The ongoing debate about the risk of wrongful convictions in capital cases was recently and prominently displayed in the dueling separate opinions of Associate Justices Scalia and Souter in the Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Marsh (hereinafter Kansas). Kansas was a surprising forum for this debate because the case did not involve an issue of guilt or innocence, but a sentencing issue for an already convicted capital murderer. The Kansas opinions were equally unexpected because both Justices had passed up an opportunity to address the issue of guilt and innocence in an earlier case in which actual liability was at issue, House v. Bell (hereinafter House). In retrospect it makes sense that this debate waited to emerge fully in a case involving a death sentencing issue, since the debate about innocence is part of a strategy to abolish capital punishment. Or as Justice Scalia explained, “[o]ne cannot have a system of criminal punishment without accepting the possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly.”

This article examines and analyzes Justice Scalia’s challenge to the claims about “mistaken convictions” in death penalty cases. His concurring opinion raises important questions about the true nature and significance of “death row exonerations” in terms of evaluating our capital punishment system. The article will briefly examine how “mistaken convictions” have been part of the developing death penalty case law, describe the development of the claims about “actually innocent” condemned prisoners, and then discuss Justice Scalia’s critique of these claims. His opinion is a significant contribution to a more balanced perspective on this issue.

The Role of the Risk of Mistaken Convictions in Modern Capital Case Jurisprudence

There is nothing new about this debate. [T]he argument that innocent people may be executed—in small or large numbers—is not new; it has been central to the centuries-old debate over both the wisdom and the constitutionality of capital punishment. The risk that innocent people may be convicted “is a truism, not a revelation.”

The Court’s Consideration of “Mistaken Convictions” Prior to Kansas v. Marsh

The potential for executing the innocent played a role in two of the separate opinions that comprised the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision invalidating all of the extant death penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia. The Court held that these statutes gave the sentencer such unbridled, standard-less discretion that the imposition of the death penalty was arbitrary, capricious, and freakish. However, Furman left the door open for states to enact new statutes which dealt with these concerns.

When the Court upheld various death penalty statutes in 1976 in Gregg and its companion cases, it approved of bifurcated guilt and penalty proceedings so that convictions would not be tainted by exposure to prejudicial aggravating evidence of the defendant’s character—evidence which was ordinarily only relevant to sentence, not the underlying verdict of guilt. The Court has also held evidence of “actual innocence” can excuse a defendant’s failure to follow state procedures for making objections or raising claims on appeal.

Public sentiment has long supported—and continues to support—the death penalty even though the populace is aware that the criminal justice system is not foolproof. In the few years between Furman and Gregg, 35 states enacted new death penalty statutes. Today, 37 states

4. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2539 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.).
5. A more detailed and complete examination of this topic by this author will be published electronically on the Web sites of both the California District Attorneys Association (www.cdaa.org) and the Institute for the Advancement of Criminal Justice (www.iacj.org).
7. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2539 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.).
9. Ibid.
11. Furthermore, the public has long understood that there is always an inherent risk that an innocent person could be convicted and sentenced to death. In 2006, the Gallup Poll found that 63 percent of those polled believed that an innocent person had been sentenced to death and executed. Gallup Poll, available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx> (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). However, in October 2007, the Gallup Poll showed that 69 percent of the country supported the death penalty. (Ibid.)
and the federal government impose the death penalty for one or more especially heinous types of crime.\textsuperscript{13}

The constitutionality of the death penalty has not seriously been questioned by the United States Supreme Court for over 30 years. In \textit{Herrera v. Collins}, the Court declined to hold that federal courts could entertain so-called "freestanding" claims of actual innocence by capital prisoners (i.e., independent claims of innocence that did not depend on a specific constitutional violation).\textsuperscript{14} The petitioners pointed out the obvious—that Constitutional protections "sometimes fail."\textsuperscript{15} The late Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the scholarly debate surrounding studies of cases of "actual innocence" or "mistaken convictions"\textsuperscript{16} (including a study cited by Justice Blackmun in dissent). When Justice Blackmun subsequently announced that he would no longer "tinker with the machinery of death," he opined on the "inevitability" of "factual, legal, and moral error." He cited an academic study to support his opinion and to criticize \textit{Herrera}. Since \textit{Herrera}, the debate about "actual innocence" has continued.\textsuperscript{17}

No reasonable prosecutor would ever claim an innocent person has never been convicted and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court already acknowledges the potential for fallibility.\textsuperscript{18} There is always a risk of convicting the "actually innocent," since our criminal justice system requires proof of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt," not to an "absolute certainty."\textsuperscript{19} "Society assumed the risk when it approved the penalty of death that its search for truth might occasionally be inadequate."\textsuperscript{20}

The Supreme Court has recognized a connection between determinations of guilt and innocence and the postconviction sentencing function. But the Court’s concern was not about "mistaken convictions," but about the risk of "mistaken acquittals" under "mandatory" death penalty statutes. A "mandatory" statute required the sentencer automatically to impose the death penalty when a defendant was convicted of capital murder without any consideration of mitigating factors justifying a sentence less than death. In 1976, the Court found these statutes were flawed because of the risk that juries would decline to convict defendants of first-degree murder in cases they believed the death penalty was undeserved. Thus, in the Court’s opinion, a conviction or acquittal was affected by the lack of any intermediate alternative.\textsuperscript{21}

On the other hand, these mandatory statutes were also unconstitutional because they prevented sentencers from considering mitigating factors when juries did convict defendants of capital murder.\textsuperscript{22} In the latter circumstance, it could not be certain whether a sentencer would have returned a death verdict, but for the non-discretionary command of the "mandatory" statute. The bottom line was that mandatory statutes gave no guidance to the sentencers about how to exercise their de facto sentencing power.\textsuperscript{23}

Subsequently, the Court invalidated an Alabama capital statute because it prohibited the trial court from instructing a jury on lesser included offenses. Under this system, a jury was presented with an "all or nothing," "convict of capital murder or acquit" choice that could result in unwarranted convictions or unwarranted not guilty verdicts because of the jury’s concern about the potential punishment.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, the Alabama scheme had the same hazards as the unconstitutional "mandatory" statutes.

As Justice Thomas ultimately recounted in \textit{Kansas}, the Court’s jurisprudence requires that, a state capital sentencing system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime. ... In aggregate, our precedents confer upon defendants the right to present sentencers with information relevant to the sentencing decision and oblige sentencers to consider that information in determining the appropriate sentence. The thrust of our mitigation jurisprudence ends here.\textsuperscript{25}

The Eighth Amendment did not mandate a particular balance of aggravating and mitigating factors.\textsuperscript{26}

13. New Jersey recently abolished the death penalty. N.J.S.A. \textsection 2C:49-1 to 2C:49-12, repealed by L.2007, c. 204, \textsection 7, eff. 12/17/07. New York’s state courts have declared its statute unconstitutional as a matter of state law. (\textit{People v. Taylor} (2007) 878 N.E.2d 969.)


