Release Date:  January 15, 2007
Contact:  Michael Rushford
(916) 446-0345

The case of a Texas man sentenced to death for the murder of a former coworker during a robbery will be argued before the United States Supreme Court on Wednesday.  The case of Smith v. Texas involves a challenge to a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision which held that an error in the instructions to the sentencing jury, which was not objected to by the defense attorney, did not affect the jury’s sentencing decision.  The California-based Criminal Justice Legal Foundation has submitted argument in this case to encourage a decision rejecting the murderer’s challenge.

“The Texas court’s review of the effect of the error on the defendant’s case was similar to a process deemed proper by the Supreme Court two years ago,” said Kent Scheidegger, the Foundation’s Legal Director.  “We believe that if the defendant cannot show that an instruction he did not object to at trial was likely to have influenced the jury’s verdict, then there is nothing unconstitutional about the state court’s affirmance of the verdict,” he added.

At about 11:30 p.m. on January 8, 1991, LaRoyce Smith knocked on the door of a Taco Bell restaurant where he had previously worked.  When an employee told him that the restaurant was closed, Smith asked to see 19-year-old Jennifer Soto, who was the shift manager that night.  When Jennifer came to the door and recognized Smith, he told her his car had broken down and asked if he could use the telephone.  She agreed, letting Smith and two accomplices enter.  After pretending to make a phone call, Smith told the other employee he was going to rob the restaurant and “if you keep your mouth shut, you’ll get a cut of the money.”  He then went into the office where Jennifer was finishing some paperwork, pulled a handgun and demanded that she open the safe.  When she explained that she did not know the combination, Smith put her in a headlock and beat her with the butt of the gun, continuing to demand the combination.  When the handle of the gun broke off, Smith took a step backwards and shot the girl in the back.  Smith then went to the kitchen and retrieved a butcher knife and returned, stabbing the wounded girl while continuing to ask for the combination to the safe.  Finally, after stabbing her in the chest, thigh, stomach, and head, Smith slit her throat.  On the way out the door, Smith told the other restaurant employee that if he identified him, “Hey, I know your face and I’ll kill you.”

At trial, Smith testified on his own behalf, blaming his accomplices for Jennifer Soto’s murder.  But, based upon overwhelming evidence, including the surviving employee’s eyewitness testimony, the jury found Smith guilty of the murder.  At the sentencing hearing, Smith’s defense attorney called 19 witnesses to testify on his behalf and presented evidence of his low IQ, difficult upbringing, and trouble in school.  The prosecution rebutted with witnesses who recalled that Smith was a troublemaker who threatened to kill one of his teachers and the police officer who had arrested him and found ten baggies of crack cocaine in his underwear two months before Soto’s murder.

Prior to Smith’s trial, the United States Supreme Court overturned the sentencing jury instructions in Texas death penalty cases with its 1989 ruling in Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I). The Court’s decision concluded that the instructions did not direct the jury to consider mitigating evidence in some cases.  Because of this, Smith’s defense attorney had asked the trial judge to rule the state’s death penalty unconstitutional.  The judge declined, but proposed a modified jury instruction and invited the defense attorney to suggest any improvements.  The defense attorney did not suggest improvements or object to the new instruction, which directed the jury to “consider any evidence which, in your opinion . . . reduces the Defendant’s personal or moral culpability or blameworthiness, and may include, but is not limited to, any aspect of the Defendant’s character, record, background or circumstances of the offense for which you have found him guilty.”

On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld Smith’s death sentence, finding that the modified instruction complied with Penry I.  After Smith’s first state habeas corpus petition was dismissed, the U. S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), which held that a modified instruction used in Penry’s retrial did not fix the problem.  In a second state habeas corpus petition, Smith failed to convince the Texas court that his jury instruction was unconstitutional under Penry II.  In 2004, the Supreme Court heard Smith’s appeal and reversed the Texas court, finding that the instruction did not comply, and sent it back for reconsideration.  Last year, the Texas court, while acknowledging that the jury instruction was error, held that the defendant had failed to show that the error had caused “egregious harm” in his case.  The Court pointed out that Smith’s defense attorneys “did a superb job of weaving all of that (mitigating) evidence into a compelling theory of the case and . . . presented a strong, coherent and persuasive closing argument on punishment.”

Last fall, the Supreme Court agreed to consider Smith’s appeal of that holding.  At the request of the Texas Solicitor General, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation has submitted an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief in the case, arguing that the Texas court applied an appropriate standard of review for a non-fundamental procedural error to which the defendant did not object.  Further, the court came to the reasonable conclusion that the error did not prejudice the defendant’s case.

“The sentence was certainly justified in this case and the error was minor,” said Scheidegger.  “The Supreme Court’s decision should acknowledge this, and uphold the authority of the state courts to make these findings,” he added.