvenile cases that had been directly filed in adult court prior to it being passed in the November 2016 election. Alexander Cervantes was 14 years old when he committed horrific sex crimes against a 13-year-old girl. He was directly charged as an adult and convicted by a jury on all charged substantive offenses. During the pendency of Cervantes’ appeal, California voters passed Proposition 57, which eliminated the statutes that required or permitted prosecutors to directly file charges against a minor in adult court. A California Court of Appeal found that Cervantes’ attorney had been ineffective at trial and partially reversed the judgment and remanded the case for retrial. The Court of Appeal further held that Proposition 57 gives Cervantes the ability to have his case retried in juvenile court. CJLF joined the case to argue that Proposition 57 only applies prospectively. Because Cervantes’ case was lawfully initiated in adult criminal court all proceedings from that point occurred as if he were an adult and it must remain in that court on remand for retrial and re-sentencing. On February 1, 2018, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Lara in which it held that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to all nonfinal cases. Because Cervantes' case was still pending when Proposition 57 passed, Lara dictates that it is applicable to his case. As a result, the court dismissed the matter and remanded it to the Court of Appeal. |
Trump v. IRAP
No. 16-1540
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 10/10/17
Border security: Mootness
Win |
President Trump issued an executive order providing for a 90-day ban on travel from
six specified countries by persons without a prior connection with the United States.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld an injunction against this
provision. Based on campaign statements and other external materials, the Court
said it was actually a “Muslim ban” even though 90% of the world’s Muslims are
unaffected by it. The 90 days will be up by the time the Supreme Court hears
argument in the case. Therefore, it will not be a “case” that the courts have power
to decide. CJLF filed a brief arguing that the case will become moot upon
expiration of the 90 days. Under long-established precedent, the case should be
dismissed, eliminating the Fourth Circuit’s decision as precedent. The Supreme
Court agreed. |
Briggs v. Brown
No. S238309
California Supreme Court
Decided: 8/24/17
Death penalty:
Validity of Prop. 66
Win |
California Supreme Court case challenging the validity of the major reform of the
state's system for reviewing death penalty cases approved by the voters in the
November 2016 election. In that election, California voters rejected a proposition
to repeal the death penalty and simultaneously approved a reform measure. Two
advocates on the losing side of the vote, John Van de Kamp and Ron Briggs,
promptly filed a lawsuit to overturn the voters' decision. They claim the measure
is invalid as embracing more than one subject, even though it is entirely about
capital cases. They also attack the reforms that put limits on the number of times a
judgment can be challenged, tightening the limit on how long a murderer has to file
a challenge, and setting a five-year standard for the California courts to complete
their review. CJLF argued the case in the California Supreme Court on behalf of
the Yes on 66 campaign committee, which has intervened to defend the initiative.
The court rejected every one of the challengers’ many arguments and upheld
the initiative. |
Davila v. Davis
No. 16-6219
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 6/26/17
Habeas corpus: Procedural default & ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court case in which a double murderer attempts to raise new challenges
to his sentence long after the proper time for doing so by accusing the previous
lawyers of ineffective assistance. In 2008, Erick Davila sprayed bullets at a
child's birthday party in an attempt to kill rival gang members. The group
assembled on the porch of the Houston home was mostly women and children having
cake and ice cream for the birthday, though the father of one of the children was
also there and being targeted by Davila. In this assault, Davila wounded three
girls and one woman, and he killed Annette Stevenson and her five-year-old
granddaughter. After Davila's case had been heard and decided on direct appeal and
in a state habeas corpus proceeding, he went to federal court with a habeas
corpus petition. There, he wanted to raise a new issue relating to the jury
instruction regarding how many people he needed to have intended to kill in order
to be guilty of capital murder rather than just murder. His lawyer had not raised
the issue on appeal (probably because she considered it a weak claim), and this
would normally block the issue from the federal courts as well. Davila claimed
that the appeal lawyer was ineffective for not raising it. His lawyer in state
habeas corpus had not claimed ineffective assistance of the appeal lawyer, so
this claim also could not normally be raised in a subsequent review of the case.
So Davila claims the habeas corpus lawyer was ineffective also. The federal
district court held that the claim was barred and, in addition, that it was
without merit even if it could be considered. In the Supreme Court, CJLF argued
that there needs to be an end to this chain of reopening decided cases by attacking
the competence of all the prior lawyers. The high court agreed and affirmed the
judgment. |
Hernández v. Mesa
No. 15-118
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 6/26/17
Civil rights suits: Bivens extraterritoriality
Draw |
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a lawsuit arising from the shooting of a
Mexican citizen by a U.S. Border Patrol agent. Sergio Hernández was a juvenile
with two prior arrests for alien smuggling when he and other teenagers confronted
Agent Jesus Mesa. The facts are disputed. Hernández's parents claim the boys
were merely playing a game where they run across the border and touch the fence.
Agent Mesa contends that he was stopping a smuggling operation when he was attacked
by multiple people throwing rocks. Agent Mesa fired his weapon and killed
Hernández, who was across the border in Mexico at the time. There are many acts
of Congress that establish remedies for people who claim to have been illegally
injured by government agents, but none of them apply in the case of a person who
is not a citizen or resident of this country and was injured outside the nation's
borders. The question is whether the courts should invent a remedy where Congress
has not. CJLF argued that in a case such as this involving relations between the
United States and another country, the judicial branch should not step in but should
leave the matter to Congress. The Supreme Court decided another case in the same
term consistently with CJLF’s position and sent this case back to the Court of
Appeals for a decision under the new precedent. |
Weaver v. Massachusetts
No. 16-240
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 6/22/17
Counsel: Structural error
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a Massachusetts murderer's claim that his
conviction must be reversed because his attorney did not bring to the trial court's
attention a trivial error that had no affect on the fairness or reliability of the
trial as a whole. In August 2003, Kentel Myrone Weaver was arrested and charged with
the murder of 15-year old Germaine Rucker. During jury selection, approximately 90
potential jurors made the courtroom very crowded, thus allowing for standing room
only. Due to the crowded conditions, a court officer informed Weaver's mother and
those accompanying her that the courtroom was closed for jury selection. They were
denied entry on the second day of empanelment for the same reason. Weaver's trial
attorney did not object to the closure. Weaver was convicted of first-degree murder
in 2006. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. Weaver argued that his attorney's failure to object to the
courtroom closure during jury empanelment violated his 6th Amendment right to a
public trial. The trial court denied the motion finding that even though his
attorney's failure to object constituted deficient performance it was not
prejudicial to Weaver. On appeal, Weaver argues that because his right to a public
trial was erroneously denied, U.S. Supreme Court precedent deems it a "structural
error" and prejudice to him is presumed. Because prejudice is presumed in that
context, he argues that he does not need to prove prejudice when claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel because it should also be presumed in that context as well.
CJLF joined the case to argue that there are two separate rights at issue in this
case—the right to a public trial and the right to effective assistance of
counsel. When a trial attorney inadvertently fails to object to a "structural
error," like the right to a public trial, it does not automatically relieve a
defendant from proving prejudice. Prejudice is an element of a defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. CJLF also argued that under a "plain
error" analysis, courts are permitted to remedy an error if not doing so would
result in a miscarriage of justice. Because the trial attorney's failure to object
to the closure during jury selection only did not affect the fairness or reliability
of the proceedings as a whole, overturning Weaver's sentence would undermine
the public's trust in the criminal justice system. The Supreme Court agreed
with our position. |
Moore v. Texas
No. 15-797
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 3/28/2017
Death penalty: Retardation
Loss |
U. S. Supreme Court case U. S. Supreme Court case to review a Texas murderer’s
claim that he is too mentally retarded to be eligible for the death penalty.
Bobby James Moore was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1980 shotgun
murder of 78-year-old James McCarble during the robbery of a grocery store in
Houston. Eyewitnesses testified to seeing Moore shoot the elderly man in the
head even though he had his hands up. After more than three decades of failed
appeals, Moore now claims that the state’s rules governing the evaluation of
mental disability in death penalty cases are unconstitutional, and should comply
with the ever-changing standards announced by private associations. When the
Supreme Court agreed to hear Moore’s claim, CJLF joined the case to argue that
allowing private organizations with political agendas to control how states
determine if murderers are mentally retarded would throw every state’s process
for determining a defendant’s mental competence into turmoil and invite endless
litigation over the sentencing of guilty and fully competent murderers such as
Moore. The Court ruled that the standard used by Texas was inappropriate and
reversed, but it did not go so far as to mandate use of privately determined
standards. |
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado
No. 15-606
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 3/6/2017
Jury: Juror testimony
Loss |
U. S. Supreme Court case involving a long-standing rule of evidence that protects
the secrecy of jury deliberations versus a criminal defendant’s constitutional right
to an impartial jury. In May 2007, Miguel Peña-Rodriguez was arrested and charged
with attempted sexual assault on a child, unlawful sexual contact, and harassment
after an encounter with two teenage sisters in a bathroom where their father was
employed. A three-day trial ensued. After entry of a guilty verdict, two jurors
spoke with defense counsel alleging that a fellow juror made racially biased
statements during deliberations. Peña-Rodriguez submitted affidavits from the
two jurors and moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, finding
that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) barred any inquiry into jury deliberations.
The Colorado Court of Appeals and Colorado Supreme Court both affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
CJLF joined the case to argue that preserving the secrecy of jury deliberations
is consistent with the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and
that allowing litigants to peek into the jury room under the guise of determining
whether racial bias played a role in the decision-making process is contrary to
Congressional intent and U. S. Supreme Court precedent. CJLF also argued that
protecting the confidentiality of jury deliberations is fundamental to the
uninhibited and forthright discussion that must occur for a jury to wholly focus
on reaching the right result. The court created a narrow exception for racial bias
claims and reversed the judgment, but it otherwise left the confidentiality rule
in place. |
Beylund v. Levi
No. 14-1507
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 6/23/16
Search & seizure:
DUI implied consent
Win |
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding North Dakota’s implied consent law, which
allows the state to suspend the driver’s license of any intoxicated driving suspect
who refuses to submit to a breath test. The case involved the 2013 arrest of
Michael Beylund on suspicion of drunk driving. Because Beylund was uncooperative
with police and failed to provide an adequate breath sample he was arrested and
taken to a hospital. After he was advised that, under the state’s implied consent
law, his refusal to be tested would result in suspension of his driver’s license,
he agreed to be tested. The test showed a blood alcohol level of over three times
the legal limit. On appeal, Beylund argued that the state’s implied consent law
subjected him to an unconstitutional search. After two state courts rejected his
claim,
the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to consider it. CJLF joined the case to argue that
the challenged law is a reasonable tool used in all 50 states to keep intoxicated
drivers off the road, and that the privilege to drive is conditioned upon
the licensee’s agreement to consent to testing to protect the public from drunk
drivers. The Supreme Court agreed. |
Utah v. Strieff
No. 14-1373
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 6/20/16
Search & seizure:
Exclusionary rule
Win |
A U.S. Supreme Court case considering whether valid evidence of crime obtained
in a search incident to a valid arrest must be suppressed because of a good-faith
mistake by a police officer making an investigatory stop leading up to the arrest.