16. Id. at 415.


23. Id. at 303–304.


27. \textit{Ibid.}
In terms of its "mitigation jurisprudence," the Court has considered the question of guilt or innocence and penalty in various cases. For instance, the Court upheld using the same jury for both guilt and sentence because the defendant would have the advantage of any "residual doubts" about guilt held by the jury at the time of sentencing. But the Court declined to hold that defendants are entitled to instructions on "residual doubt." Interestingly, during the same term as the House and Kansas decisions, Justice Breyer wrote the lead opinion for a unanimous Court, upholding a state law that precluded introduction of new evidence supporting an alibi in the penalty phase. Justice Breyer's opinion noted that "sentencing traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed the crime."  

The Court, or an individual justice, has touched upon the fallibility of the system in other recent cases. In 2002, the Court declared that the execution of the mentally retarded substantively violated the Eighth Amendment. One of the reasons for this decision was the risk that the mentally retarded would falsely confess to murder. Justice Stevens' opinion stated

we cannot ignore the fact that in recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated. These exonerations have included at least one mentally retarded person who unwittingly confessed to a crime that he did not commit.  

Prior to Kansas, Justice Breyer referred to the debate about the potential unreliability of convictions as one of a number of reasons he favored jury determination of the appropriate sentence.  

Kansas v. Marsh  

Members of the Court did not debate the risk of "mistaken convictions" as a systemic issue until Kansas v. Marsh. The events leading up to the Kansas opinions began with the earlier briefing the same term in House.  

In that case, convicted murderer House filed a habeas corpus petition raising claims in federal court that the state court had rejected on procedural grounds. The rule is that federal courts will not hear such claims (the "procedural default" rule). But federal courts will excuse the default if the petitioner produces compelling evidence of actual innocence. In House, the Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner had submitted convincing evidence of his innocence. The petition for writ of certiorari referred to an "increasing number of exonerations" in capital cases and cited the Web site of the Death Penalty Information Center (hereinafter DPIC). The American Bar Association and a separate group of criminal law professors and former prosecutors filed amici curiae briefs. The ABA asserted that "innocence exonerations" were "uncommon," but still "increasingly frequent" and cited various sources including the DPIC. The brief filed by law professors and former prosecutors similarly claimed that the recent exonerations of death row inmates had "garnered significant publicity," and included the DPIC as a source. The State of California and 14 other states filed an amicus curiae brief criticizing the DPIC's List of death row exonerations. Ultimately, a majority of the Court held that House had made a compelling case of "actual innocence." But neither the majority nor dissenting opinions discussed the larger issue of exonerations raised in the amici curiae briefs. That issue waited for a case that related to capital sentencing itself.  

Later that same term, in Kansas, the issue did not involve the guilt or innocence of a convicted murderer. Rather, the question before the Court was whether the state could require a jury to impose a death sentence if the aggravating and mitigating factors were evenly balanced or in "equipoise." By a 5–4 majority, the Court upheld the Kansas state law requirement since the Eighth Amendment did not prevent a state from permitting a sentence less than death only when the mitigating factors actually outweighed aggravating factors.  

In his Kansas dissent, Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) argued for extending "the thrust of mitigation jurisprudence"
and the Court’s Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence in general. He relied on what he characterized as a remarkable and unimaginable number of exonerations in capital cases. Justice Souter cited the evidence of “repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences” and argued that those concerns were of “cautionary” and “practical” relevance to the constitutionality of Kansas’ procedure for determining a capital sentence. Without referring to the briefing filed in House, Justice Souter relied upon the “growing literature” cited in the amici curiae briefs filed in that case. He concluded that,

the same risks of falsity that infect proof of guilt raise questions about sentences, when the circumstances of the crime are aggravating factors and bear on predictions of future dangerousness.

Justice Souter’s dissent also included a pregnant observation that it was still “far too soon for any generalization about the soundness of capital sentencing across the country.”

Justice Thomas’ majority opinion dismissed Justice Souter’s concerns as “irrelevant,” except to note that their “logical consequence” was a standard of perfection that would result in the improper judicial abolition of the death penalty. Justice Thomas noted various studies and reports about exonerations in capital cases and, with prescience, stated that they invoked an “incendiary debate” that was beyond the scope of the pure sentencing issue presented by Kansas.

Of course, Justice Souter had already ignited the debate, and Justice Scalia fired back.

Justice Scalia vigorously criticized Justice Souter’s dissent and the “growing literature” he cited. First, he noted, there was no showing that an “actually innocent” person had been executed under contemporary capital punishment laws. Second, he challenged the methodology of the studies cited by Justice Souter. Third, he agreed with Justice Thomas that the reasoning of Justice Souter’s dissent amounted to a quest for “100% perfection” in capital proceedings that would lead to additional unjustified judicially-created encumbrances on the imposition of the death penalty.

Fourth, Justice Scalia believed it necessary to point out the insubstantiality of Justice Souter’s concerns in order to minimize the risk that the dissent would be trumpeted as vindicating “sanctimonious” international “finger-waggers.”

In his Kansas concurring opinion, Justice Scalia acknowledged that “courts and juries are not perfect.” But while acknowledging that imperfection is inevitable, Justice Scalia offered perspective on the misleading methodology, temporal irrelevance, and exaggerated rhetoric behind current claims relating to death row “exonerations.”

Justice Scalia’s concurrence highlighted the deficiencies in the list of allegedly exonerated death row inmates maintained by the DPIC. In the “inflation of the word ‘exoneration,’” he identified the DPIC List as the “best known” catalogue of “innocence” in the death-penalty context. In particular, Justice Scalia cited information that was contained only in the California amici briefing in House.

Both Justice Thomas’ opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Kansas establish a bright line between guilt and penalty phases in capital cases. To the extent that a consideration of guilt and innocence affects Eighth Amendment procedural jurisprudence, it is limited only to statutes that preclude a jury from considering factors that would mandate a sentence less than death (the concern about mistaken acquittals that rendered mandatory statutes unconstitutional). That concern will not extend further to embellish the procedural requirements of the Eighth Amendment for imposition of the death penalty because its impossibly perfectionistic premise would effectively abolish capital punishment.

41. Id. at 2544.
42. Id. at 2544–2546.
43. Id. at 2545.
44. Id. at 2528–2529.
45. Id. at 2528.
46. Id. at 2533.
47. Id. at 2538.
48. Id. at 2532–2533.
49. Id. at 2539.
50. Id. at 2537. When Justice Scalia wrote his opinion in Kansas, the DPIC List contained 123 “exonerated” defendants. The number listed, as of May 5, 2008, is 129, DPIC List, supra, note 35.
51. Id. at 2531–2539 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.); California House Brief, supra, note 38 at 13–16, 21 (discussing the Steven Smith, Jeremy Sheets, and Delbert Tibbs cases).
52. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2529 (maj. opn. of Thomas, J.), 2539 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.).
But as already noted, the specific purpose of this article is to elaborate on, and expand upon, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Kansas. The article briefly sets forth the history and development of the DPIC List. In addition, it further buttresses Justice Scalia’s criticisms of the DPIC List’s definitions of “exoneration” and “actual innocence,” and show how its approach artificially inflates the number of truly innocent defendants.

