Maryland v. Shatzer (Decided: 2/24/10)
U. S. Supreme Court case involving a habitual sex offender found guilty of molesting his 3-year-old son. In 2003, while Michael Shatzer was in prison for molesting another child, his son told a social worker about an incident involving oral sex with his father. When a police investigator met with Shatzer in prison to question him, Shatzer invoked his Miranda rights and refused to discuss the matter without an attorney present. Because the 3-year-old victim was the only witness, the case was closed. Three years later, when Shatzer’s son, then six, was more capable of describing the incident, the case was reopened and another detective visited Shatzer in prison. This time Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he had molested his child. Following his failure to suppress the confession, Shatzer was convicted. Maryland’s highest court overturned the conviction on appeal, citing a Supreme Court holding in Edwards v. Arizona, which involved a second interrogation of a suspect the day after he had refused to answer questions. When the Supreme Court agreed to review that ruling, CJLF joined the case to argue that the Edwards decision did not apply because Shatzer was already a prison inmate with no expectation of being set free if he cooperated and because 2½ years had lapsed between the two interviews. The high court agreed.

Wood v. Allen (Decided: 1/20/10)
U. S. Supreme Court decision rejecting an Alabama murderer’s claim that his three state-appointed defense attorneys failed to properly represent him in his sentencing hearing. In 1993, habitual criminal Holly Wood killed his exgirlfriend with a shotgun. At the time, he was on parole for attempting to murder another former girlfriend. Because there was no question regarding Wood’s guilt, his defense attorneys considered a mental defense. The evaluation indicated that Wood was slow but not retarded, and it also revealed his inability to control his temper. Because this information could damage the defense, Wood’s counsel asked the court to suppress it. Wood was convicted, and, although his counsel argued for mercy, the jury recommended a death sentence. In his appeal, Wood claimed that the psychiatric evidence might have persuaded the jury to sentence him to life. Accepting Alabama’s invitation to join the case, CJLF argued that the state court had already decided the claim and reasonably found that the lawyers made a strategic decision to keep out double-edged evidence. The court agreed.

McDaniel v. Brown (Decided: 1/11/10)
U. S. Supreme Court decision in the case of a Nevada child rapist. Troy Brown was convicted and sentenced to prison for the brutal forcible rape of a nine-year-old girl in Carlin, Nevada. Evidence introduced at trial included testimony of witnesses who saw Brown in the vicinity of the victim’s home at the time of the rape, the victim’s description of her attacker, and two DNA tests on two separate semen samples that matched Brown’s DNA and established odds of 3 million to one and 10 thousand to one against the DNA matching at random. Ten years later, a federal district judge conducted his own evidentiary hearing and, after deciding to disregard the DNA evidence, overturned the jury’s verdict. Later, the Ninth Circuit upheld that ruling. When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to consider Nevada’s appeal, CJLF joined the case to argue that the lower federal courts ignored precedent and an Act of Congress in order to overturn this child rapist’s conviction. The Court’s unanimous per curiam opinion agreed, overturning the Ninth Circuit ruling.

Beard v. Kindler (Decided: 12/8/09)
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the death sentence of a brutal Pennsylvania murderer. Joseph Kindler, and accomplices beat, electric shocked, and finally drowned a witness who identified him in a burglary. The jury convicted him on overwhelming evidence and sentenced him to death. When Kindler escaped from jail, the judge dismissed challenges to the verdict, concluding that by escaping Kindler had waived his ability to challenge the verdict. Years later, after Kindler was recaptured, his attorney petitioned to revive these claims. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, citing the state’s fugitive forfeiture law. After a federal district judge and appeals court brushed aside the state’s forfeiture law and overturned Kindler’s death sentence, the Philadelphia District Attorney invited CJLF to join the high court appeal. CJLF argued for a decision reinstating Kindler’s sentence and clarifying the standards which state rules must meet to prevent the lower federal courts from ignoring them. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts cited the CJLF brief for providing a key argument in the case.

Kansas v. Ventris (Decided: 4/29/09)
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding the use of a cellmate’s testimony to impeach the defendant, even though the cellmate’s testimony may have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In January 2004, Donnie Ray Ventris and his live-in girlfriend devised a plan to rob an acquaintance. The pair went to Ernest Hicks home, and Hicks was shot and killed. Ventris and his girlfriend left the scene with Hicks’ wallet, approximately $300, his cell phone, and his pickup truck. At trial, both Ventris and his girlfriend accused the other of killing Hicks. In rebuttal to Ventris’s testimony, his cellmate, Johnnie Doser, testified that Ventris told him that he was the triggerman. Doser admitted that he had been placed in Ventris’s cell and was told to keep his ears open. The defense was unable to convince the judge to strike Doser’s testimony, and the jury convicted Ventris of aggravated robbery and burglary. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Kansas Supreme Court had misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent, which allows testimony of a jailhouse informant that does not question the defendant, but only listens. An opinion authored by Justice Scalia held that Doser’s statements could be used to impeach Ventris because “[t]he interests safeguarded by such exclusion are ‘outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process.’ ”