A narcotics detective conducting surveillance of a suspected drug operation
suspected that Strieff was involved and stopped him briefly in a convenience store
parking lot. When he learned Strieff's identity and discovered there was an
outstanding warrant for his arrest, he arrested Strieff. A legal search incident
to arrest discovered evidence of drug dealing. The prosecutor conceded that the
evidence the detective had to suspect Strieff before the initial stop was not
quite sufficient to meet the required threshold of "reasonable suspicion" for such
a stop. The state court of appeals held that the outstanding arrest warrant and
the legal arrest on that warrant were intervening factors sufficient to make the
evidence admissible. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. CJLF has filed
a brief asking the Supreme Court to go beyond the narrow question presented and
examine the more fundamental question of whether a good-faith mistake by an officer
who genuinely and reasonably believed he was making a valid stop should require
the drastic remedy of excluding valid evidence of crime. |
Johnson v. Lee
No. 15-789
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 5/31/16
Habeas corpus: Adequate State Grounds
Win |
A U. S. Supreme Court case regarding whether a double murderer can reopen challenges
to her convictions after they have been properly dismissed by the state courts.
On Mother's Day 1995, Donna Lee and Paul Carasi murdered Carasi's mother, Doris
Carasi, and Sonia Salinas, who was Carasi's previous girlfriend and the mother of
his child. The California Court of Appeal considered and rejected the claims that
Lee raised on appeal. In a second review of the case, called habeas corpus, the
state courts properly refused to consider claims that Lee could have raised in the
initial appeal, but did not. Nearly all states and the federal courts have similar
Procedural default" rules. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reopened these weak claims, requiring a new round of litigation, by declaring
California's rule "inadequate" merely because its courts do not mechanically apply
in every instance, but sometimes deny claims on the merits instead. CJLF has filed
a brief asking the U. S. Supreme Court to review this decision. In a system of
limited resources and long delays, scarce resources should not be spent routinely
relitigating defaulted claims in final cases. Such reopening should be limited to
cases with strong claims of actual innocence. |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
No. 14-280
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 1/25/16
Habeas corpus: Retroactivity
of Miller
Loss |
A U.S. Supreme Court ruling announcing that the Court's 2012 decision in the Miller v. Alabama ruling applies retroactively. The 2012 ruling
announced that laws providing a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for juvenile
murderers whose crimes would carry a death sentence if they were adults was
unconstitutional, but the Court did not apply the law to older cases. CJLF joined
the case to argue that the Court's ruling announced a change in procedure rather than
substance and that the petitioner received a fair trial and was properly sentenced
for his crime in 1963. |
HCRC v. Dept. of Justice
No. 14-16928
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: 3/23/16
Habeas corpus: Capital fast track
Win |
A unanimous U. S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision overturning a 2013
order by District Judge Claudia Wilken. That order had blocked the fast-track
process for federal appeals of state death penalty cases enacted by Congress and
signed into law by President Clinton in 1996. The judge's ruling was based upon
the claim of a group of government-paid defense attorneys that the process would
work a hardship on them. Efforts by the states of Texas and Arizona to be approved
for the fast-track process were stopped by Judge Wilken's ruling. When the U. S.
Justice Department appealed that ruling, CJLF joined the case on behalf of two family
members of murder victims, Marc Klaas of California and Edward Hardesty of Arizona.
CJLF argued that the defense attorneys did not have a legal right (standing) to
challenge the law and that it was not appropriate for the district court to review
any challenge at this time. The Ninth Circuit opinion used argument and research
introduced by the Foundation to overturn the ruling and dismiss the lawsuit. |
Kanasa v. Carr/Gleason
Nos. 14-449, 14-450, 14-452
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 1/20/16
Death penalty: Jury instructions
Win |
A U.S. Supreme Court case reversing a decision by the Kansas Supreme Court that
had thrown out a standard instruction for juries in capital cases. The Carr
brothers engaged in a crime spree that started with a carjacking and battery,
continued with another robbery and murder, and culminated in a horrible crime
of home invasion robbery, sadistic sex crimes, and the cold-blooded murder of
five of the victims and attempted murder of the sixth. In the separate Gleason
case, Gleason committed a robbery and then murdered an accomplice and her
boyfriend to keep them quiet. The juries in both cases were instructed,
correctly under Kansas law, that aggravating circumstances had to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, but they were not instructed on any burden of proof
for mitigating circumstances submitted to them by the defendants. The Kansas
Supreme Court, in an exercise in strained logic, decided that the jury might
assume that the mitigating circumstances also had to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt if not expressly told otherwise. CJLF joined the case to argue
that the instructions were proper. The National District Attorneys Association
and the California District Attorneys Association joined the brief.
The United States Supreme Court agreed by an 8-1 vote and reversed the decision,
reinstating the death sentences. |
Connecticut v. Santiago
No. SC17413
Connecticut Supreme Court
Decided: 8/25/15
Death penalty: Prospective-only repeal
Loss |
Divided Connecticut Supreme Court ruling announcing that an April 2012 law, which
prospectively abolished the death penalty but allowed the execution of murderers
currently on the state's death row, violates the state constitution. The court's
four-judge majority accepted condemned murderer Eduardo Santiago's claim that by
abolishing future executions, the Legislature affirmed that capital punishment
serves no penological interest and should therefore apply retroactively. CJLF was
asked to join the case by Dr. William Petit, who survived a brutal 2007 home
invasion robbery that resulted in the sexual assault and murder of his wife and two
daughters. The two habitual felons convicted of these crimes were sentenced to
death prior to the law's enactment. CJLF argued that applying a law retroactively
would violate the Legislature's constitutional authority to determine the scope
of the laws it enacts. |
Jones v. Davis
No. 14-56373
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: 11/12/15
Death penalty: Delays
Win |
Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision overturning a federal judge's 2014
ruling, which voided the death sentence of rapist/murderer Ernest Dewayne Jones
because delays in enforcing the law in California meant that executing murderers
"will serve no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be arbitrary." Jones was
convicted and sentenced to death for the 1992 rape and murder of his girlfriend's
mother. Substantial evidence, including a DNA match of his sperm in the victim's
body, confirmed his guilt. Jones had been convicted of raping another woman six
years earlier. CJLF had joined the appeal of the judge's ruling to argue that
much of the delay in death penalty cases is the result of repeated and lengthy
reviews by the federal courts and cannot be blamed on the state. Also, the
judge's ruling created a new rule of law on habeas corpus, which violates U. S.
Supreme Court precedent (won by CJLF). |
Glossip v. Gross
No. 14-7955
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided: 6/29/2015
Death penalty: Lethal injection
Win |
A 5-4 U. S. Supreme Court decision to reject the claim of three condemned murderers
that Oklahoma’s execution process is unconstitutional because it might cause pain.
One of the murderers in this case hired a contract killer to beat a man to death
with a baseball bat. Another bent his 9-month-old daughter backwards, killing her
because her crying interrupted his video game. The third stabbed a female food
service supervisor to death while he was serving a 130-year prison sentence for
multiple armed robberies. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Constitution does
not guarantee a pain-free execution, but lethal injection only requires a level of
anesthesia to prevent extreme pain. The Foundation also argued that when murderers
challenge an execution method as unconstitutional they are required to present an
alternative method that does comply with the Constitution. The Court’s decision
adopted both of these points. |
Ohio v. Clark
No. 13-1352
U. S. Supreme Court
Decided date: 6/18/2015
Evidence: Child statement
Win |
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision to reinstate an Ohio child abuser’s
conviction. The Ohio Supreme Court had held that allowing the teachers who
discovered the victim’s injuries to testify about what the child told them violated
the criminal’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. The
case involved the 2010 conviction of Darius Clark for the beating of his
girlfriend’s three-year-old son and two-year-old daughter. When preschool teachers
noticed bruises on the little boy’s face, they asked him who hurt him. When he
responded that Clark had hit him, they reported the incident to child protective
services who located the boy and his sister and took them to a hospital where
other injuries to both children were discovered. On appeal, Clark won a decision
announcing that the testimony of the teachers at this trial was unconstitutional.
When the state appealed that ruling, CJLF joined the case to argue that a statement
made to a first responder, whether a policeman or someone else, is not the same as a
statement taken by an investigator building a case against a known suspect. The
statement to the investigator is “testimonial” as that term is used by the Supreme
Court, and the statement to the first responder, or in this case, a teacher, is
not. The Supreme Court’s decision agreed. |
Elonis v. United States
No. 13-983
United States Supreme Court
Decided date: 6/1/15
First Amendment: Threats
Draw |
U. S. Supreme Court ruling overturning the conviction of a Pennsylvania man
who posted threats on Facebook to brutally murder his estranged wife and a female
FBI agent. In 2010, after his wife left him, and he was fired from his job for
sexually harassing a female employee, Anthony Elonis began posting threats to
murder his wife on his Facebook page, including a statement that he would not stop
until “your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.”