**Background of the DPIC List**

Although there are other studies and lists relating to innocence, it is appropriate to focus on the DPIC List because it is concerned exclusively with capital cases since 1970. Most (though by no means all) capital cases tried since 1970 have been subject to the various procedural protections mandated by the Supreme Court’s post-Gregg Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and the DPIC List is the most prominent and frequently cited of the lists of allegedly innocent condemned inmates. Most significantly, the DPIC List is the leading edge of the current strategy for the abolition of the death penalty in the United States.

According to its Web site, DPIC derives its List from court opinions, media reports, and conversations with unidentified participants. Although the List was commissioned by the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights in 1993, it traces its origins to studies referenced in Herrera. These studies were discussed in an academic exchange of articles in the 1988 Stanford Law Review.

The Stanford study focused primarily on “wrong person” mistakes, cases in which the defendant was both legally and physically uninvolved. It excluded cases in which the defendant was acquitted on grounds of self-defense. The Stanford authors admitted that their study was not definitive and that their conclusions about innocence were based on their untested belief that a “majority of neutral observers” examining these cases would conclude the defendants named in their study were actually innocent. The popular successor to the Stanford study is the 1992 book by the same authors entitled In Spite of Innocence.

The most recent refinement of the Stanford study appears in Radelet, Lofquist & Bedau, Doubts About Their Guilt, published in the Cooley Law Review in 1996. This article altered the criteria in the Stanford study. For instance, it included accomplices mistakenly convicted as actual perpetrators. More notably, Cooley inclu[ed] cases where juries have acquitted, or state appellate courts have vacated the convictions of defendants, because of doubts about their guilt (even if we personally believe the evidence of innocence is relatively weak).

Regrettably, the Cooley article does not identify all the cases which the authors believe are “relatively weak” examples of actual innocence.

The DPIC List amalgamates the cases listed in these studies with other cases. It has recently described its revised criteria for inclusion of cases on its list.

The definition of innocence that DPIC uses in placing defendants on the list is that they had been convicted and sentenced to death.

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53. Due to constraints of space, this article cannot conduct an exhaustive analysis of all 129 inmates currently named on the DPIC List. A more detailed and complete examination of this topic by this author will be published electronically on the Web sites of both the California District Attorneys Association (www.cdaa.org) and the Institute for the Advancement of Criminal Justice (www.iacj.org).

54. For instance, the amici in House and Justice Scalia in Kansas also cite Samuel Gross, Exoneration in the United States 1989 Through 2003 (2004) 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523. This study relies substantially on the DPIC List although it does not agree with the DPIC List regarding all defendants. The Gross study also includes cases other than capital crimes.

55. York, supra, note 3 at pp. 20–23.

56. DPIC Web site, supra, note 35.

57. Herrera, supra, note 34 at 415.


59. Stanford, supra, at 23–24, 45, 47–48, 74. Ironically, the DPIC has now repudiated this “neutral observer” standard without acknowledging that it was originated by the Stanford study for cases now included on the DPIC List. See Innocence and the Crisis in the American Death Penalty, supra, note 35.

60. Bedau & Radelet, In Spite of Innocence (Northeastern 1992). Both the Stanford study and its immediate sequel were limited to “wrong person” convictions. However, most of the cases cited did not involve death sentences. They also included cases in which the defendant committed crimes for which the death penalty can no longer be sought. On the other hand, these studies also excluded cases in which the defendants were actual perpetrators, even if they acted in self-defense or were insane.


62. Id. at 914 (emphasis added), 917 (identifying Samuel Poole as a ‘weak’ example of an innocent defendant).
and subsequently either a) their conviction was overturned and they were acquitted at a re-trial, or all charges were dropped; or b) they were given an absolute pardon by the governor based on new evidence of innocence.  

As will be shown below, these criteria do not accurately identify persons sentenced to death who are “actually innocent” of the underlying crime. They are not consistent with the “wrong person” criteria used in the original Stanford study nor are they consistent with popular understanding of true exoneration. To the extent that the DPIC’s definition was intended to act like a presumption of “actual innocence,” it fails since it will not reach the correct result most of the time.

The Expansion of Innocence: Why the DPIC List is Overly Inclusive

“A prototypical example of ‘actual innocence’ in a colloquial sense is the case where the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime.” The DPIC List criteria quoted above have obvious shortcomings in terms of identifying the “actually innocent” because appellate reversals, acquittals on retrial, and prosecutorial dismissals are not conclusive evidence of innocence. The DPIC List is misleading for another reason: it includes defendants whose convictions were reversed due to legal insufficiency, not based on successful assertions to a judge or jury of actual “wrong person” innocence. Justice Scalia described this flaw as a failure to, distinguish[] between exoneration of a convict because of actual innocence, and reversal of a judgment because of legal error affecting conviction or sentence but not inconsistent with guilt in fact.

The DPIC List, according to Justice Scalia, inflates the word ‘exoneration’ by ‘mispercharacteriz[ing] reversible error as actual innocence.’

The DPIC List Equates Acquittals and Dismissals with “Actual Innocence”

When a jury acquits a defendant because the prosecution has not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that verdict does not mean that the defendant did not actually commit the crime, i.e., that the defendant is “actually innocent.” Even an acquittal based on self defense

