Baze v. Rees (Decided: 4/16/08)
U.S. Supreme Court case to review a legal challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol by two double-murderers facing execution. Ralph Baze shot and killed a county sheriff and his deputy in 1992. Thomas Bowling shot and killed a Lexington couple and wounded their two-year-old son in 1990. In a federal lawsuit, they, along with several anti-death penalty groups, claim that the lethal injection process used in 37 states is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Constitution does not guarantee condemned murderers a painless execution and that, properly administered, the lethal injection process is painless. Procedures now in place in Kentucky and elsewhere are sufficient to minimize the chance of error. The Foundation also argues that the delays caused by legal challenges to a method of execution that pro-criminal groups insisted was humane 20 years ago, adds to the pain and suffering of the families of murder victims and denies justice to the law-abiding public. The Supreme Court agreed, and executions should resume shortly in most states.

Medellin v. Texas (Decided: 3/25/08)
U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction and death sentence of Jose Medellin, a Mexican national convicted of the 1993 rape and murder of two teenaged girls in Houston. The case involved Medellin’s claim that when the police failed to notify the Mexican Consulate following his arrest, they violated an international treaty signed in 1963. He also argued that the Texas courts’ rejection of his claim violated a 2004 World Court decision and that decision required that the judgment be set aside. CJLF joined the case on behalf of one of the murdered girl’s parents to argue that this murderer’s international rights claim had already been considered and rejected by the Texas Courts, and that no further delay of his sentence was required. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Texas court.

Allen v. Siebert (Decided: 11/5/07)
U.S. Supreme Court decision reinstating the death sentence of Alabama serial murderer, Daniel Siebert. Siebert had admitted to, and ultimately been convicted of the murders of Sherri Weathers and her son, as well as the murder of Linda Jarman. Siebert was sentenced to death for both murders in 1987. In 1992, after both convictions had been affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court, Siebert filed state petitions for habeas relief. He filed his state petitions three months past the state filing deadline, and the circuit county court rejected both petitions. In 2001, Siebert filed federal petitions for habeas corpus review. The petitions were dismissed as they were filed after the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) filing deadline for habeas corpus petitions had lapsed. In 2005, while Siebert’s appeal of the dismissal was pending in the Eleventh Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “time limits, no matter their form, are filing conditions,” and an untimely state petition does not suspend federal time limits. Two years later, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Alabama’s time limits did not prevent federal court review of Siebert’s claims. CJLF argued as an amicus curiae that the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling was “demonstrably erroneous” and summary reversal was appropriate. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, and stated, in a 7-2 decision, “[w]hen a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter . . . .” The decision affirmed the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

People v. Taylor (Decided: 10/23/07)
New York’s Court of Appeals upheld its 2004 People v. LaValle decision that a jury instruction that was a part New York’s sentencing scheme was invalid because the instruction might influence a jury to recommend the death sentence instead of deadlocking. Under the New York scheme, a deadlocked jury would allow the judge to sentence the defendant to 20 to 25 years with the possibility of parole. Before his trial, Taylor challenged the sentencing scheme. Taylor had been convicted for the robbery of a Wendy’s franchise in Flushing, New York and the murder of five Wendy’s employees in 2000. Taylor was sentenced to death under the New York death penalty law that required the challenged instruction. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argue that New York’s entire death penalty scheme should not be overturned because of one jury instruction. CJLF argued the Court of Appeals should give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and remove the improper instruction while leaving the other provisions of New York’s death penalty statute in place. CJLF argued the New York law contained a severability provision for the purpose of allowing constitutional provisions to remain in effect while striking any unconstitutional provisions. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court found the jury instruction to be “inextricably interwoven with the sentencing procedure and necessary to effectuate the legislature’s intent.” The Court held the death penalty sentencing statute to be unconstitutional on its face and vacated Taylor’s death sentence. Taylor’s case was remitted for resentencing.

U.S. v. Lujan/U.S. v. Meier (Decided: 10/2/07 and 9/28/07)
In companion cases Lujan and Meier, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the petitioner’s claims that Oregon’s DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (DNA Act) violated Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Lujan’s claims that Oregon’s Act violated the ex post facto clause of the constitution, was an unconstitutional bill of attainder, and that the Act violated the Constitution’s separation of powers principles. Both Lujan and Meier claimed the Oregon Act violated their Fourth Amendment rights because it authorized a probation officer to demand the collection of a blood sample as a condition to a convicted criminal’s supervised release. Petitioners had pled guilty to one count of unarmed bank robbery in May 1999. They were each sentenced to prison time and three years supervised release. Oregon law stated supervised release was subject to standard conditions, including those conditions imposed by the DNA Act. CJLF’s amicus brief argued the DNA Act should survive petitioners’ Fourth Amendment challenges. CJLF argued that as a convicted criminal subject to supervised release, petitioners had a diminished expectation of privacy. The United States Supreme Court had stated a probationer’s diminished privacy was part of society’s special need to supervise probationers. In its brief, CJLF urged that when examining society’s special need, a court should consider circumstances such as: the convicts’ substantially diminished expectation of privacy; the minimal intrusiveness of blood testing; and the enormous benefit to society of maintaining DNA databanks of convicted murderers and sex offenders. The Ninth Circuit agreed and relied on its 2004 decision in United States v. Kincaide, 379 F.3d 813, that a “totality of the circumstances” could justify compulsory DNA collection.