After Elonis refused an interview with a female FBI agent, he posted about slitting
her throat. Following his conviction in 2011 for transmitting threats, Elonis
appealed, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional because it was not proven
that he specifically intended to threaten his victims. CJLF joined the Supreme Court
review of the case to argue that, while there was no high court precedent on this
issue, nine of the eleven federal circuit courts have held that the transmission of
threats is a general intent crime, requiring only that a reasonable person would
recognize his statements as threats. The Court’s ruling held that the criminal
transmission of threats requires a state of mind somewhere above negligence. The
Court did not address whether recklessness would be sufficient, either under the
statute or the First Amendment. If it is, the law would be largely unchanged, as
a practical matter. Because the key issues remain undecided, we count this as a draw. |
Jennings v. Stephens
No. 13-7211
United States Supreme Court
Decided date: 1/14/15
Habeas corpus: Isues on appeal
Draw |
U. S. Supreme Court ruling allowing a condemned cop killer to raise on appeal an
allegation challenging his conviction on federal habeas corpus even though it had been
rejected by a lower court. The case involved the conviction of Robert Lee Jennings for murdering a Houston police officer during a 1988 robbery. After his conviction and
sentence had been upheld by the state’s highest court on direct appeal, Jennings raised allegations challenging the competence of his trial attorney before a federal district
court on habeas corpus. The court denied one of his allegations, but accepted others. When the federal appeals court refused to hear the denied allegation on appeal, the
Supreme Court agreed to review that holding. CJLF joined the case seeking a decision
requiring that all allegations included in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
be considered together as one claim on appeal, even if a lower court denies some of
them. A decision requiring this would have simplified and shortened the
post-conviction review of death penalty cases. In its ruling, the court chose not to
confront the "claim" issue, but allowed the defendant to raise his rejected allegation. |
Hall v. Florida
No. 12-10882
U. S. Supreme Court Court
Decision date: 5/27/14
Death penalty: Retardation
Loss |
U. S. Supreme Court decision announcing that, when determining the IQ of a murder defendant who claims he is ineligible for the death penalty because he is mentally retarded, states should not use a rigid cutoff score that does not account for a margin of error. The case involved a murderer’s claim that the IQ requirement for mental retardation should be expanded from a score of below 70 to a range of 67 to 75. In 1981, Freddie Lee Hall, and an accomplice, kidnapped a 21-year-old pregnant woman from a grocery store parking lot and drove her into the woods where she was raped, beaten, and shot to death. After two decades of appeals upholding Hall’s conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court decided in another case that executing the mentally retarded was unconstitutional. At that time, the Florida Legislature had already adopted a nationally accepted standard, which included an IQ below 70 to qualify. Hall, whose lowest admissible IQ score was 71, asked the Supreme Court to broaden the range to include him. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Hall’s appeal, CJLF accepted the Florida Attorney General’s request to join the case. CJLF argued that standards for mental retardation should be left up to the states. Otherwise, well-deserved sentences for clearly guilty murderers will be held up for years as these issues are endlessly reviewed. |
People v. Moffett
No. S206771
California Supreme Court
Decision date: 5/5/14
S206771
Draw |
California Supreme Court ruling that a California law, which allows murderers between the ages of 16 and 18 years old to be eligible for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), does not violate the U. S. Supreme Court’s June 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama. The case involves a criminal (a few days short of his 18th birthday) who committed an armed robbery along with an accomplice. During their attempted escape, the accomplice shot and killed a police officer. Andrew Moffett was convicted of the murder of Officer Larry Lasater, which is a death penalty offense for murderers over 18. Because of his age, he received a sentence of LWOP. During sentencing, the judge noted that she was exercising her discretion to give this sentence, rather than life with parole, due to the circumstances of the crime. While Moffett’s case was on appeal, the U. S. Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama, abolished mandatory LWOP for murderers under 18. The state Court of Appeal overturned Moffett’s sentence, announcing that it violated the “spirit” of Miller. When the California Supreme Court agreed to hear the state’s appeal, CJLF filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Officer Lasater’s wife, mother, and brother arguing to reinstate Moffett’s sentence. The brief noted that the Miller ruling bars mandatory LWOP for murderers under the age of 18, while California law gives judges sentencing discretion. The state Supreme Court agreed, but due to Miller’s expanded factors that must be considered at sentencing, Moffett’s case was sent back to the original trial judge for resentencing, and the judge resentenced Moffett to LWOP. |
White v. Woodall
No. 12-794
U. S. Supreme Court
Decision date: 4/23/14
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court decision to reversed a 2012 federal appeals court ruling that had improperly held the murderer's death sentence unconstitutional. Undisputed evidence, including a DNA match, proved that on the evening of January 25, 1997, Woodall kidnpapped high school cheerleader Sarah Hansen from a convenience store and took her to a nearby lake where he raped and beat her before slitting her throat. After Woodall pled guilty to the crimes, the sentencing jury heard testimony from 14 witnesses supporting a life sentence, but Woodall did not take the stand. Following his conviction and sentence, Woodall won a federal court ruling overturning his death sentence, announcing that the judge had violted his rights by failing to tell the jury to ignore his decision not to testify. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, CJLF accepted the Kentucky Attorney General's invitation to file argument. The Foundation argued that there is no Supreme Court precedent requiring a "no adverse inference" instruction at a sentencing hearing and, as such, the claim was properly denied by the state courts. The brief noted that the federal appeals court had exceeded its authority in order to void Woodall's sentence. The Supreme Court's decision overturning the lower court cited CJLF Legal Director Kent Scheidegger for providing the key argument. |
Kansas v. Cheever
No. 12-609
U. S. Supreme Court
Decision date: 12/11/13
Win |
Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision to overturn a Kansas court ruling, which held that the Constitution prohibited a prosecution expert from testifying in rebuttal to a cop killer's expert on a mental defense claim. In 2005, drug dealer Scott Cheever shot and killed a Kansas county sheriff who was serving an arrest warrant. Cheever shot at several other officers before he surrendreed. At trial, a pharmacist testified that Cheever was too high on drugs to have intended to kill the sheriff. Over Cheever's objection, the prosecution introduced an expert who testified that Cheever knew what he was doing on the day of the murder. The Kansas Supreme Court later overturned Cheever's conviction and death sentence, finding that, with the exception of a claim of mental illness, the Constitution did not allow a compelled examination by a prosecution expert to rebut defense experts on other mental defenses, such as intoxication. CJLF joined the state Attorney Generla's appeal to argue that the Kansas court's holding was not supported by the Constitution or any Supreme Court precedent. |
Cook v. FDA
No. 12-5176
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Decision date: 7/23/13
Win |
Unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which overturned a federal district judge's March 2012 ruling that ordered the FDA to confiscate existing stocks of the execution drug sodium thiopental from state departments of corrections. In a lawsuit brought by 25 condemned murderers facing execution in Arizona, California, and Tennessee, the District Court held that thte drug, which is widely used for executions, was illegally obtained from its foreign manufactuterer and had to be confiscated. On November 12, 2012, the Foundation filed an amicus curiae brief with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the district judge's order, which affects dozens of states who were not parties in the case, violates federal rules and the rights of affected states and ignores a fundamental requirement of due process. The court's opinion cited and thanked the CJLF for providing a key argument used in its decision. |
Salinas v. Texas
No. 12-246
United States Supreme Court
Decision date: 6/17/13
Win |
U.S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reject a Texas murderer's claim that his incriminating behavior during a voluntary interview with police should have been excluded from his trial. The case involved the 1992 shotgun murders of two brothers in Houston. After police learned that Genovevo Salinas may have been involved, they visisted his parents' home, where he also lived. During the visit, Salias's father turned over his shotgun to the police, and his son agreed to go to the police station for a voluntary interview. After an hour of answering questions, when asked if the shells found at the murder scene would match the shotgun, Salinas stared at the floor and would not answer. Testing later revealed that the shells were a match, and a witness came forward telling police that Salinas admitted to the murders. At trial, the jury leanred that Salinas had refused to answer the shotgun question. Following his conviction, Salinas appealed, arguing that informing the jury of his silence violated the Fifth Amendment. CJLF joined the Supreme Court review of this case to argue that a suspect's behavior during a voluntary interview is evidence which should not be kept from the jury. The court's 5-4 decision agreed. |
Trevino v. Thaler
No. 11-10189
United States Supreme Court
Decision date: 5/28/13
Loss |
Five to Four United States Supreme Court ruling expanding a criminal's ability to
extend court review by attacking his state-paid habeas corpus lawyer. In 1997, gang member Carlos Trevino was convicted and sentenced to death for the kidnap, gange rape, and murder of a 15-year-old Texas girl. After years of appeals of his conviction and sentence, including an attack on the competenceof his trial lawyer, Trevino's new lawyer came up with a different claim against the trial lawyer. When the Federal District Court dismissed the claim as defaulted, Trevino argued that a 2012 high court ruling creating a narrow exception tot the rule prohibiting incompetence claims against a defendant's habeas corpus lawyer should be expanded to accommodate his case. At the invitation of the Tecas Solicitor General, CJLF joined this case to argue that the exception Trevino wants would swallow the rule. The Court ruled to create the exception anyway, opening the door to years of unnecessary and expensive review to already lengthy death penalty cases. |
United States v. Chaidez |
2/23/13 |
Win |
Habeas Corpus: Retroactivity |
United States v. Chaidez:
U.S. Supreme Court case involving the use of a new rule to overturn convictions
entered years ago. Roselva Chaidez was convicted of fraud for her part in an
insurance scam, claiming injuries in an accident that never happened. Immigration
law requires aliens who commit frauds over $10,000 to be deported. Several years
later, she falsely claimed on a naturalization petition that she had never been
convicted of a crime, and the government began deportation proceedings. She now
claims her conviction should be overturned because her criminal defense lawyer
did not advise her of the immigration consequences of a plea, even though that
was not a ground for overturning a plea at the time and even though she made no
claim she did not commit the offense. In 2010, the Supreme Court
created a new rule of law allowing guilty pleas to be attacked on this basis.
The case threatens the
landmark precedent of Teague v. Lane, won by CJLF in 1989. That case held that
new rules of procedure cannot be used to go back and overturn convictions that
are already final. Without this rule, many thousands of final convictions would
be subject to overturning every time the Supreme Court alters the rules of
procedure, as it often does. CJLF entered the case to argue that the rule
against retroactivity strikes the correct balance and should be preserved. The
high court agreed and left the judgment intact. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
United States v. Alvarez |
6/28/12 |
Loss |
Fourth Amendment: Stolen Valor Act |
United States v. Alvarez:
U. S. Supreme Court case considering the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, a
law enacted by Congress to prohibit the false claiming of military medals. Xavier
Alvarez, a member of a California water district board, made numerous false claims
about his military record, including being awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
In fact, he has never served in the military. He was convicted under the Stolen Valor
Act and sentenced to probation, a fine, and community service. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction, finding that the
Stolen Valor Act violates the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. In
the Supreme Court, CJLF entered the case, filing a brief on behalf of the Legion of
Valor of the United States and itself. Our brief argues that the Act only prohibits
lies, not mistakes, parodies, or theatrical performances, and that lies are not
protected under the First Amendment. In a splintered decision, the Court decided
that the Act as presently drafted is not constitutional. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Lafler v. Cooper/Missouri v. Frye |
3/21/12 |
Loss |
Counsel: Plea bargains |
Lafler v. Cooper/Missouri v. Frye: Two U. S. Supreme
Court cases involving criminal defendants who claim that their convictions should be
overturned because they may have been convicted on lesser charges had their defense
attorneys not given them bad advice. In 2003 Anthony Cooper was charged with attempted
murder for shooting a woman causing serious injury. A police officer witnessed the
shooting. Prior to trial, the state offered Cooper a plea bargain carrying a shorter
sentence than if he were convicted on all charges. His attorney advised against the
deal. Cooper was later convicted by a jury and received the longer sentence. In 2007,
Galin Frye was charged with driving with a suspended license, a felony because of his
multiple prior convictions. Prior to trial, the prosecutor offered to allow Frye to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor and serve 90 days in jail. Frye’s attorney did not
report this offer to his client. Later, Frye pled guilty to the original felony charge
and received 3 years in prison. In Frye, the state appellate court ruled in favor of
the defendant. In Cooper, the state courts rejected the claim but a federal appellate
court overturned the judgment. CJLF has joined the high court review of these cases
to argue that, while a better attorney might have obtained a more favorable deal,
neither criminal was unjustly convicted, and neither is entitled to a second chance
for a better result. The Supreme Court allowed the claims to proceed but said that
the prisoners will not necessarily get their original plea offers back. The high
court left the remedy to the trial judge, who might reinstate the original plea offer
or reimpose the same sentence the defendants received before. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Martinez v. Ryan |
3/20/12 |
Draw |
Habeas corpus: Right to counsel |
Martinez v. Ryan: U. S. Supreme Court review of a
child molester’s claim that his conviction should be overturned because his
state-appointed appeals lawyer failed to attack the effectiveness of his trial attorney.
Luis Martinez was convicted of two incidents of sexual conduct with his 11-year-old
stepdaughter on a July morning in 1999. Evidence at trial included the victim’s
videotaped description of the assaults to a social worker and a DNA match of Martinez’s
semen on her nightgown. Following his conviction, Martinez’s claims challenging his
trial and sentencing were rejected by the state courts on direct appeal, and his
appointed lawyer reported that she could find no worthy claims to raise on state
collateral review. Later, represented by a different lawyer, Martinez claimed that
his appellate lawyer was ineffective because she did not find flaws in the performance
of his trial lawyer. This claim was reviewed and rejected by two state courts, the
federal district court and the court of appeals. When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
consider Martinez’s appeal, CJLF joined the case. CJLF argued there is no
constitutional right to a government paid lawyer for collateral review or habeas
corpus, and therefore no right to challenge the effectiveness of a lawyer appointed
for those types of post-conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court's decision retains
the rule we argued for as the general rule. However, it carved out a narrow exception
for states such as Arizona that do not allow ineffective assistance claims to be made
on direct appeal (the first review of a conviction). For these states, ineffective
assistance on the state collateral review will be considered "cause" to raise the
ineffectiveness as trial counsel on federal habeas corpus. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Maples v. Thomas |
1/18/12 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for default |
Maples v. Thomas: U. S. Supreme Court review of a
convicted Alabama murderer’s claim that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus review of
his case even though he missed the state deadline for requesting review. Cory Maples was
convicted on strong evidence of the 1995 execution-style murders of two acquaintances and
the theft of the car of one of the victims. In 1997 he was convicted on all charges and
sentenced to death. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the state court of
appeals and supreme court, attorneys from a New York law firm representing Maples pro
bono argued on state collateral review that his trial attorney had been ineffective.