63. DPIC List, supra, note 35. Due to this revision, the DPIC removed six defendants it had formerly classified as “exonerees,” including Californians Jerry Bigelow and Patrick Croy. Both of these defendants had been listed on the DPIC List even though they were indisputably actual perpetrators or physically involved in the murders for which they had been sentenced to death. Bigelow v. Superior Court (People) (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1127 (jury acquitted Bigelow of first-degree murder, but found true that the murder occurred while Bigelow was committing or was an accomplice in the commission of robbery and kidnapping; court mistakenly excused jury before giving it the opportunity to clarify its inconsistent verdict; however, this verdict still established that the jury rejected Bigelow’s defense and believed he was at least an accomplice to first degree murder); People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 (Croy’s conviction of conspiracy to commit murder was affirmed, but his first-degree murder conviction was reversed for instructional error, his defense at his first trial was intoxication); Talbort, The Ballad of Hooty Croy, L.A. Times (June 24, 1990) p. 16 (Croy abandoned intoxication on retrial and changed his defense to “cultural self defense” based on his status as a Native American). The DPIC has prudently chosen not to place another Californian, Lee Perry Farmer, on its List even though it has asserted that his case is one of “probable innocence.” Farmer is not an appropriate candidate for a designation of “actual innocence.” Farmer and an associate, Huffman, were tried separately for a 1981 burglary murder connected with their extortionate scheme to collect a drug debt from the victim’s roommate owed to Farmer. Huffman was acquitted. At his trial, Farmer blamed Huffman for the killing and claimed he did not participate. Farmer was nonetheless convicted. His original death sentence was reversed because of instructional error in the penalty phase. (People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888.) On retrial, Farmer was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Thus, the normal appellate review process worked to reduce his sentence. Ultimately, Farmer’s second trial was also reversed on federal habeas corpus for ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was acquitted of murder at his third trial, although he was found guilty of burglary and accessory to murder. (Farmer v. Ratelle (9th Cir.1997) 133 F.3d 146, 1997 WL 730314 (unpublished disposition); Kataoka, Retrial Jury Acquits Man Who Has Served 16 Years, Riverside Press-Enterprise (Jan. 16, 1999) p. B1). It was undisputed that Farmer and Huffman broke into the victim’s apartment a first time and stole his roommate’s gun and other valuables. According to Farmer, they returned to the apartment a few hours later to confront the debtor about the “collateral” they had collected. After his objections, Huffman had reentered the apartment to steal more items when the murder occurred. However, the victim remained alive long enough to tell police that his killer had drug dealings with his roommate and that his name was in a “phone book.” Farmer fit this description. By the time of the third trial, six witnesses from the first trial were unavailable and the prosecutor could only read their prior testimony into the record. The prosecution did not charge and convict the wrong people for murder—either Farmer or Huffman was the guilty party. Farmer was involved in the activities leading up to the murder and afterwards. The only issue is whether he or Huffman was the triggerman. That controversy centers on contradictory confessions and accusations by Huffman. Huffman made contradictory statements, but he never personally testified he was the actual killer, even after he was acquitted and could not be retried. Both men benefited from having separate trials when each could blame the other. At his final trial, Farmer presented evidence of his transformation from a drug maker into a “highly spiritual man.” A year after his acquittal, he apparently transformed back to a life of crime and pled guilty to methamphetamine crimes in both Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. (Kataoka, Slaying Suspect to Go in Front of Third Jury, Riverside Press-Enterprise (Jan. 2, 1999) p. B1; Kataoka, Ex-death Row Inmate Pleads Guilty, Riverside Press-Enterprise (Nov. 2, 2001) p. B3; People v. Farmer (2004) 2004 WL 405901 (unpublished opinion affirming seven-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine.).

64. Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 737 (“Per se rules should not be applied, however, in situations where the generalization is incorrect as an empirical matter; the justification for a conclusive presumption disappears when application of the presumption will not reach the correct result most of the time.”).


66. Stanford Reply, supra, note 58 at 162.

67. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2536.

68. Id. at 2537.

69. Dowling v. United States (1990) 493 U.S. 342, 249; Graham v. City of Philadelphia (3rd Cir. 2005) 402 F.3d 139, 145 (“an acquittal (i.e., not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) following a criminal trial is not ipso facto a finding of actual innocence”).
that the defendant is innocent or that the defendant is not guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but for reasons wholly unrelated to guilt or innocence (for example, the prosecution’s chief witnesses may have died or disappeared).75

“Passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible.”76 Finally, in egregious cases, a case may be dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct even if the defendant is not actually innocent.77

As an example of a defendant whose name has been misplaced on the DPIC List, Justice Scalia’s House concurrence focuses on the particularly notorious example of Jay C. Smith (48),78 a defendant whose case was dismissed for reasons other than “actual innocence.”79 As a matter of Pennsylvania law, Smith escaped retrial for triple murder due to prosecutorial misconduct.80 But when he sought damages from the government for false imprisonment stemming from his initial conviction, the federal appeals court conclusively retorted, “Our confidence in Smith’s convictions for [triple-murder] is not the least bit diminished.”81 Yet Smith still remains on the DPIC List as an ‘exonerée.’82

There are cases similar to Smith’s on the DPIC List. For instance, the Florida Supreme Court explained that, evidence exists in this case to establish that [Robert Hayes (71)] committed this offense [rape-murder], physical evidence also exists to establish that someone other than Hayes committed the offense.83

The appeals court excluded evidence of Hayes’s semen on the victim’s shirt. Despite the presence of Hayes’s semen in the victim’s vagina, other circumstantial evidence pointing at another perpetrator raised a reasonable doubt about Hayes.84 But Hayes’s acquittal hardly establishes that the prosecution was trying the “wrong person.”

Similarly, when the California Supreme Court vacated Troy Lee Jones’ (66) murder conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court noted that there was still evidence suggesting Jones’s guilt even if that evidence was not overwhelming.85 The court did not indicate that Jones was actually innocent. But due to the passage of time, the prosecution no longer had the evidence and witnesses available to retry Jones’ case.86

Warren Douglas Manning (83) was tried five times before he was acquitted. The first four trials ended as either mistrials or convictions that were reversed for instructional and venue error,87 but the jury’s verdict was not based on ‘actual

71. Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 316 (a “subjective state of near certitude”); Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16 (upholding California’s “reasonable doubt” instruction and agreeing that “everything is open to some possible or imaginary doubt”).
73. Gregg, supra, note 12 at 225 (conc. opn. of White, J.).
75. Bedau & Radelet, supra, note 74 at 106.
78. The parenthetical number refers to a defendant’s numerical placement on the DPIC List as of May 5, 2008. See DPIC List, supra, note 35; Marquis, supra, note 18 at 516.
79. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2536–2537.
81. Id. at 201.
82. DPIC List, supra, note 35.
innocence.” Rather, as Manning’s lawyer conceded to the jury:

If there wasn’t any case against Warren Manning, then we wouldn’t be here. But the law requires that the state prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Without that, the law says you cannot find him guilty.88

Most recently, and despite Justice Scalia’s criticism, the DPIC listed Curtis McCarty (124) as an exonerated death row inmate. McCarty was convicted and sentenced to death for a murder related to a sexual assault. McCarty’s case was not dismissed because he was innocent. Rather, the trial court found that the actions of a former police chemist had tainted or destroyed forensic evidence in the case. Based on the other evidence, the trial court judge actually advised McCarty that she believed that McCarty was still involved in the murder for which he had been convicted.89 The other evidence included McCarty’s fingerprint at the scene of the crime, evidence that the rope wrapped around the victims’ neck was similar to rope manufactured at McCarty’s place of employment, evidence that he was in the vicinity of the murder the night it occurred and that he made admissions referencing the death of a girl and indicating a consciousness of guilt, and his own inconsistent statements. Although DNA testing showed that sperm in the victim was not McCarty’s, both the trial court and the reviewing court found that McCarty was not exonerated since the testing did not eliminate the possibility that he had acted with an accomplice. The actions of the forensic chemist ultimately compromised the case, but there was still substantial evidence of McCarty’s guilt.90

The DPIC List Includes Defendants Whose Cases Were Reversed for Legal Insufficiency, Not Actual Innocence

The DPIC List violates its own criteria by including cases in which convictions were reversed due to legal insufficiency, not because of actual innocence. The federal standard for legal sufficiency was articulated in Jackson v. Virginia.91 But “[a]ctual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”92 A finding that the evidence could not reasonably prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not the equivalent of an exoneration.93

Of course, if an appeals court reverses a conviction because the evidence of guilt was legally insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the state cannot retry the defendant under the Double Jeopardy Clause.94 The prosecution gets no second chance, even if there is better evidence of guilt available. But that does not mean that the defendant who is released is the “prototypical” example of “actual innocence,” the “wrong person.” Rather, it is a vindication of [the capital justice system’s] effectiveness in releasing not only defendants who are innocent, but those whose guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.95

When defendants’ convictions are returned for legal insufficiency, they are not “innocent” under the DPIC List’s own criteria. They were not “acquitted at a re-trial” nor were “all charges … dropped” due to their innocence nor were they pardoned based on innocence.