Cone v. Bell (Decided: 4/28/09)
U. S. Supreme Court decision reversing the Sixth Circuit’s decision to uphold Cone’s conviction and death sentence. Gary Cone was convicted fourteen years ago of beating an elderly Memphis couple to death during a two-day crime spree. Cone’s sole defense was that he was temporarily insane at the time of the murders. Although the defense attorney appealed for mercy, the jury sentenced Cone to death. On appeal, Cone alleged his attorney was incompetent. The claim was thoroughly reviewed and denied in the state courts. When Cone appeared before the Sixth Circuit for the third time, he alleged that prosecutors had improperly withheld evidence of his drug use, which he believed would have encouraged sympathy from the jury. The Sixth Circuit rejected his claim as procedurally defaulted and meritless. The Foundation joined the case to argue that Cone’s claim had been given more consideration than required by law, and further delay was not warranted. In a 5-1-1-2 decision, with Justice Stevens speaking for the majority, the Court remanded the case to the District Court to decide whether the evidence of Cone’s drug use was reasonably likely to have affected the sentence. Under the unusual procedural history of this case, the federal court was required to make this determination itself.

Rivera v. Illinois (Decided: 3/31/09)
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision that a criminal conviction may stand if a juror was wrongly seated after being opposed by a defense lawyer’s peremptory challenge. The Court reasoned that because it is within the state’s province to grant or withhold peremptory challenges, states are free to decide on their own what remedy should follow such error. Michael Rivera, the “Chief Enforcer” of a Chicago gang, shot and killed Marcus Lee as Lee walked down the street. During jury selection, Rivera tried to strike an African American female from the jury because she worked at a facility that also treated gunshot victims. The trial judge was not satisfied by counsel’s explanation and challenged the strike. He overruled use of the peremptory strike. Defense counsel later remarked he was striking the juror because he wanted more men on the jury. The Illinois Supreme Court found the trial judge had erred in overruling the strike without proof of discrimination, but also found the error was harmless. The Foundation joined the case to argue that the trial judge had not erred in finding discrimination. The Supreme Court found that the judge’s refusal to excuse the juror did not violate Rivera’s right to a fair and impartial jury.

Philip Morris v. Williams (Decided: 3/31/09)
U. S. Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted, leaving undecided the issue of when a state court’s holding that a party had failed to properly preserve his federal claim could also preclude federal court review of the question. CJLF filed a brief in Philip Morris because this question often arises in federal court review of state criminal convictions. The Oregon Supreme Court held that Philip Morris lost its federal claim of excessive damages by not using a state procedure required to preserve its claim. Philip Morris claimed the state rule departed from the state’s previous rulings on the rule, and could not be used to block a federal claim. The Foundation had asked the Court to define a clear standard to apply in this confused area of law, but the Court did not use this opportunity.

Arizona v. Johnson (Decided: 1/26/09)
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding the authority of a police officer to pat down a suspicious passenger for weapons during a traffic stop. The search occurred after Tucson police pulled over an uninsured vehicle in a neighborhood frequented by drug gangs. One officer noticed that the backseat passenger was dressed head to toe in local gang colors and had a police scanner sticking out of his pocket. After he told the officer he was recently released from prison, she asked him to step out of the car and frisked him for weapons. The search uncovered a handgun and drugs. Following his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and drugs, the defendant won an appeals court ruling that the search was unlawful, because, as the passenger, he was not the subject of the traffic stop. When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to consider Arizona’s appeal, CJLF joined the case to argue that the appeals court had misinterpreted precedent, which gives police officers the authority to pat down a person confronted in the line of duty if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person might be armed. The Foundation pointed out that an ex-con wearing the colors of a local drug gang, with a police scanner, meets this criterion. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed.

Oregon v. Ice (Decided: 1/14/09)
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding a judge’s authority to require a defendant convicted of multiple felonies to serve the sentences for each crime consecutively. Thomas Eugene Ice, an apartment manager, was convicted for twice using his pass key to burglarize a resident’s unit and molest her 11-year-old daughter. Ice was convicted on two counts of first-degree burglary and four counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The defense argued that the jury must make the findings that Oregon law requires before a judge may order that sentences run consecutively. Unconvinced, the judge ordered the consecutive sentences. Oregon’s Court of Appeals affirmed the decision; but the state supreme court later overturned that holding and Ice’s sentence, ruling that earlier U. S. Supreme Court decisions supported the defendant’s claim. CJLF joined the Supreme Court’s review of the case to argue that the Oregon court improperly extended a rule announced to prevent judges from punishing the defendant for a higher offense than the jury found. The court’s 5-4 decision agreed, in a decision that consecutive sentencing remains within the trial judge’s discretion.