Prior to the state court’s ruling denying these claims, the attorneys who had appeared
in the court quit the firm, and the firm failed to inform the court of the change of
attorneys. As a result, Maples did not receive notice of the ruling, and he missed the
state deadline for filing an appeal, which also prevented review of his claims on
federal habeas corpus.
CJLF has joined the case to argue that Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that
criminals are not entitled to counsel for state collateral review or federal habeas
corpus. While Maples pro bono lawyers certainly failed him, absent compelling evidence
that he is innocent, the post-conviction review of his case should be over. The Court
issued a narrow opinion holding that on the unusual facts of this case, the failings
of the lawyers constitute cause for the default. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Perry v. New Hampshire |
1/11/2012 |
Win |
Evidence: Eyewitness notification |
Perry v. New Hampshire: U. S. Supreme Court review
of a habitual thief's claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the
admission of eyewitness testimony in his trial for burglarizing a car. On August 15,
2008, at 2:53 a.m., Barion Perry was caught in the parking lot of an apartment building
carrying stereo equipment stolen from a nearby car. A woman, whose husband reported the
crime, identified Perry as the man she saw break into a car in the well-lit parking lot
and steal the equipment. Her husband also identified Perry as the man he had seen
wandering around the lot looking into parked cars. At trial, Perry challenged the
testimony of the woman arguing her identification of him was unreliable and therefore
violated the 14th Amendment (the Due Process Clause) of the Constitution. The judge
disagreed, the testimony was admitted, and Perry was convicted. Perry’s claims regarding
his identification by the witness were later rejected by the New Hampshire Supreme Court
on direct appeal. When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Perry’s appeal, CJLF
joined the case to argue that, except in cases of police misconduct, the Constitution
leaves rules governing the introduction of evidence to the states. A decision supporting
the thief would have allowed criminals to waste years and millions in tax dollars with
federal court challenges to eyewitnesses. The Supreme Court agreed with our position
and affirmed the conviction by an 8-1 vote. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Davis v. United States |
6/16/11 |
Win |
Search and seizure: Reliance of existing law |
Davis v. United States: U. S. Supreme Court decision
rejecting a criminal’s claim that his conviction as an ex-felon in possession of a
firearm was invalid because the police search that uncovered his gun violated the
Exclusionary Rule. The gun was found in Willie Gene Davis’s jacket pocket during
a search after a traffic stop. Davis had left his jacket in the car when police
asked him to step out. While the search was legal at the time, during Davis’s appeal
a new Supreme Court decision changed search rules to prohibit searching belongings
left in a vehicle during a traffic stop. After the appeals court upheld Davis’s
conviction because the police had followed the law at the time of the search, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear his appeal. CJLF joined the case to encourage a
decision finding that searches such as this one should fall under the “good faith”
exception established by United States v. Leon, a high court
decision CJLF helped win in 1984. The Court’s holding adopted that reasoning. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Brown v. Plata |
5/23/11 |
Loss |
Jury trial |
U. S. Supreme Court ruling upholding the January 2010 order by a panel of three
federal judges that requires California to lower its prison population by 27%
(currently 33,500 inmates), within two years to
remedy overcrowding, which was determined to violate inmates’ constitutional rights.
CJLF had joined the case to argue that the release order was invalid because the
selection of three notorious pro-defendant judges as panel members by the Chief Judge
of the Ninth Circuit guaranteed the result, and that once on the panel, the judges
manipulated the process to prevent any objective review of the inmates’ claims. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Cullen v. Pinholster |
4/4/2011 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: New evidence |
U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the death
sentence of a habitual criminal who killed a man during a home burglary in Los
Angeles. In 1984, Scott Pinholster was convicted on strong evidence, including his
own incriminating statements, and sentenced to death. Over the next 25 years, six
courts reviewed his claim that his defense attorney had failed to adequately present
evidence of his mental health problems. In 2009, after a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit reviewing the case on habeas corpus rejected the claim, a larger en banc
panel accepted it and overturned Pinholster’s death sentence. The en banc panel, after
reviewing a third psychiatric evaluation not presented in state court, ruled that the
California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s claim was unreasonable. CJLF joined
the high court appeal of that ruling to argue that the Ninth Circuit violated federal
law, which prohibits federal courts reviewing a state court decision on habeas corpus
from considering evidence never presented to the state court. The court’s decision
adopted that reasoning. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Tolentino v. New York |
3/29/11 |
Draw |
Search and seizure: Government records |
U. S. Supreme Court announcement
that it would not reconsider a New York Court of Appeals decision which denied a
defendant’s claim that police access to his criminal record during a traffic stop
amounted to an illegal search. Last fall, the high court announced it would hear
Jose Tolentino’s claim that because police illegally stopped his car for excessive
noise in 2005, they could not introduce his record, which indicated that he was driving
on a suspended license and had at least 10 prior suspensions. While the legality of
the traffic stop was never determined, the New York court held that the government’s
own records do not fall under the protection of the Exclusionary Rule and cannot be
excluded from trial. Before the Supreme Court, CJLF argued that the rules governing
traffic stops do not prevent police from learning a driver’s identity and checking his
or her criminal record. After reviewing briefs and hearing oral argument, the Court
determined that it would not disturb the lower court’s holding. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Walker v. Martin |
2/23/11 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Adequate state grounds |
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court
decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reverse a 2009 Ninth Circuit ruling that had
found California’s deadline for filing state habeas corpus petitions inadequate.
Charles Martin was convicted on strong evidence and sentenced to life in prison for
the 1986 stabbing murder of a Sacramento man. After years of successive attempts to
overturn his conviction, Martin’s final petition raising new claims was dismissed by
both state and federal courts for violating a state rule which requires claims be
filed in a timely manner. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court’s
decisions and granted additional review of Martin’s claims. CJLF joined the appeal
of that ruling to argue that federal courts should not be allowed to ignore state
procedural rules, so long as a defendant had adequate notice of the rule and a
reasonable opportunity to comply with it. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Harrington v. Richter |
1/19/11 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Summary dispositions |
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court
decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reverse a 2009 Ninth Circuit ruling that overturned
the robbery/murder conviction of a Sacramento man. After his conviction on strong
evidence, Joshua Richter’s claim, that his attorney had been ineffective, was reviewed
and summarily rejected by the California Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and
a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel. An en banc eleven-judge Ninth Circuit panel overturned
all three courts, finding California’s high court decision unreasonable. In the U. S.
Supreme Court, CJLF argued that the California court’s judgment was reasonable and
entitled to deference. The high court ruling noted this, protecting thousands of
convictions nationwide. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Premo v. Moore |
1/19/11 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Attack on guilty plea |
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision
reinstating the conviction of an Oregon murderer. The decision utilized CJLF arguments
to unanimously overturn a 2009 Ninth Circuit ruling which had announced that the
murderer’s lawyer was ineffective. Randy Moore admitted to kidnapping a man and then
killing him with a gunshot to the temple, but claimed that the single-action revolver
went off accidently. His defense attorney negotiated a plea deal which spared Moore from
the possibility of a death sentence. Years later, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the
conviction, ruling that the defense attorney should have sought to have the confession
excluded. CJLF joined the state’s appeal to argue that the Ninth Circuit ruling ignored
key facts and violated limits on its authority. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
United States v. Ghailani |
7/13/10 |
Win |
Speedy trial: Noncriminal custody |
Federal District Court decision rejecting the claim of a suspected terrorist, who President
Obama decided to try in civil court, that he detention by the military as an enemy combatant
at Guantanamo Bay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Ghailani, who has
since been convicted of conspiracy in the 1998 bombings of two U. S. embassies killing 223
people, was joined by the Center for Constitutional Rights in arguing that because his
rights were violated, the must be set free. At the invitation of the District Judge in this
case, CJLF introduced argument noting that the suspected terrorist was a military
prisoner being held for national security reasons before the government decided to give
him a trial in civil court. He had no speedy trial right during this period. The
federla judge agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Holland v. Florida |
6/14/10 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Tolling limitations |
U. S. Supreme Court ruling upholding a Florida murderer's claim that the time
limit for filing his petition for a fifth review of his case should be waived.