As Justice Scalia’s Kansas opinion points out, the inclusion of Steven Smith’s (79) case refutes any claim that the DPIC List distinguishes between pure “legal error” and “actual innocence.”96 He found significant that the Illinois Supreme Court reversed Smith’s conviction for insufficiency of the evidence with the following caveat:

While a not guilty finding is sometimes equated with a finding of innocence, that conclusion is erroneous. Courts do not find people guilty or innocent. They find them guilty or not guilty. A not guilty verdict expresses no view as to a defendant’s innocence. Rather, it indicates simply that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof…. When the State cannot meet its burden of proof, the defendant must go free. This case happens to be a murder case carrying a sentence of death against a defendant where the State has failed to meet its burden. It is no help to speculate that the defendant may have killed the victim.97

Interestingly, Justice Souter’s dissent simply cited Smith as an example of an exoneration without any particular explanation or analysis.98

Other cases on the DPIC List echo Justice Scalia’s point about the Steven Smith case. For instance, Andrew Golden’s (55) conviction was reversed because of legal insufficiency of the

93. Jackson, supra, note 91 at 33.
95. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2536.
96. Id.
98. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2545.
because they have benefited from the Defendants who cannot be retried Evidence of Their Guilt
The DPIC List Includes Defendants Who Benefited From the Exclusion of Evidence of Their Guilt

Jonathan Treadaway (13) made a “windfall” of suppressed or excluded evidence of their guilt are not “actually innocent.”

[I]t has long been clear that exclusion of illegally seized but wholly reliable evidence renders verdicts less fair and just, because it “deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.”

Yet the DPIC List contains defendants whose cases were dismissed because evidence of their guilt was excluded on retrial, not because they were the “wrong persons.”

In particular, Justice Scalia singled out Jeremy Sheets (97). The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed Sheets’ conviction because the trial court should have excluded some prosecution evidence. However, there was no showing that this excluded evidence was unreliable. In light of this state court ruling, the prosecution did not retry Sheets. But the Nebraska State Victims’ Compensation Fund denied Sheets’ request for compensation because the dismissal of his case was not based on innocence. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Sheets’ civil rights suit because there was no showing that the evidence of Sheets’ guilt, including the excluded evidence, was unreliable.

When he was interrogated about the murderous sexual assault of a six-year-old boy in the little boy’s bedroom, Jonathan Treadaway (13) made a number of incriminating statements to police and failed to explain other incriminating evidence including the presence of his two palm prints outside the victim’s locked bedroom window. The evidence of his statements was suppressed because of a technical violation of Miranda v. Arizona. Of course, the exclusion of a statement on Miranda grounds does not mean that the statements were unreliable. The exclusion of these statements precluded evidence of a “consciousness of guilt” by Treadaway that could have affected the jury’s ultimate acquittal of him on retrial since jurors were concerned that the prosecution had not presented enough evidence to establish that Treadaway was inside the boy’s home. The acquittal did not mean that Treadaway was “actually innocent.”

The trial court excluded evidence of Dale Johnston’s (43) guilt that was seized as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” of an unconstitutionally coercive interrogation. Subsequently, a state trial court rejected Johnston’s request for compensation for wrongful imprisonment because his innocence was not established.

Benjamin Harris (70) made incriminating statements that he committed a contract killing to the police, which he then contradicted on the witness stand when he denied that the killing was contractual. The incriminating statements were then suppressed on

103. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2537.
108. Bedau & Radelet, supra, note 60 at 349. At Treadaway’s first trial, he had testified that he had not looked in the victim’s window that night or anytime shortly before. However, the testimony of the victim’s mother that she washed the front windows of the house the day before the murder raised the inference that Treadaway’s palm prints were fresh. (State v. Treadaway (Ariz. 1977) 568 P.2d 1061, 1062–1063.) Treadaway had also been arrested for a similar sexual attack of a boy in the boy’s bedroom three months before the murder for which he was initially convicted and sentenced to death. A physical examination of Treadaway’s pubic area and clothes revealed the presence of “rare” crab louse sacks. When Treadaway was interrogated after his arrest for murder, he admitted he had “crabs.” However, even though the court admitted evidence of Treadaway’s prior bad similar act, the later admission about his lice was suppressed. (State v. Corcoran, supra, note 106.) Thus, on retrial, the jury heard about Treadaway’s prior crime, but did not hear the evidence about the infestation that identified him as the perpetrator of both crimes.
the ground that Harris’s attorney was ineffective for permitting Harris to talk to the police. Harris was not retried.

The DPIC List Includes Defendants Who Were the Actual Perpetrators or Principals

Contrary to the original Stanford Study, the DPIC List now includes defendants who were involved in the murders they were charged with committing, even if they were not the actual perpetrators. Richard Neal Jones (34) was acquitted of murder, but remained implicated in the conspiracy leading to the murder.

Similarly, the evidence was insufficient that Ricardo Aldape Guerra (69) was the actual triggerman in the murder of a police officer, but the evidence remained that he was an accomplice. Since Guerra was not prosecuted under Texas’ “law of parties,” he could not be retried.

The DPIC List also abandons the criteria of the Stanford Study and includes defendants who were not the “wrong persons,” but were acquitted on grounds of justified or excusable “wrong persons,” but were acquitted or who had their cases dismissed because of recanted testimony or statements. Yet, recantations “are properly viewed with great suspicion.” Notwithstanding the inherent unreliability of recantations, the DPIC List includes defendants who were acquitted or who had their cases dismissed because of recanted testimony and statements.

For instance, Joseph Green Brown (27) could not be retried because of the multiple recantations of the prosecution’s witness.

Oscar Lee Morris (93) was found ineligible for the death penalty due to insufficient evidence. Ultimately, he was released due to a “deathbed recantation” given by a prosecution witness under “suspicious circumstances.” After Morris’s unsuccessful civil rights suit, the Los Angeles City Attorney referred to the recantation as “an under-the-cover recitation with nobody who can verify it one way or another.”

When Joaquin Martinez (96) was returned for retrial, his ex-wife recanted the testimony she gave against him at the first trial. The taped statements that could have contradicted her recantation were excluded.

