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A Guide to Regulating Panhandling
by Kent S. Scheidegger
Part II - Statutory Language
 
 

Statutory Language in Specific Cases.

For the benefit of those drafting statutes and ordinances in this area, we reproduce here the specific language of the enactments which were upheld or struck down in some of the leading cases. Along with each enactment, we cite the case dealing with validity of the enactment.
1. Complete ban.
"It shall be unlawful and a class C offense for anyone to beg or solicit alms in the streets or public places of the city or exhibit oneself for the purpose of begging or obtaining alms."
Jacksonville Municipal Ordinance § 330.105.
This ordinance was held unconstitutional in C.C.B. v. State.(61)
"A person is guilty of loitering when he:
"(1) Loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging."

New York Penal Law § 240.35(1).

Although phrased in terms of loitering, this statute seems to be a complete ban on panhandling. It is difficult to see how one could panhandle without either remaining or "wander[ing] about." This statute was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Loper v. New York City Police Dept.(62) It is likely that the city will appeal.

2. Accosting while soliciting.
"Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor: . . . (c) who accosts other persons in any public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms."

California Penal Code § 647(c).

This statute was upheld by a state appellate court in Ulmer v. Municipal Court.(63) However, it was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Blair v. Shanahan.(64) The Blair case is presently on appeal. We believe that the Ulmer decision is correct and that Blair was wrongly decided. This statute is permissible "manner" regulation. It only prohibits accosting people for solicitation. Standing in one place and soliciting passers-by is legal under this statute.

3. Obstructing traffic.
"B. A person is guilty of pedestrian interference if . . . [that person] intentionally:
Seattle Municipal Code 12A.12.015(B)(1).
This ordinance was upheld against a panhandler's claim that it was unconstitutional on its face in Seattle v. Webster.(65) The fact that the obstruction must be intentional was a key factor in the decision.
4. Particular places.
a) Airports.
* * *
Airport Rules and Regulations, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Chapter III (applicable to JFK, La Guardia, and Newark airports).
This regulation was upheld in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.(66) The majority held that the airports were not public forum. Justice Kennedy held that this was a permissible manner regulation, because only solicitation for immediate payment is prohibited. Handing out envelopes for mail-in donation, for example, is allowed.
b) Post Offices.
39 Code of Federal Regulations § 232.1(h)(1) (1989).
This regulation was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kokinda.(67) The plurality held that the post office and its grounds are not a public forum, and that the regulation was reasonable. Justice Kennedy concurred on the basis that, even though he believed the sidewalk leading into the post office was a public forum, the regulation's prohibition of solicitation for immediate payment of money was a permissible regulation of the manner of speech.
c) State Fairs.
Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05, authorized by Minn. Stat. § 37.16 (1980).
The licensed locations were fair booths, which were "rented to all comers in a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis." As so applied, the Supreme Court upheld the regulation in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.(68) The fact that the rule applied evenhandedly to all would-be solicitors was important to the decision.(69)
d) Subways.
New York Compiled Codes, Rule & Regulations, tit. 21 § 1050.6(b)-(c) (1989).
This regulation was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court but upheld by a 2-1 decision of the Court of Appeals.(70) The dissenting judge felt that the exemption for political, religious, and charitable causes transformed the subway into a public forum and hence opened it to panhandling. Compare Kokinda and Krishna, above, where flat bans on all in-person solicitation for immediate payment were upheld.
 
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Notes

61. 458 So. 2d 47, 50 (Fla. App. 1984).  [GO BACK] 

62. 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  [GO BACK] 

63. 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1976). 

64. 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
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65. 115 Wash. 2d 635, 802 P. 2d 1333 (1990).  [GO BACK] 

66. 120 L. Ed. 2d 541, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).  [GO BACK] 

67. 111 L. Ed. 2d 571, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).  [GO BACK] 

68. 452 U. S. 640 (1981). 

69. See id., at 649. 
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70. Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F. 2d 146 (CA2 1990).  [GO BACK] 

 
 
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