Albert Holland was convicted on overwhelming evidence of murdering a Florida
police officer. While Holland's claims of trial error and ineffective assistance
of counsel were reviewed four times by state courts, including two reviews in
the Florida Supreme Court, his lawyer failed to meet the deadline for filing a
petition for re-review of these claims on federal habeas corpus. In the Supreme
Court, Holland and the ACLU claimed that the lower federal courts are entitlted
to waive the time limit to prevent an injustice. At Florida's invitation, CJLF
joined the case to argue that Congress adopted the time limits to prevent
unwarranted delay and specified the exceptions that would be allowed. The Court
ruled to allow exceptions beyond those specified by Congress. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Berghuis v. Thompkins |
6/1/10 |
Win |
Self-incrimination: Implied waiver |
U. S. Supreme Court review of a lower court ruling overturning the conviction of a
Michigan murderer. Habitual criminal Van Thompkins was found guilty of the gang-style
shooting of two men, killing one. Following his arrest, Thompkins was read his Miranda rights and was questioned for three hours. While he did not ask for an attorney, he did
limit his responses to "yeah," "no," or "I don't know." Finally, the detective asked him
if he wanted God to forgive him for the killing. Thompkins answered, "yes." Substantial
evidence of guilt, including his admission, resulted in a guilty verdict. Four courts denied
Thompkins' claim that his admission of guilt should have been excluded from trial because
the questioning violated his right to remain silent. Later, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, announcing that his limited responses to questioning demonstrated that
he did not want to talk to the police. CJLF joined the Supreme Court appeal of that ruling
to argue that the state court had reasonably applied established Supreme Court precedent when
they affirmed Thompkins' conviction, and the Sixth Circuit had erred in reversing it. The
Supreme Court held that the interrogation was proper and reinstated the conviction. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Graham v. Florida/Sullivan
v. Florida |
5/17/10 |
Loss |
Sentencing: Juvenile LWOP |
U. S. Supreme Court cases challenging state laws which allow states to sentence repeat
juvenile offenders who commit violent crimes before their 18th birthday to life without
possibility of parole (LWOP). Joe Sullivan had already been convicted of 17 crimes, including
several felonies when, at the age of 13, he robbed and brutally raped an elderly woman. One
month prior to his 18th birthday, Terrance Graham, who was on parole for robbery and assault,
was convicted of an armed home-invasion robbery. Following his arrest, he admitted to four
additional robberies. In the Supreme Court, Graham and Sullivan argue that the LWOP sentences
they received constitute cruel and unusual punishment. At least 15 organizations, including
the NAACP and Amnesty International, have filed briefs asking the Court to prohibit states
from allowing an LWOP sentence for their worst juvenile criminals, at least in nonhomicide
cases. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Constitution has left decisions regarding the
sentencing of criminals to the states and that the public has the right to protect itself from
violent, repeat offenders regardless of their age. In the Graham case, a
bare majority of five Justices created a new rule exempting anyone under 18 from a
life-without-parole sentence for a crime other than homicide. The Court dismissed the Sullivan case without explanation, a disposition possibly based on CJLF's
argument that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Berghuis v. Smith |
3/30/10 |
Win |
Jury: Cross-section |
U. S. Supreme Court decision rejecting a murderer's claim that his conviction was
invalid becasue the jury selection process did not maintain a racial quota. Diapolis
Smith was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal shooting of a man during
an argument in a bar in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The address his bias claim, a hearing
was conducted to review the process for summoning citizens to jury duty. Evidence
showed that, while the system was color-blind, the percentageof black excused for
childcare and transportation hardship was greater than for whites. Experts testified
that more blacks than whites in the county were unemployed, single mothers and that
fewer black households owned automobiles. Based upon this, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that there was no systematic bias in the process. Later, the Federal
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Smith's conviction, concluding that there
was racial bias. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Federal court ruling was
improper because, based upon the evidence, the state court's holding was not
unreasonable, and that a requirement for racial quotas would force single mothers and
those without transportation to serve. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Barnett v. Superior Court |
4/8/10 |
Loss |
Discovery: Postjudgment in DP Cases |
California Supreme Court case to review a murderer's claim that a state law requires
district attorneys to search for and turn over information (discovery) regarding a
conviction and death sentence handed down 19 years ago. Max Lee Barnett, a habitual
criminal, was convicted on strong evidence of the kidnap, torture, and murder of his
one-time mining partner in a remote area of Butte County. In 1998, the state Supreme
Court denied his claims of trial and sentencing error, and the U. S. Supreme Court
refused his appeal. In 2004, a trial judge granted Barnett's request for discovery
even though he did not have a case pending in that court. The judge ruled that he was
required to grant the request under a law enacted by a simple majority of state
legislators in 2002, which expanded the discovery rights of murderers sentenced to
death. The poorly written statute has given condemned murderers a device to further
delay the review of their cases. After an appeals court issued a ruling upholding some
of Barnett's requests, the California Supreme Court agreed to review it. CJLF joined
the case to argue that the law which expanded Barnett's rights violates a ballot
initiative adopted by the voters in 1990. Prop. 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform
Act, requires that legislation changing the rules of criminal discovery must be passed
by a super majority of the members of the Legislature. The California Supreme Court
decided the issue in another case, People v. Superior Court (Pearson), and upheld the statute. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger |
3/25/10 |
Win |
Parole: Revocation procedure |
Unanimous Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision upholding a key provision
of California's Proposition 9, which changed the state process for revoking the parole
of criminals who violate parole conditions or commit new crimes. Proposition 9
adopted procedures required by the U. S. Supreme Court and utilized by other states.
Since 2004, California's parole revocation process has been governed by a federal
injunction to settle a lawsuit by criminals who claimed that their rights had been
violated. The injunction had granted more rights to parolees than required by the
Supreme Court, added costs to the process, and placed additional burdens on crime
victims and law enforcement. In March 2009, the same federal judge who ordered the
injunction rule that the parole reforms in Proposition 9 were unconstitutional. CJLF
joined the state's appeal of that ruling to argue that the federal judge overstepped
his authority and ignored precedent in order to prevent enforcement of a constitutional
amendment adopted to balance the rights of criminals with those of crime victims
and law-abiding Californians. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Maryland v. Shatzer |
2/24/10 |
Win |
Counsel: Interrogation |
U. S. Supreme Court case involving a habitual sex offender found guilty of molesting
his 3-year-old son. In 2003, while Michael Shatzer was in prison for molesting another
child, his son told a social worker about an incident involving oral sex with his father.
When a police investigator met with Shatzer in prison to question him, Shatzer invoked his
Miranda rights and refused to discuss the matter without an attorney present. Because the
3-year-old victim was the only witness, the case was closed. Three years later, when
Shatzer's son, then six, was more capable of describing the incident, the case was
reopened and another detective visited Shatzer in prison. This time Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he had molested his child. Following his
failure to suppress the confession, Shatzer was convicted. Maryland's highest court
overturned the conviction on appeal, citing a Supreme Court holding in Edwards v.
Arizona, which involved a second interrogation of a suspect the day after he had
refused to answer questions. When the Supreme Court agreed to review that ruling, CJLF
joined the case to argue that the Edwards decision did not apply because Shatzer was
already a prison inmate with no expectation of being set free if he cooperated and
because 2½ years had lapsed between the two interviews. The high court agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Wood v. Allen |
1/20/10 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: State court findings |
U. S. Supreme Court decision rejecting an Alabama murderer's claim that his three
state-appointed defense attorneys failed to properly represent him in his sentencing
hearing. In 1993, habitual criminal Holly Wood killed his exgirlfriend with a shotgun.
At the time, he was on parole for attempting to murder another former girlfriend.
Because there was no question regarding Wood's guilt, his defense attorneys considered
a mental defense. The evaluation indicated that Wood was slow but no retarded, and it
also revealed his inability to control his temper. Because this information could
damage the defense, Wood's counsel asked the court to suppress it. Wood was convicted,
and, although his counsel argued for mercy, the jury recommended a death sentence.
In his appeal, Wood claimed that the psychiatric evidence might have persuaded the
jury to sentence him to life. Accepting Alabama's invitation to join the case, CJLF
argued that the state court had already decided the claim and reasonably found that
the lawyers made a strategic decision to keep out double-edged evidence. The court
agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
McDaniel v. Brown |
1/11/10 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: New evidence and 2254(d) |
U. S. Supreme Court decision in the case of a Nevada child rapist. Troy Brown was
convicted and sentenced to prison for the brutal forcible rape of a nine-year-old
girl in Carlin, Nevada. Evidence introduced at trial included testimony of witnesses
who saw Brown in the vicinity of the victim's home at the time of the rape, the
victim's description of her attacker, and two DNA tests on two separate semen samples
that matched Brown's DNA and established odds of 3 million to one and 10 thousand to
one against the DNA matching at random. Ten years later, a federal district judge
conducted his own evidentiary hearing and, after deciding to disregard the DNA
evidence, overturned the jury's verdict. Later, the Ninth Circuit upheld that ruling.
When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to consider Nevada's appeal, CJLF joined the
case to argue that the lower federal courts ignored precedent and an Act of Congress
in order to overturn this child rapist's conviction. The Court's unanimous per
curiam opinion agreed, overturning the Ninth Circuit ruling. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Beard v. Kindler |
12/8/09 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Procedural default |
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the death
sentence of a brutal Pennsylvania murderer. Joseph Kindler, and accomplices beat,
electric shocked, and finally drowned a witness who identified him in a burglary. The
jury convicted him on overwhelming evidence and sentenced him to death. When Kindler
escaped from jail, the judge dismissed challenges to the verdict, concluding that by
escaping Kindler had waived his ability to challenge the verdict. Years later, after
Kindler was recaptured, his attorney petitioned to revive these claims. The trial
judge denied the motion, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, citing the
state's fugitive forfeiture law. After a federal district judge and appeals court
brushed aside the state's forfeiture law and overturned Kindler's death sentence,
the Philadelphia District Attorney invited CJLF to join the high court appeal.
CJLF argued for a decision reinstating Kindler's sentence and clarifying the standards
which state rules must meet to prevent the lower federal courts from ignoring them.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts cited the CJLF brief for providing a
key argument in the case. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Kansas v. Ventris |
4/298/09 |
Win |
Counsel: Jailhouse informant |
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding the use of a cellmate’s testimony to impeach the
defendant, even though the cellmate’s testimony may have been obtained in violation of the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In January 2004, Donnie Ray Ventris and his
live-in girlfriend devised a plan to rob an acquaintance. The pair went to Ernest Hicks home, and
Hicks was shot and killed. Ventris and his girlfriend left the scene with Hicks’ wallet,
approximately $300, his cell phone, and his pickup truck. At trial, both Ventris and his girlfriend
accused the other of killing Hicks. In rebuttal to Ventris’s testimony, his cellmate, Johnnie
Doser, testified that Ventris told him that he was the triggerman. Doser admitted that he had been
placed in Ventris’s cell and was told to keep his ears open. The defense was unable to
convince the judge to strike Doser’s testimony, and the jury convicted Ventris of aggravated
robbery and burglary. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Kansas Supreme Court had misinterpreted
Supreme Court precedent, which allows testimony of a jailhouse informant that does not question the
defendant, but only listens. An opinion authored by Justice Scalia held that Doser’s
statements could be used to impeach Ventris because “[t]he interests safeguarded by such
exclusion are ‘outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the
trial process.’ ” [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Cone v. Bell |
4/28/09 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Procedural default |
U. S. Supreme Court decision reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision to uphold Cone's conviction and
death sentence. Gary Cone was convicted fourteen years ago of beating an elderly Memphis couple to
death during a two-day crime spree. Cone's sole defense was that he was temporarily insane at the
time of the murders. Although the defense attorney appealed for mercy, the jury sentenced Cone to
death. On appeal, Cone alleged his attorney was incompetent. The claim was thoroughly reviewed and
denied in the state courts. When Cone appeared before the Sixth Circuit for the third time, he
alleged that prosecutors had improperly withheld evidence of his drug use, which he believed would
have encouraged sympathy from the jury. The Sixth Circuit rejected his claim as procedurally
defaulted and meritless. The Foundation joined the case to argue that Cone's claim had been given
more consideration than required by law, and further delay was not warranted. In a 5-1-1-2 decision,
with Justice Stevens speaking for the majority, the Court remanded the case to the District Court to
decide whether the evidence of Cone's drug use was reasonably likely to have affected the sentence.
