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Decision Leaves Main Questions Unanswered
The United States Supreme Court today sent back to lower courts a dispute over the execution of a murderer with schizophrenia. Scott Louis Panetti has the delusional belief that the state is going to execute him to stop him from preaching the Gospel. However, the Court decided neither whether Panetti can eventually be executed nor precisely what standard should be used for evaluating such claims.
At issue in the case of Panetti v. Quarterman was the standard for deciding when a murderer’s present mental illness precludes execution of the death sentence. The case does not involve the defense of insanity at the time of the crime, which is a different issue. In this case, the federal courts applied the standard of mental competency as they understood it to be set by the Supreme Court in its 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright. Under that standard, the criminal must be able to understand that he committed the murder and will be executed for it. Double murderer Scott Panetti sought a decision announcing that this standard is too narrow.
The California-based Criminal Justice Legal Foundation had joined the case to encourage a decision upholding the standard used by the federal courts. A brief filed by the American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the National Alliance on Mental Illness urged a sweeping standard, precluding execution if the murderer’s mental condition “significantly impairs his or her capacity . . . to appreciate the reason for [the punishment’s] imposition in the prisoner’s own case . . . .”
Writing for the Court’s 5 to 4 majority, Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected the standard used by the Fifth Circuit as too narrow. That standard would make delusions irrelevant even if the prisoner “cannot reach a rational understanding of the reason for the execution.” However, the opinion went on to caution that not all abnormal or irrational thinking precludes execution. Many criminals have so-called personality disorders that include beliefs most people would consider strange. “Someone who is condemned to death for an atrocious murder may be so callous as to be unrepentant; so self-centered and devoid of compassion as to lack all sense of guilt; so adept in transferring blame to others as to be considered, at least in the colloquial sense, to be out of touch with reality.” Such mental states are not included in today’s ruling, Justice Kennedy wrote. This case involves a psychotic disorder.
“We are pleased that the Court did not announce a new, sweeping definition of insanity for this purpose,” said Foundation Legal Director Kent Scheidegger. “However, it is disappointing that the standard remains unclear and will be the basis for further litigation and delay,” he added. Justice Thomas, in the dissenting opinion, wrote, “what emerges is a half-baked holding that leaves the details of the insanity standard for the District Court to work out.”
The case involved Panetti’s conviction for the shotgun murders of his wife’s parents. Panetti had a long record of violent behavior prior to the murders. He had been hospitalized on multiple occasions for substance abuse, addiction, personality disorders, depression, and schizophrenia. Doctors observed that when Panetti took his medication, his mental illness was controlled.
In August of 1992, due to his excessive drinking and violent, abusive behavior, Panetti’s second wife Sonja and three-year-old daughter left him. When they moved in with Sonja’s parents, the Alvarados, Panetti telephoned to threaten to kill them. Six days after Sonja received a restraining order against Panetti, he awoke early, shaved his head and donned camouflage, armed himself with a shotgun, rifle and several knives and drove to the Alvarados’ home in Fredericksburg, Texas. When he arrived, Panetti attempted to break down the door to Sonja’s bedroom. He caught her in the front yard after she ran from the house and hit her in the face with his rifle. Sonja managed to run back into the house and lock the front door, but Panetti shot the lock off and confronted her parents in the kitchen. As Sonja and her daughter watched from an adjacent hallway, Panetti shot and killed her father, then placed the shotgun to her mother’s chest and fired, killing her. He then forced Sonja and the child into his car and drove to his residence, where he held them until he surrendered to police the next day.
Panetti was evaluated by a psychiatrist and found competent to stand trial for murdering the Alvarados. He then requested a competency hearing. At the initial hearing the jury deadlocked, but a second jury agreed that he was competent. Prior to trial, Panetti insisted that he represent himself. At a separate hearing, the judge warned him not to dismiss his legal counsel but Panetti insisted that he was aware of the charges against him and the penalty he faced. He told the court that he had the right under Texas law and the U. S. Constitution to represent himself. When the District Attorney also expressed concern about Panetti representing himself the judge again advised against it to which Panetti replied, “I understand everything that’s been going on today, sir. I do, however, feel a little bit insulted that I have been asked the same question so many times, Your Honor.” The judge ruled that Panetti could represent himself but appointed standby counsel.
At trial Panetti presented an insanity defense, describing his years of mental health problems and claiming that when he did not take his medication, he could not distinguish right from wrong. He explained that an alternate personality named “Sarge” killed the Alvarados. The jury did not accept this and found him guilty of both murders. At a separate sentencing trial, the jury recommended the death penalty.
His conviction and sentence were upheld by the Texas courts on appeal, and his mental competence for execution was upheld on habeas corpus by the Federal District Court and Court of Appeals.
In an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief, the Foundation agreed that genuinely insane people should not be executed but argued that the definition of insanity for this purpose should be kept narrow. CJLF pointed out that a decision announcing a new, vague standard for competency would “trigger a wave of last-minute litigation,” causing delays which would “impair the deterrent effect of the death penalty and cost the lives of innocent people.”