Recently, in May 2008, the DPIC posted Levon Jones (129) on the “Innocence List.” A federal district court vacated Jones’ conviction and death sentence for murdering Leamon Grady due to ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to adequately impeach the prosecution’s main witness, Lovely Lorden, and present evidence of another suspect. Significantly, the federal district court refused to find that Jones was actually innocent, only that this new evidence may well have caused one or more of the jurors to have a reasonable doubt … however, [the evidence was

111. Harris v. Wood (9th Cir. 1995) 64 F.3d 1432.
114. Guerra v. Johnson (5th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 1075, 1076.
115. Plate v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) 875 S.W.2d 344, 347 (under the “law of parties,” a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. If a defendant is tried only as an actual perpetrator and then the conviction is reversed, he or she cannot be retried under the “law of parties.”).
117. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2536.
118. Id. at 2537.
121. People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1. Thus, the state court had already found him legally ineligible for the death penalty.
not] so compelling as to establish that no reasonable juror could have found [Jones] guilty of murder.\textsuperscript{125}

Witness Lorden had testified against Jones because she was afraid of him and wanted to make certain he was never released.\textsuperscript{126} When the prosecution decided not to seek the death penalty on retrial, the North Carolina sentencing law made Jones eligible for release after 20 years. Lorden immediately recanted. Since another witness and investigator who could have provided incriminating testimony against Jones had died during the 15 years since the trial, the prosecution dismissed the case. Accordingly, this is not a case in which Jones was found actually innocent. The main witness recanted under suspicious circumstances consistent with her fear of his pending release and other evidence was no longer available. The federal court which vacated the original conviction did not find evidence of Jones’ innocence sufficiently compelling to preclude a retrial. “As a result of this delay, the State has been severely handcuffed in its obligation to prosecute Mr. Jones for the murder of Leamon Grady.”\textsuperscript{127}

The DPIC List ignores evidence from co-defendant’s trials that is inconsistent with claims of “actual innocence.” When co-defendants are tried separately, evidence admissible against a defendant in one trial may not be admissible in the other co-defendant’s trial. This may include evidence of the co-defendant’s guilt.\textsuperscript{128} An analysis of an allegedly exonerated prisoner’s co-defendant sometimes provides a more complete picture of the offense and casts doubt on an a prisoner’s innocence claim. In several cases, the evidence elicited in other trials casts doubts on the “actual innocence” of defendants listed on the DPIC List.

James Robison’s (53) conviction was reversed due to evidentiary error, and he was acquitted on retrial. However, evidence incriminating Robison was introduced at the separate trial of his alleged accomplice.\textsuperscript{129}

Muneer Deeb (54) was acquitted of a bungled murder for hire after his case was reversed for hearsay error. A previous witness also refused to testify.\textsuperscript{130} But evidence at the separate trial of Deeb’s alleged co-conspirator still connected Deeb with the murder.\textsuperscript{131}

The DPIC List ignores media reports inconsistent with “actual innocence.”

Defendants are acquitted for many reasons, the least likely being innocence. A defendant may be acquitted even though almost every member of the jury is satisfied of his guilt if even one juror harbors a lingering doubt.\textsuperscript{132}

Although the DPIC List cites media reports as sources for its information, it disregards statements by jurors inconsistent with the conclusion that a defendant is “actually innocent.” While such statements are not admissible as evidence, these contemporaneous post-verdict explanations illustrate the distinction between acquittal and “actual innocence.”

The jurors who acquitted Robert Charles Cruz (58) explained their not guilty verdict as a matter of reasonable doubt.\textsuperscript{133}

Jurors admitted that they had doubts as soon as they voted unanimously for acquittal, with some saying they walked into the courtroom with aching stomachs. Some said they were consoled by the thought that if Cruz was involved, he had spent nearly 15 years in prison.\textsuperscript{134}

Similarly, a juror in the Alfred Rivera (84) trial characterized the acquittal as only a matter of reasonable doubt.\textsuperscript{135}

Sabrina Butler (61) was acquitted after the state court reversed her conviction because the prosecutor improperly commented on her failure to testify at her trial for murdering her infant son Walter by inflicting fatal abdominal injuries.\textsuperscript{136} She was acquitted on retrial, but not necessarily because she was not the actual killer of her young baby. There were alternative explanations for the baby’s death, and the jury foreperson indicated only that the jury had a “reasonable doubt” that Butler administered the fatal blow. Butler’s own attorney stated that he “doesn’t know what the truth is.” Butler’s co-counsel indicated that, at best, the case should have been prosecuted as a manslaughter, hardly an endorsement of Butler’s innocence. Butler’s acquittal on retrial does not represent a finding that she did not administer the deadly trauma that killed Walter.\textsuperscript{136}
The DPIC List includes cases in which the conventional system of appellate review worked to the defendant’s benefit

Cases in which convictions were reversed “in the normal course of appellate review” without the “fortuitous discovery of new evidence” should have no “legitimate role to play in attacks on the death penalty.” As Justice Scalia elaborated:

Reversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas ... demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success. Those devices are part and parcel of the multiple assurances that are applied before a death sentence is carried out. The DPIC List includes many cases in which defendants were acquitted on retrial after reversal on direct review or were released on grounds of insufficient evidence due to the idiosyncrasies of state laws that are even more stringent than the federal standards for sufficiency of the evidence. Delbert Tibbs (11) was convicted and sentenced to death for the evidence. On appeal, Tibbs benefitted from a now obsolete Florida rule that he raped. On appeal, Tibbs benefited from the same rule that the rape complainant since she was the sole witness in the rape case “so as to avoid an unmerited conviction.” Thus, despite the evidence of Tibbs’ guilt as stated in this Court’s opinion in Tibbs v. Florida his conviction was reversed—an action that the Florida Supreme Court later regretted as “clearly improper.”

Annibal Jaramillo (21) was released after his conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence because of Florida’s peculiar state law which required circumstantial evidence to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This demanding standard of certitude is not required by the Constitution or utilized in other states. Similarly, Robert Cox’s (38) conviction was also reversed because of insufficient evidence.

Circumstances that create nothing more than a strong suspicion that the defendant committed the crime was not sufficient to support a conviction. Although state witnesses cast doubt on Cox’s alibi, the state’s evidence could have created only a suspicion, rather than proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cox, and only Cox, murdered the victim.

Finally, John Robert Ballard’s (123) conviction was reversed for reasons similar to Cox’s.

Juan Ramos (32) was acquitted after his conviction was reversed because of inadequate foundation for the admission of dog scent evidence. It should be noted that with proper foundation that dog scent lineup identifications are admissible evidence in many states.

Thomas Kimbell (101) was acquitted after his case was reversed because the trial court did not permit him to impeach a witness with prior inconsistent statements. “The reality is that we don’t know for sure why the two Kimbell juries came to two different conclusions.”

Carl Lawson’s (67) case is an example of the system working well. He was acquitted on retrial after his case was reversed because the trial court denied him funds for a shoeprint expert and because his attorney had a conflict of interest.

“Steven Manning ([85]) is another case in which it appears that the system itself worked.” Manning’s case was reversed for evidentiary error, and he was acquitted on retrial.

Wesley Quick’s (109) multiple murder convictions were reversed because the trial court impeded the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. Quick had testified he had been on LSD and did not remember what happened during the murders. When Quick was retried, he changed his version of events and impeached the witnesses. His subsequent acquittal is another example of the state appellate system properly working. But Quick’s changing testimony does not support a conclusion that he was the prototypical “wrong person.”