Under the unusual procedural history of this case, the federal court was required to make this
determination itself. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Rivera v. Illinois |
3/31/09 |
Draw |
Equal protection: Review of Batson claims |
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision that a criminal conviction may stand if a juror was wrongly
seated after being opposed by a defense lawyer's peremptory challenge. The Court reasoned that
because it is within the state's province to grant or withhold peremptory challenges, states are free
to decide on their own what remedy should follow such error. Michael Rivera, the "Chief Enforcer" of
a Chicago gang, shot and killed Marcus Lee as Lee walked down the street. During jury selection,
Rivera tried to strike an African American female from the jury because she worked at a facility that
also treated gunshot victims. The trial judge was not satisfied by counsel's explanation and
challenged the strike. He overruled use of the peremptory strike. Defense counsel later remarked
he was striking the juror because he wanted more men on the jury. The Illinois Supreme Court found
the trial judge had erred in overruling the strike without proof of discrimination, but also found
the error was harmless. The Foundation joined the case to argue that the trial judge had not erred
in finding discrimination. The Supreme Court found that the judge's refusal to excuse the juror did
not violate Rivera's right to a fair and impartial jury. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Philip Morris v. Williams |
3/31/09 |
Draw |
Procedural default: Adequate state ground |
U. S. Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted, leaving undecided the issue of when
a state court's holding that a party had failed to properly preserve his federal claim could also
preclude federal court review of the question. CJLF filed a brief in Philip Morris because this
question often arises in federal court review of state criminal convictions. The Oregon Supreme
Court held that Philip Morris lost its federal claim of excessive damages by not using a state
procedure required to preserve its claim. Philip Morris claimed the state rule departed from the
state's previous rulings on the rule, and could not be used to block a federal claim. The Foundation
had asked the Court to define a clear standard to apply in this confused area of law, but the Court
did not use this opportunity. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Arizona v. Johnson |
1/26/09 |
Win |
Search and seizure: Frisk of passengers |
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding the authority of a police officer to pat down a suspicious
passenger for weapons during a traffic stop. The search occurred after Tucson police pulled over an
uninsured vehicle in a neighborhood frequented by drug gangs. One officer noticed that the backseat
passenger was dressed head to toe in local gang colors and had a police scanner sticking out of his
pocket. After he told the officer he was recently released from prison, she asked him to step out
of the car and frisked him for weapons. The search uncovered a handgun and drugs. Following his
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and drugs, the defendant won an appeals
court ruling that the search was unlawful, because, as the passenger, he was not the subject of the
traffic stop. When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to consider Arizona’s appeal, CJLF joined
the case to argue that the appeals court had misinterpreted precedent, which gives police officers
the authority to pat down a person confronted in the line of duty if there is a reasonable suspicion
that the person might be armed. The Foundation pointed out that an ex-con wearing the colors of a
local drug gang, with a police scanner, meets this criterion. The Supreme Court unanimously
agreed.[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Oregon v. Ice |
1/14/09 |
Win |
Sentencing: Jury for consecutive |
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding a judge’s authority to require a defendant convicted of
multiple felonies to serve the sentences for each crime consecutively. Thomas Eugene Ice, an
apartment manager, was convicted for twice using his pass key to burglarize a resident’s unit
and molest her 11-year-old daughter. Ice was convicted on two counts of first-degree burglary and
four counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The defense argued that the jury must make the findings
that Oregon law requires before a judge may order that sentences run consecutively. Unconvinced,
the judge ordered the consecutive sentences. Oregon’s Court of Appeals affirmed the decision;
but the state supreme court later overturned that holding and Ice’s sentence, ruling that
earlier U. S. Supreme Court decisions supported the defendant’s claim. CJLF joined the
Supreme Court’s review of the case to argue that the Oregon court improperly extended a rule
announced to prevent judges from punishing the defendant for a higher offense than the jury found.
The court’s 5-4 decision agreed, in a decision that consecutive sentencing remains within the
trial judge’s discretion. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Hedgpeth v. Pulido |
12/2/08 |
Win |
Harmless error: Standard of review |
U. S. Supreme Court decision to overturn a 2007 Ninth Circuit ruling, which had voided the
conviction of California murderer Michael Pulido. Pulido was convicted on strong evidence of
killing a gas station cashier during a 1992 robbery. Because both Pulido and his accomplice blamed
each other for the killing, the jury could not agree on who actually fired the gun, but
California’s felony-murder rule provides that accomplices to murder during the commission of a
felony can both be found guilty of the murder. Fifteen years after his conviction, the Ninth Circuit
sidestepped federal rules to invalidate Pulido’s conviction due to a minor jury instruction
error previously deemed harmless by the California Supreme Court. CJLF joined the state’s
appeal to argue that precedent (won by CJLF) requires that a claim of trial error raised on federal
habeas corpus must be supported by substantial evidence that the error prejudiced the
defendant’s case. No such evidence was presented to support the Ninth Circuit ruling. The
high court agreed.[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Bell v. Kelly |
11/17/08 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Deference standard |
U. S. Supreme Court order refusing to reconsider a federal court ruling upholding the death sentence
of Virginia cop killer Edward Bell. In 2001, Bell, an illegal immigrant and drug dealer, was
convicted on strong evidence of murdering a police sergeant by shooting him in the face. On appeal,
Bell claimed that his attorneys did not adequately represent him at his sentencing hearing. After
the Virginia Supreme Court rejected this claim, Bell added additional evidence to support his claim
to his petition for review on federal habeas corpus. A federal District Court rejected the claim,
and later the federal Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Earlier this year, the high court
agreed to review Bell’s appeal based upon his false claim that the Virginia Supreme Court had
refused to consider the evidence he added to his federal petition. CJLF had joined the case to argue
that Bell had never presented the new evidence to the Virginia Court and that the federal courts
reviewing his new evidence ruled that it did not support his allegation of lawyer incompetence. When
the Supreme Court learned the truth, it dropped Bell’s case. Bell was executed on February 19,
2009. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
People v. Hernandez |
8/27/08 |
Win |
Jury trial: Sentencing Factors |
Hernandez was convicted of evading an officer with reckless driving and resisting the officer's
performance of duty. He was sentenced to the upper term of three years for evading an officer with
reckless driving. At sentencing, the trial court imposed the upper-term sentence based on
Hernandez's prior convictions, prior prison term, the fact that he was on parole at the time he
committed the charged offenses, and because his past performance on probation and parole had been
unsatisfactory. In its brief to the California Supreme Court, CJLF argued Hernandez's sentence was
consistent with the U. S. Supreme Court's holding in Cunningham v. California. CJLF argued
Hernandez's sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment protections of Almendarez-Torres, Apprendi, and Cunningham because a prior conviction is still an aggravating factor
that can be found by the trial court to impose an upper-term sentence. The California Supreme
Court's decision in People v. Towne, S125677 (June 26, 2008), affirmed this reasoning. In People v. Towne, the California Supreme Court ruled the trial court may find the aggravating
circumstance that a defendant served a prior prison term, was on parole, or on probation at the time
of the crime. Furthermore, a trial judge may find the aggravating factor of unsatisfactory
performance on parole or probation if the unsatisfactory performance is established through a record
of prior convictions. However, a right to a jury trial will attach if the poor performance on
probation or parole can be established only by finding facts other than prior convictions, such as
failed drug tests or failure to appear for appointments. The conclusions reached by the California
Supreme Court in Towne were consistent with the amicus brief submitted by CJLF. In
its brief, CJLF argued that Apprendi v. New Jersey required a jury to find the defendant
eligible for an upper-term sentence. However, once a jury found a single fact making the defendant
eligible, past convictions and unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole could be found by a
trial judge and applied at his discretion to determine whether the defendant actually received the
upper-term sentence. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Indiana v. Edwards |
6/19/08 |
Win |
Counsel: Competency for self-representation |
U.S. Supreme Court case on whether the Constitution requires states to allow a mentally ill defendant
to act as his own attorney. The case involves the 2005 conviction of Ahmad Edwards, a thief who shot
a security guard and a bystander at an Indianapolis department store. Edwards spent several years in
state mental institutions until doctors determined that, with the aid of an attorney, he was
competent to stand trial. However, the trial judge denied the defendant's request to represent
himself. On appeal, the defendant won an Indiana Supreme Court ruling overturning his conviction,
announcing that an earlier U. S. Supreme Court decision (Faretta v. California) required the
trial judge to grant the defendant's request. When the nation's highest court agreed to hear
Indiana's appeal, CJLF joined the case. The Foundation argued that the Faretta decision did
not prohibit states from setting limits on the right to self-representation to prevent mentally ill
defendants from turning the trial into a mockery of justice. The Supreme Court agreed, enabling
trial judges to preserve the fairness and reliability of the trial. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Boumediene v. Bush / Al Odah |
6/12/08 |
Loss |
Habeas Corpus: Enemy Detainees |
In companion cases before the United States Supreme Court, CJLF filed an amicus curiae brief
to demonstrate that the writ of habeas corpus was never meant to extend to prisoners of war
designated as enemy combatants. CJLF filed its brief in response to the claims of two groups of enemy
combatants, as well as 23 groups representing the interests of the combatants. The combatants, and
their amicus, challenged their detention at a United States naval base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. The groups claim the United States Constitution requires the government to allow them to file
habeas corpus petitions in federal court. The groups also claim Congress does not have the authority
to prohibit federal courts from hearing habeas claims, and that Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs), created by an Act of Congress in 2006 to determine the status of the detainees,
unconstitutionally denied the petitioners due process rights. CJLF's brief examined the history of
habeas corpus going back to the English common law to show that a writ of habeas was never meant to
extend to military prisoners with no prior connection to the United States. A narrow majority of the
Supreme Court disagreed and extended the protection of the United States Constitution to enemies it
was never intended to protect. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) |
5/12/08 |
Win |
Evidence: DA and Victim privacy |
California Supreme Court case to review lower court rulings that had disqualified a public prosecutor
for opposing the disclosure of an 8 year-old sexual abuse victim's confidential psychotherapy
records. Both the mother of the victim and the victim's therapist objected to the disclosure of the
records. However, the victim's father, who is also the accused molester's brother, consented to the
release of the records. The prosecutor believed that the father's consent should not be sufficient
for disclosure because of the father's conflict of interest in the case. The prosecutor then objected
to the consent and filed a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for the victim. The court denied the
prosecutor's motion, and later granted the defense's motion to disqualify the prosecutor. The court
found the prosecutor had incurred a conflict of interest by seeking to represent the victim's
interests. The appellate court later agreed with this ruling. CJLF joined the appeal to the
California Supreme Court to argue the lower courts had misinterpreted the duties of the prosecutor.
The prosecutor had a duty to enforce the law as a representative of a party to the case, and as such,
the prosecutor had the right to participate in litigation affecting the proceeding. CJLF argued a
prosecutor acts within the lawful range of his or her duties by acting as a zealous advocate for both
the victim and the people of California. The lower courts had an obligation to respect the
prosecutor's duty, as well as the rights and interests of crime victims. The California Supreme
Court unanimously agreed that the prosecutor's actions were proper and not a conflict of interest. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Baze v. Rees |
4/16/08 |
Win |
Death penalty: Lethal injection |
U.S. Supreme Court case to review a legal challenge to Kentucky's lethal injection protocol by two
double-murderers facing execution. Ralph Baze shot and killed a county sheriff and his deputy in
1992. Thomas Bowling shot and killed a Lexington couple and wounded their two-year-old son in 1990.
In a federal lawsuit, they, along with several anti-death penalty groups, claim that the lethal
injection process used in 37 states is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. CJLF joined
the case to argue that the Constitution does not guarantee condemned murderers a painless execution
and that, properly administered, the lethal injection process is painless. Procedures now in place
in Kentucky and elsewhere are sufficient to minimize the chance of error. The Foundation also argues
that the delays caused by legal challenges to a method of execution that pro-criminal groups
insisted was humane 20 years ago, adds to the pain and suffering of the families of murder victims
and denies justice to the law-abiding public. The Supreme Court agreed, and executions should
resume shortly in most states. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Medellin v. Texas |
3/25/08 |
Win |
International law: Vienna Convention |
U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction and death sentence of Jose Medellin, a Mexican
national convicted of the 1993 rape and murder of two teenaged girls in Houston. The case involved
Medellin's claim that when the police failed to notify the Mexican Consulate following his arrest,
they violated an international treaty signed in 1963. He also argued that the Texas courts'
rejection of his claim violated a 2004 World Court decision and that decision required that the
judgment be set aside. CJLF joined the case on behalf of one of the murdered girl's parents to
argue that this murderer's international rights claim had already been considered and rejected by
the Texas Courts, and that no further delay of his sentence was required. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Texas court. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Allen v. Siebert |
11/5/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Limitations, tolling |
U.S. Supreme Court decision reinstating the death sentence of Alabama serial murderer, Daniel
Siebert. Siebert had admitted to, and ultimately been convicted of the murders of Sherri Weathers
and her son, as well as the murder of Linda Jarman. Siebert was sentenced to death for both murders
in 1987. In 1992, after both convictions had been affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court, Siebert
filed state petitions for habeas relief. He filed his state petitions three months past the state
filing deadline, and the circuit county court rejected both petitions. In 2001, Siebert filed
federal petitions for habeas corpus review. The petitions were dismissed as they were filed after
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) filing deadline for habeas corpus
petitions had lapsed. In 2005, while Siebert’s appeal of the dismissal was pending in the
Eleventh Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “time limits, no matter their form, are
filing conditions,” and an untimely state petition does not suspend federal time limits. Two
years later, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Alabama’s time limits did not prevent
federal court review of Siebert’s claims. CJLF argued as an amicus curiae that the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling was “demonstrably erroneous” and summary reversal was
appropriate. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, and stated, in a 7-2 decision, “[w]hen a
postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter . . . .”
The decision affirmed the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544
U.S. 408 (2005). [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
People v. Taylor |
10/23/07 |
Loss |
Death penalty: NY Law |
New York's Court of Appeals upheld its 2004 People v. LaValle decision that a jury instruction that
was a part New York's sentencing scheme was invalid because the instruction might influence a jury
to recommend the death sentence instead of deadlocking. Under the New York scheme, a deadlocked jury
would allow the judge to sentence the defendant to 20 to 25 years with the possibility of parole.
Before his trial, Taylor challenged the sentencing scheme. Taylor had been convicted for the robbery
of a Wendy's franchise in Flushing, New York and the murder of five Wendy's employees in 2000.
Taylor was sentenced to death under the New York death penalty law that required the challenged
instruction. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argue
that New York's entire death penalty scheme should not be overturned because of one jury
instruction. CJLF argued the Court of Appeals should give effect to the Legislature's intent, and
remove the improper instruction while leaving the other provisions of New York's death penalty
statute in place. CJLF argued the New York law contained a severability provision for the purpose of
allowing constitutional provisions to remain in effect while striking any unconstitutional
provisions. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court found the jury instruction to be
"inextricably interwoven with the sentencing procedure and necessary to effectuate the legislature's
intent." The Court held the death penalty sentencing statute to be unconstitutional on its face and
vacated Taylor's death sentence. Taylor's case was remitted for resentencing. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
United States v. Lujan
United States v. Meier |
10/2/07
9/28/07 |
Win |
DNA Testing: Suspicionless searches |
In companion cases Lujan and Meier, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the petitioner’s claims that Oregon’s DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000 (DNA Act) violated Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Lujan’s
claims that Oregon’s Act violated the ex post facto clause of the constitution, was an
unconstitutional bill of attainder, and that the Act violated the Constitution’s separation of
powers principles. Both Lujan and Meier claimed the Oregon Act violated their Fourth Amendment
rights because it authorized a probation officer to demand the collection of a blood sample as a
condition to a convicted criminal’s supervised release. Petitioners had pled guilty to one
count of unarmed bank robbery in May 1999. They were each sentenced to prison time and three years
supervised release. Oregon law stated supervised release was subject to standard conditions,
including those conditions imposed by the DNA Act. CJLF’s amicus brief argued the
DNA Act should survive petitioners’ Fourth Amendment challenges. CJLF argued that as a
convicted criminal subject to supervised release, petitioners had a diminished expectation of
privacy. The United States Supreme Court had stated a probationer’s diminished privacy was
part of society’s special need to supervise probationers. In its brief, CJLF urged that when
examining society’s special need, a court should consider circumstances such as: the
convicts’ substantially diminished expectation of privacy; the minimal intrusiveness of blood
testing; and the enormous benefit to society of maintaining DNA databanks of convicted murderers and
sex offenders. The Ninth Circuit agreed and relied on its 2004 decision in United States v.
Kincaide, 379 F.3d 813, that a “totality of the circumstances” could justify
compulsory DNA collection. [CJLF brief in Lujan.] [CJLF brief in Meier.] |
Getsy v. Mitchell |
7/25/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Clearly established law |
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case involving hired hit man Jason Getsy. An
Ohio jury found Getsy guilty of the contract killing of Ann Serafino, whose son had a business
dispute with John Santine. Getsy was sentenced to death. A separate jury convicted Santine of
murder, but Getsy's confession was not admissible in that trial, the jury did not find murder for
hire had been proved, and Santine was not sentenced to death. A panel of the Sixth Circuit found
that this difference in sentences required that Getsy's death sentence be overturned. CJLF submitted
a brief arguing that no current rule of law authorizes a federal court to overturn a state sentence
on this basis, and Congress has forbidden lower federal courts from making up new rules in such
cases. The full Sixth Circuit agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
People v. Hernandez/Sandoval |
7/19/07 |
Win |
Jury trial: Sentencing factors |
Companion cases before the California Supreme Court involving criminals who received upper-term
sentences under the state’s determinant sentencing law. The law had allowed a trial
judge to sentence criminals to one of a range of three terms (such as 2, 4, or 6 years), based upon
mitigating or aggravating factors related to the crime or the defendant. In 2007, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled, in Cunningham v. California, that aggravating factors used to
make a defendant eligible for the upper term must be found by a jury, rather than the judge.
The state Supreme Court is reviewing these two cases to determine the extent that the Cunningham decision disrupts California sentencing. Joel Hernandez and Aida
Sandoval were both convicted of felonies and sentenced to upper terms. Hernandez had a number
of prior felonies, which the judge considered during sentencing for reckless driving and evading a
police officer. Sandoval did not have priors, but the judge gave her an upper term and
required her to serve her sentences consecutively, after considering the particularly cold-blooded
nature of the circumstances of her crimes of voluntary manslaughter which left two people dead and
her attempt to kill a third victim. CJLF argues that the Cunningham decision does allow judges to base an upper-term sentence upon a defendant’s prior
convictions and require that multiple sentences be served consecutively. Further, once a single
aggravating factor has been properly found, the judge may find and consider additional factors in
deciding whether to impose the upper term. In deciding Sandoval's case and another case, the
California Supreme Court agreed with each of the major points of CJLF's brief. Hernandez's case is
still pending. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Panetti v. Quarterman |
6/28/07 |
Loss |
Death penalty: Competency |
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a Texas double-murderer’s claim that he cannot be executed
because he is mentally ill. In 1992, the defendant, Scott Panetti, murdered his wife's
parents with a sawed-off shotgun in front of his wife and three-year-old daughter, who had moved in
with the victims to escape his violent behavior. Following his arrest, he confessed to the
murders. After being found mentally competent to stand trial, Panetti insisted on
representing himself. He presented an insanity defense, claiming that an alternate
personality named “Sarge” committed the murders. After his conviction, sentence,
and multiple appeals, the state court found him competent to be executed. The federal
District Court and Court of Appeals later affirmed his competency and his death sentence.
Panetti, along with the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the American Bar Association, and
the American Psychological Association, is seeking a decision to broaden the standard for
incompetence for execution. The present standard requires that the murderer be able to understand
that he committed the murder and will be executed for it, which the federal court found Panetti
does. At the request of the Texas Solicitor General, CJLF has joined the case to argue for a
decision to maintain the current standard. The Court sent the case back to the lower courts to
reconsider, but it did not adopt the sweeping rule proposed by the ABA and others. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Fry v. Pliler |
6/11/07 |
Win |
Habeas Corpus: Harmless Error |
The United States Supreme Court affirmed a murderer's conviction. The defendant, drug dealer John
Fry, was convicted on strong evidence of killing a Vacaville couple in 1992. On appeal, he claimed
that his conviction was invalid because a witness who claimed that her cousin admitted to killing
two people was not allowed to testify. The state court rejected the claim, finding that in light of
the weakness of this evidence, excluding it was within the trial judge's discretion. The federal
courts reviewed the claim on habeas corpus applying a standard of review announced by the Supreme
Court's 1993 decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson (won by CJLF) and also concluded that the
exclusion was error, but harmless. Before the Supreme Court, Fry argued that the Brecht standard is
too difficult for him to meet and should not apply to his case. CJLF joined the case to argue for a
decision reaffirming the existing standard. The Supreme Court, unanimous on this point, agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Roper v. Weaver |
5/21/07 |
Draw |
Due Process: Prosecutor Argument |
United States Supreme Court case to review a federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling which
overturned the death sentence of William Weaver. A Jackson County, Missouri jury found Weaver guilty
on substantial evidence of murdering Charles Taylor, a key witness in a federal drug case in July
1987. Among Weaver's claims on appeal was that in closing argument at his sentencing hearing the
prosecutor made allegedly improper statements which invalidated his sentence. Specifically, the
prosecutor told the sentencing jury that he supported the death penalty, that it was their duty,
like soldiers, to sentence Weaver to death, and that a death sentence would deter others from
committing murder. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the claim and upheld Weaver's conviction and
sentence. In 2001, a federal district judge accepted the claim and overturned the sentence. That
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals last year. CJLF joined the state's appeal of that ruling
to argue that the federal law prohibited the Eighth Circuit court from overturning the Missouri
Supreme Court decision unless it misapplied clearly established law or Supreme Court precedent. CJLF
pointed out that there is no Supreme Court precedent finding similar statements made in closing
argument unconstitutional, and that the Missouri court's review of Weaver's claim was reasonable.
The Court decided that, due to some unusual procedural issues in the case, it would not decide the
question presented but instead dismiss the case as "improvidently granted." This decision
effectively leaves the Eighth Circuit decision requiring a new sentencing hearing in place, but it
does not set a Supreme Court precedent either way. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Schriro v. Landrigan |
5/14/07 |
Win |
Death penalty |
The United States Supreme Court reversed a 2006 Ninth Circuit ruling and reinstated the death
sentence of a man who brutally murdered an acquaintance in Arizona, after escaping from an Oklahoma
prison where he was serving time for an earlier murder. At his sentencing hearing, Jeffrey Landrigan
announced in open court that he would not allow his attorney to present evidence mitigating his
responsibility for the murder. Over a span of 15 years, three courts and a panel of the Ninth
Circuit rejected the claim that his death sentence was unconstitutional because his attorney failed
to present the evidence. However, a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit accepted it. Before the
Supreme Court, CJLF argued that this violates an Act of Congress which forbids setting aside the
facts found by the state courts unless the finality is unreasonable. The Supreme Court agreed in a
5-4 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Smith v. Texas |
4/25/07 |
Loss |
Death penalty: Jury Instructions |
U. S. Supreme Court decision to require the resentencing of LaRoyce Smith for the 1991 murder of a
Dallas Taco Bell shift manager during a robbery. At trial, the defense attorney asked the judge to
declare the Texas death penalty unconstitutional based upon a recent Supreme Court decision striking
down the state's sentencing jury instructions. The judge instead modified the jury instructions to
accommodate a recent high court decision and asked the defense attorney if he wanted to suggest any
improvements. The defense attorney did not and raised no objection to the new instructions. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later ruled that the modified instructions complied with the recent
decision. Later on habeas corpus, the same court denied Smith's claim that the instruction violated
a subsequent high court decision on jury instructions. In 2004, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed
the Texas court decision and sent the case back for further review of Smith's claim. A year later,
the Texas court ruled that the disputed instruction did not require overturning his death sentence.