138. Kansas, supra note 1 at 2536.
139. Id. at 2537–2538.
140. Tibbs v. State (Fla. 1976) 337 So.2d 788, 791. See, e.g., People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 86 (cautionary instruction about assessing credibility of accusers in sex offense cases no longer performed any "just function.").
146. Ramos v. State (Fla. 1986) 496 So.2d 121.
149. Marshall, supra, note 1 at p. 89.
151. Marshall, supra, note 1 at p. 88; York, supra, note 3 at p. 20–21.
The DPIC List is Artificially Expanded to Include Irrelevant Cases of Defendants Who Were Convicted Under Unconstitutional Death Penalty Statutes

The years of 1973 through 1976 were a watershed in death penalty jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{154} Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in 

\textit{Furman} and \textit{Gregg}, many death judgments were imposed under unconstitutional statutes. Death judgments that were imposed under pre-\textit{Furman}/\textit{Gregg} era statutes or under post-\textit{Furman} laws, such as "mandatory" statutes, which limited consideration of mitigating evidence were unconstitutional. In any of these cases, the defendants were either sentenced under unpredictable and standard-less pre-\textit{Furman} statutes or under post-\textit{Furman} statutes that either precluded or limited consideration of mitigating evidence. These defendants were convicted and sentenced to death without the benefit of recent innovations in capital proceedings described by the authors of \textit{In Spite of Innocence} as follows:

Current capital punishment law already embodies several features that probably reduce the likelihood of executing the innocent. These include abolition of mandatory death penalties, bifurcation of the capital trial into two distinct phases (the first concerned solely with the guilt of the offender, and the second devoted to the issue of sentence), and the requirement of automatic appellate review of a capital conviction and sentence.\textsuperscript{155}

Justice Scalia agreed,

Capital cases are given especially close scrutiny at every level, which is why in most cases many years elapse before the sentence is executed. And of course capital cases receive special attention in the application of executive clemency.\textsuperscript{156}

Justice Scalia stated that it was a matter of "obsolescence" to rely on cases that predate "our current system of capital adjudication" and "cast no light" on its functioning.\textsuperscript{157} His point, of course, is underscored by the fact that his concurrence appears as part of the decision in a case about capital sentencing, not guilt and innocence. Justice Souter's dissent made an issue of these cases in order to argue for modifications of modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. But the studies he cited included cases in which death judgments were not even imposed under current standards. Following Justice Scalia's reasoning, to the extent that the DPIC List names cases in which the defendants were convicted and sentenced to death under statutes that did not meet the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in \textit{Furman} and \textit{Gregg}, those cases are irrelevant.\textsuperscript{158}

The inclusion of these constitutionally anachronistic cases artificially inflates the number of "actual innocent" defendants on the DPIC List. They are irrelevant because they were convicted and sentenced under defunct statutes. Since it is totally speculative whether these defendants would have been convicted and sentenced to death under today's rules, they are irrelevant to assessing modern capital punishment schemes and do nothing to advance any strategy about reexamining our current system. It is speculative whether these defendants would have been convicted and sentenced to death under today's jurisprudence that requires states to narrow the field of eligible murderers for capital punishment and to permit the sentence to consider all potential mitigating evidence.

Accordingly, on its face, based on the year of the defendant's offense and statute in effect at that time, the DPIC List includes the following irrelevant cases:

- David Keaton (1)—pre-\textit{Furman} Florida statute\textsuperscript{159}
- Samuel A. Poole (2)—North Carolina mandatory statute\textsuperscript{160}
- Wilbur Lee (3)
- Freddie Pitts (4)—pre-\textit{Furman} Florida statute,\textsuperscript{161}
- James Creamer (5)—pre-\textit{Furman} Georgia statute\textsuperscript{162}
- Christopher Spicer (6)—North Carolina mandatory statute\textsuperscript{163}
- Thomas Gladish (7)
- Richard Greer (8)
- Ronald Keine (9)
- Clarence Smith (10)—mandatory New Mexico statute\textsuperscript{164}
- Gary Beeman (14)—Ohio's pre-\textit{Lockett} v. \textit{Ohio}, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) statute\textsuperscript{165}
- Johnny Ross (19)—mandatory Louisiana statute\textsuperscript{166}
- Ernest (Shujaa) Graham (20)—mandatory California statute\textsuperscript{167}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{United States v. Taveras} (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 424 F.Supp.2d 446, 457 (referencing the “modern death penalty era of \textit{Furman} and \textit{Gregg}).
  \item Bedau & Radelet, supra, note 60 at p. 279.
  \item Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2538.
  \item Id. at 2534.
  \item Markman & Cassell, supra, note 58 at p. 147–152.
  \item \textit{Keaton v. State} (Fla. 1973) 273 So.2d 385.
  \item \textit{State v. Poole} (N.C. 1974) 203 S.E.2d 786 (statute declared unconstitutional in \textit{Woodson} v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280); Cooley, supra, note 61 at 919 (also identified as a “weak” example of actual innocence).
  \item Pitts v. State (Fla. App. 1975) 307 So.2d 473.
  \item \textit{State v. Spicer} (N.C. 1974) 204 S.E.2d 641.
  \item Stanford, supra, note 58 at p. 118 (Gladish, Greer, Keine, and Smith were sentenced in 1974 under New Mexico's mandatory death penalty statute); \textit{State v. Rondeau & Beaty} (N.M.1976) 553 P.2d 688 (declaring the New Mexico mandatory statute unconstitutional).
  \item Stanford, supra, note 58 at p. 96 (Beeman convicted in 1976).
  \item \textit{People v. Rois} (La. 1977) 343 So.2d 722.
  \item \textit{Graham v. Superior Court} (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 880.
\end{itemize}
• Lawyer Johnson (22)—pre-\textit{Furman}
  Massachusetts statute\textsuperscript{168}
• James Richardson (40)—pre-\textit{Furman}
  Florida statute\textsuperscript{169}
• Peter Limone (94)—pre-\textit{Furman}
  Massachusetts standard\textsuperscript{170}
• Timothy Howard (111)
• Gary Lamar Jones (112)—pre-\textit{Lockett v. Ohio}
  statute\textsuperscript{171}
• Laurence Adams (117)—pre-\textit{Furman}
  Massachusetts statute\textsuperscript{172}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The cases cited by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in \textit{Kansas v. Marsh}, and the additional cases discussed above, refute any notion that the DPIC’s criteria for defining “exoneration” truly distinguishes between convicts who were freed because they were actually innocent and other convicts who were released because of legal error in their cases that were not “inconsistent with guilt in fact.”\textsuperscript{173} The four cases Justice Scalia discussed, all of which are on the DPIC List, barely scratched the surface. Furthermore, the only judicial analysis of the DPIC List [\textit{Quinones I}] concluded in 2002 that only 31 out of 101 convicts on the list were “factualy innocent.”\textsuperscript{174}

Justice Scalia’s \textit{Kansas} concurrence is noteworthy because he refused to accept the conventional wisdom about exonerations stemming from the DPIC List. For too long, the List created the false impression that all of its named 128 convicts were the “prototypical” wrong persons.