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Smith's challenge to that ruling, CJLF joined the case to
argue that the standard for review of trial errors not objected to by the defense has been
historically left up to the state courts. The Court's 5 to 4 ruling held that the instruction given
in this case did not satisfy its requirements and that the defense lawyer's initial objection was
sufficient to preserve the issue. [CJLF
brief in PDF.] |
Irons v. Carey |
3/6/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Constitutionality of 2254(d)(1) |
Federal Ninth Circuit decision overturning a district judge's ruling ordering the parole of San
Francisco murderer Carl Irons. In 1984, Irons received a 17-years-to-life prison sentence for
shooting and stabbing a neighbor to death then dumping his body in the ocean. In 2001, Irons
appealed a decision by the Board of Prison Terms to deny him parole. The state Court of Appeal
reviewed the case, deciding that the Board's decision was proper. When he appealed to the federal
court, a magistrate was appointed to consider his claim. In 2004, the magistrate recommended that
Irons be released based on Ninth Circuit precedent not accepted by the California courts or required
by the U.S. Supreme Court. When a federal district judge adopted this recommendation and ordered
Iron's release, California appealed. CJLF joined the case to argue that federal rules adopted by
Congress prohibit federal courts from overturning a state appeals court decision, unless the state
court misapplied United States Supreme Court precedent. Because there was no misapplication of law
or binding precedent by the California Court of Appeal, the federal judge had no authority to
re-decide Irons' claim. The Ninth Circuit decision agreed. [CJLF
brief in PDF.] |
Whorton v. Bockting |
2/28/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Retroactivity of Crawford |
U. S. Supreme Court decision to reinstate the 1988 conviction of a Nevada child molester. A jury
found Marvin Bockting guilty of engaging in various sex acts with his six-year-old stepdaughter.
Because the child was too emotionally upset to testify, her tape-recorded description of the incident
was introduced at trial in addition to medical evidence and Bockting's incriminating statements. The
applicable federal rules at the time allowed the child's taped statement (hearsay) in lieu of her
direct testimony. Two years later, the Supreme Court sent Bockting's case back for a determination
of the statement's trustworthiness under a new standard. In 1993, the Nevada Court ruled that the
statement was trustworthy. In 2003, the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v.
Washington announced a new rule barring "testimonial" hearsay statements from trial. In
February 2005, the Ninth Circuit applied the new rule retroactively to overturn Bockting's
conviction. Before the Supreme Court, CJLF argued that only rules fundamental to a fair trial can be
applied retroactively and that the change in hearsay does not meet that standard. The high court
agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Burton v. Stewart |
1/9/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Retroactivity of Blakely |
United States Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reject a Washington sex
offender's challenge to his sentence. The case involved a 47-year-sentence given to Lonnie Burton for
the rape and robbery of a 15-year-old boy and the burglary of his parents' home. Because of Burton's
multiple prior felony convictions, he qualified for an increased sentence under Washington law. While
a challenge to his sentence was being reviewed by the state's highest court, Burton launched a
separate challenge to his conviction in federal court on habeas corpus. Federal law generally allows
only one round of habeas corpus review of a criminal judgment. After his state challenge failed,
Burton asked the federal court to consider claims against his sentence on habeas corpus. The federal
court agreed to hear the case, but refused to overturn his sentence. In 2004, after the U.S. Supreme
Court announced new sentencing rules in Blakely v. Washington, Burton amended his
appeal to claim that the Blakely ruling applied retroactively to invalidate his sentence. CJLF joined
the high court review of the case to argue that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review
Burton's second petition. The Court's decision said exactly that. [CJLF
brief in PDF.] |
Carey v. Musladin |
12/11/06 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Deference |
United States Supreme decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the murder conviction
of an abusive husband who gunned down his estranged wife's fiancé in front of several
witnesses. In 2005, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had overturned the murderer's
sentence, ruling that it was unconstitutional for members of the victim's family to wear buttons with
the deceased's picture on it during the trial. Prior to Mathew Musladin's trial, the judge refused
Musladin's request to prevent Studer's family from wearing the photo buttons. Following his
conviction, Musladin appealed, claiming that the buttons prejudiced the jury against him. The Court
of Appeal denied the claim, as did the federal District Court on habeas corpus. But a divided panel
of the federal Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and announced that the buttons
violated Musladin's constitutional rights. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the state's appeal,
CJLF joined the case to point out that, once again, the Ninth Circuit's ruling sidestepped
Congressional limits on its authority in order to overturn a reasonable state court decision. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Ex parte Medellin |
11/15/06 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Vienna Convention |
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision to deny further review of a foreign national's claim that
the failure to notify the Mexican government of his arrest and trial for murdering two young girls
invalidates his conviction and death sentence. In 2005, CJLF won a U.S. Supreme Court decision which
rejected the murderer's request for federal court review of this claim. When the case was sent back
to the Texas court, CJLF argued that the claim was reviewed and rejected in state court years ago and
no further consideration is required. The Texas court rejected Medellin's claim on a different
ground, and he has since asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case again. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Ayers v. Belmontes |
11/13/06 |
Win |
Death penalty: Catch-all instruction |
United States Supreme Court decision reinstating the death sentence of a California man who, in 1981,
beat a 19-year-old girl to death with a metal bar while burglarizing her home. The Court's decision overturned a 2005 Ninth Circuit ruling which announced that the instructions given to the
murderer's sentencing jury 25 years ago were unconstitutional. CJLF joined the review of that ruling
to argue that two prior Supreme Court decision (both won by CJLF) held that the jury
instructions were proper. The Court held that they were. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld |
6/29/06 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Detainee Treatment Act |
The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
and held that accused terrorists held in Guantanamo Bay could not be tried by military tribunal
under current law. CJLF had argued that Congress had repealed the Court’s jurisdiction to
hear this claim in the Detainee Treatment Act. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon |
6/28/06 |
Win |
Evidence: Vienna Convention |
The United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, upholding the
conviction of Moises Sanchez-Llamas for the attempted murder of a police officer. Sanchez-Llamas made
incriminating statements shortly after his arrest and before he was informed of his right to have the
Mexican Consulate notified of his arrest. CJLF argued and the Court held that suppression of evidence
is not an available remedy for enforcement of the Vienna Convention, the treaty that requires
consular notification. Suppression of the truth in a criminal trial is a drastic remedy, it is not
required by the treaty, and no other country suppresses evidence on this basis. Further, there is
no causal connection between the treaty violation and the defendant’s statements, because he
had no right to have the consulate notified before the interrogation. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Kansas v. Marsh |
6/26/06 |
Win |
Death penalty: Aggravating = Mitigating |
The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court and reinstated the
death penalty in Kansas. In 1995, Marsh murdered a young mother and set the house on fire, burning
her 19-month-old daughter to death. The state court had held that the state’s death penalty
statute was unconstitutional because it required a verdict of death in the extremely unlikely event
that the jury found the aggravating and mitigating factors precisely equal. CJLF argued and the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a capital sentencing statute from operating in this
manner. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Washington v. Recuenco |
6/26/06 |
Win |
Jury trial: Blakely & Harmless error |
The United States Supreme Court reinstated the sentence of a Washington man who had threatened his
wife with a gun, reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of Washington. Arturo Recuenco was
convicted by a jury of assault, and the jury also found he had used a deadly weapon. The judge
sentenced him to an additional three years for using a gun, in accordance with Washington law.
After the trial, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Blakely v. Washington that sentence
enhancement facts such as these must be found by the jury. The Washington Court of Appeals found
that the error was harmless, because the jury found he had used a weapon and the gun was the only
weapon at issue in the trial. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that
“Blakely error” can never be harmless. CJLF argued, and the U.S. Supreme Court
held, that errors such as this do not require reversal where it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the result would have been the same in the absence of the error. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Samson v. California |
6/19/06 |
Win |
Search and Seizure: Parole search condition |
California’s policy of requiring parolees to be subject to search at any time was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court. The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, and in
most cases that means the police must have probable cause before conducting a search. However,
there are exceptions, and even law-abiding people are subject to search when entering a courthouse or
boarding an airplane. Convicted felons are subject to search at any time while in prison, and the
state may reasonably require that prisoners released on parole, but still officially in custody, also
be subject to search. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Hudson v. Michigan |
6/15/06 |
Win |
Search and Seizure: Knock-notice & excl. rule |
The United States Supreme Court decided that evidence obtained in a valid search of a house, i.e.,
made pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause, need not be suppressed because the police did
not wait long enough to enter after announcing their presence. The opinion discussed the high social
cost of suppressing the truth in criminal cases and decided that the exclusionary rule should not be
extended into new territory. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Hill v. McDonough |
6/12/06 |
Loss |
Death penalty |
In this case, the United States Supreme Court decided that a death row inmate could use a civil suit
under the Civil Rights Act to challenge the state’s method of execution and thereby postpone
his execution. CJLF had argued that invoking the Civil Rights Act for this purpose was an end-run
around the limitations that Congress had placed on habeas corpus for the specific purpose of limiting
such last-minute litigation. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Muntaqim v. Coombe |
6/1/06 |
Win |
Voting: Felon disenfranchisement |
Convicted killers in New York prisons claimed that they had the right to vote,
despite New York law, under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. CJLF joined an amicus brief to oppose this claim, noting the history of felon disenfranchisement laws nationwide before
and after the Voting Rights Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Rice v. Collins |
1/18/06 |
Win |
Jury: Batson review |
U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments
to overturn a Ninth Circuit ruling, which had found racial bias during jury selection
in the trial of a habitual criminal. The defendant, who had prior convictions of
forcible rape and robbery, received a 25 years to life sentence for his third felony
conviction on drug dealing charges. On appeal, he claimed that the prosecutor exercised
racial bias in excusing two black jurors, although two other blacks were accepted and
served. After the trial judge, the state appellate court and the federal District Court
found no bias, the Ninth Circuit discovered it in a 2003 ruling. When the Supreme Court
agreed to review the ruling, CJLF joined the case to argue that federal rules and
precedent require that the lower courts give great deference to the findings of the
trial judge regarding racial bias claims. The high court's precedent-setting decision agreed. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Brown v. Sanders |
1/11/06 |
Win |
Death penalty: Invalid aggravators |
U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to
reinstate the death sentence of a man who beat a Bakersfield woman to death in 1981.
While California law requires a jury to find at least one special circumstance related
to a murder to qualify the killer for a death sentence, the jury in this case found four.
On appeal, the state Supreme Court ruled that two of the four special circumstances
were invalid, but the death sentence was upheld. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit overturned
the death sentence. Before the high court, CJLF argued that the sentence was proper
because two special circumstances remained valid, and all of the facts considered by the
jury were properly considered under unchallenged circumstances. The invalid circumstances
were therefore redundant and made no difference in this case. The Court's decision
incorporated this argument. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
Maryland v. Blake |
11/14/06 |
Draw |
Self-incrimination |
U. S. Supreme Court dismissal of a case it had accepted for
review of a Maryland appeals court ruling suppressing incriminating statements made by a
juvenile accomplice to a murder. When the actual murderer (Tolbert) blamed his juvenile
accomplice for the killing, the accomplice (Blake), who had previously refused to talk to
police, agreed to make a statement "to set the record straight." In his statement, Blake
admitted his involvement but identified the older Tolbert as the murderer. Prior to trial,
Blake's attorney won a Maryland appeals court ruling that excluded Blake's incriminating
statements, concluding that he had been badgered into making them. CJLF joined the high
court appeal of that ruling to argue that there was no evidence of badgering by police and
that Blake's statements were voluntary. The Supreme Court dismissed the case without
deciding the issue. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
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