In other forums, this misimpression leads to hyperbolic rhetoric.\textsuperscript{175}

When dozens of innocent people are being sentenced to death, and dozens of guilty people are working [walking] free because the State has convicted the wrong person, we must ask ourselves what went wrong in that trial process.\textsuperscript{176}

Similarly,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{[t]here is one other thing we should keep in mind. If the wrong person is on death row for a murder, if somebody is convicted of a murder they did not commit, that means that the real murderer is still running loose. Maybe everybody can feel comfortable that we have locked up somebody for the murder, but if there is still a killer on the loose, everything has broken down. Not only is an innocent man on death row, but a guilty man is running free.}\textsuperscript{177}
\end{itemize}

As explained in the text, the fact that a defendant is acquitted or a case is dismissed does not necessarily mean that a “guilty person” is still “walking free” or “running loose.” Even in its most recent report, the DPIC cannot resist insinuating that its list demonstrates that the wrong person was convicted of the crime:

Besides the danger of establishing a class of individuals who are placed under permanent suspicion, the failure to acknowledge the innocence of those who have been exonerated retards the search for the real perpetrator.\textsuperscript{178}

At the confirmation hearings for Judge John G. Roberts as Chief Justice of the United States, the 121 inmates then mentioned on the DPIC List were cited as “121 people who we know were sentenced to die for crimes they did not commit.”\textsuperscript{179} The briefing in \textit{House} perpetuated this myth with statements that “for every innocent person left imprisoned, a guilty one remains at large” and “of course the State wins, too, when exonerations permit it to prosecute and punish the true perpetrators of crime.”\textsuperscript{180}

It is not true that simply because a defendant was acquitted on retrial or a case was dismissed that he or she was the “wrong person” and there is some other guilty criminal roaming around. Rather, it frequently means the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the “right person.” As Justice Scalia explained, the DPIC List and its ilk ignore this distinction.

To compile its list, the DPIC relies on inexact standards, such as acquittals


\textsuperscript{169} Richardson v. State (Fla. 1989) 546 So.2d 1037.

\textsuperscript{170} Limone v. Massachusetts (1972) 408 U.S. 936.

\textsuperscript{171} According to the DPIC List Web site, \textit{supra} note 35, both Howard’s and Jones’ death sentences were reduced to life when Ohio’s death penalty statute was held unconstitutional in 1978. See \textit{Lockett v. Ohio} (1978) 438 U.S. 586 (Ohio statute declared unconstitutional because it did not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eighth Amendment.).


\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Kansas}, \textit{supra} note 1 at 2356.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Quinones I}, \textit{supra} note 6 at 265 & fn. 11. This study was confined just to the actual descriptions of the cases on the DPIC Web site and the reviewing court used an undefined “conservative criterion.”

\textsuperscript{175} For an extensive discussion of the nature and effect of the “histrionics of innocence advocates,” see Hoffman, \textit{The Myth of Factual Innocence} (2007) 82 Chi.-Kent L.Rev 663.

\textsuperscript{176} Remarks of Sen. Leahy, 146 Cong. Rec. S4669-03, S4675 (June 7, 2000).

\textsuperscript{177} Remarks of Sen. Leahy, 148 Cong. Rec. S889-02, S891 (Feb. 15, 2002).

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Innocence & the Crisis in the American Death Penalty}, \textit{supra} note 35 at Pt. IV.

\textsuperscript{179} Transcript, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on the President’s Nomination of Judge John G. Roberts as Chief Justice of the United States, September 14, 2005 (remarks of Sen. Feingold).

on retrial, dismissals by the prosecution, and reversals for legal insufficiency of evidence, to exonerate released death row inmates. But there is a big difference between “reasonable doubt” and the kind of “wrong person mistake” that was the genesis of the original Stanford study. Moreover, the DPIC uses old cases in which the defendants did not receive the modern protections that “probably reduce the likelihood of executing the innocent.” It ignores the fact that the criminal justice system includes a system of review which gives defendants repeated opportunities to test the fairness and reliability of their convictions.

On its own terms, the DPIC List claims “actual innocence” for only 1.6 percent of the approximately 7,887 death sentences imposed between 1973 and 2008. The more conservative approach of the court in Quinones I only recognized “actual innocence” in one-half of one percent of the 7,084 death sentences imposed between 1973 and 2001. And as Justice Scalia emphasized, no “actually innocent” person has been identified as having been executed.

Justice Scalia closes his Kansas concurrence by stating a self-evident proposition that death penalty opponents still ignore:

The American people have determined that the good to be derived from capital punishment—in deterrence, and, perhaps most of all, in the meting out of condign justice for horrible crimes—outweighs the risk of error.

By deflating the DPIC List, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Kansas v. Marsh contributes to an honest and realistic assessment of that actual risk.

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181. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Capital Punishment 2005, App. Table 2; DPIC Web site, supra, note 35. The inclusion of the 20 irrelevant cases that predate current death penalty statutes impacts this calculation. Without those cases, the “actual innocence” cases on the DPIC List drops to only 1.3 percent of the approximate 7,887 death sentences since 1973. Although a complete survey cannot be done in this limited article, the author estimates that 90 of the 129 inmates currently listed on the DPIC List are not meaningful examples of “actual innocence”—the remaining 39 constitute less than one-half of 1 percent of the approximately 7,887 death sentences imposed since 1973.

182. Quinones I, supra, note 6 at 265 & fn. 11. Recently, Judge Morris B. Hoffman estimated that the total percentage of wrongful convictions for the entire criminal justice system fell somewhere between 1.95 percent and .0016 percent of total dispositions. Hoffman, supra, note 175 at 672–673.

183. Kansas, supra, note 1 at 2539.

184. Ibid.

185. Recently in Baze v. Rees (2008) ___ U.S. ___; 128 S.Ct. 1520, Justices Scalia and Stevens both concurred in upholding Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. Justice Stevens, however, also concluded based on his “experience” that the death penalty was unconstitutional. One of his concerns was the “risk of error” in capital cases. He specifically cited the “equipoise” rule in Kansas as an example of the Court putting the “thumb” on the prosecution’s side of the scale. Justice Stevens acknowledged there was no evidence that an actually innocent person had been executed, but he still found that the rate of exonerations was unacceptable and that the risk could be “entirely eliminated” with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Id. at 1550–1551 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) As he did in Kansas, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens’ concerns: “Justice Stevens’ final refuge in his cost-benefit analysis is a familiar one: There is a risk that an innocent person might be convicted and sentenced to death—though not a risk that Justice Stevens can quantify, because he lacks a single example of a person executed for a crime he did not commit in the current American system.” (Id. at 1554 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.).) Justice Scalia specifically referred to the recent body of scholarship indicating that the death penalty has a deterrent effect. (Id. at 1553.) Finally, he also notes that all of Justice Stevens’ concerns proved too much, since they could be applied to invalidate any punishment, not just the death penalty. (Id. at 1554–1555.)