Getsy v. Mitchell (Decided: 7/25/07)
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case involving hired hit man Jason Getsy. An Ohio jury found Getsy guilty of the contract killing of Ann Serafino, whose son had a business dispute with John Santine. Getsy was sentenced to death. A separate jury convicted Santine of murder, but Getsy's confession was not admissible in that trial, the jury did not find murder for hire had been proved, and Santine was not sentenced to death. A panel of the Sixth Circuit found that this difference in sentences required that Getsy's death sentence be overturned. CJLF submitted a brief arguing that no current rule of law authorizes a federal court to overturn a state sentence on this basis, and Congress has forbidden lower federal courts from making up new rules in such cases. The full Sixth Circuit agreed.

People v. Hernandez / People v. Sandoval (Decided: 7/19/07)
Companion cases before the California Supreme Court involving criminals who received upper-term sentences under the state’s determinant sentencing law.  The law had allowed a trial judge to sentence criminals to one of a range of three terms (such as 2, 4, or 6 years), based upon mitigating or aggravating factors related to the crime or the defendant.  In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Cunningham v. California, that aggravating factors used to make a defendant eligible for the upper term must be found by a jury, rather than the judge.  The state Supreme Court is reviewing these two cases to determine the extent that the Cunningham decision disrupts California sentencing. Joel Hernandez and Aida Sandoval were both convicted of felonies and sentenced to upper terms.  Hernandez had a number of prior felonies, which the judge considered during sentencing for reckless driving and evading a police officer.  Sandoval did not have priors, but the judge gave her an upper term and required her to serve her sentences consecutively, after considering the particularly cold-blooded nature of the circumstances of her crimes of voluntary manslaughter which left two people dead and her attempt to kill a third victim.  CJLF argues that the Cunningham decision does allow judges to base an upper-term sentence upon a defendant’s prior convictions and require that multiple sentences be served consecutively. Further, once a single aggravating factor has been properly found, the judge may find and consider additional factors in deciding whether to impose the upper term. In deciding Sandoval's case and another case, the California Supreme Court agreed with each of the major points of CJLF's brief. Hernandez's case is still pending.

Panetti v. Quarterman (Decided: 6/28/07)
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a Texas double-murderer’s claim that he cannot be executed because he is mentally ill.  In 1992, the defendant, Scott Panetti, murdered his wife's parents with a sawed-off shotgun in front of his wife and three-year-old daughter, who had moved in with the victims to escape his violent behavior.  Following his arrest, he confessed to the murders.  After being found mentally competent to stand trial, Panetti insisted on representing himself.  He presented an insanity defense, claiming that an alternate personality named “Sarge” committed the murders.  After his conviction, sentence, and multiple appeals, the state court found him competent to be executed.  The federal District Court and Court of Appeals later affirmed his competency and his death sentence.  Panetti, along with the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the American Bar Association, and the American Psychological Association, is seeking a decision to broaden the standard for incompetence for execution. The present standard requires that the murderer be able to understand that he committed the murder and will be executed for it, which the federal court found Panetti does. At the request of the Texas Solicitor General, CJLF has joined the case to argue for a decision to maintain the current standard. The Court sent the case back to the lower courts to reconsider, but it did not adopt the sweeping rule proposed by the ABA and others.

Fry v. Pliler (Decided: 6/11/07)
The United States Supreme Court affirmed a murderer’s conviction. The defendant, drug dealer John Fry, was convicted on strong evidence of killing a Vacaville couple in 1992. On appeal, he claimed that his conviction was invalid because a witness who claimed that her cousin admitted to killing two people was not allowed to testify. The state court rejected the claim, finding that in light of the weakness of this evidence, excluding it was within the trial judge’s discretion. The federal courts reviewed the claim on habeas corpus applying a standard of review announced by the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson (won by CJLF) and also concluded that the exclusion was error, but harmless. Before the Supreme Court, Fry argued that the Brecht standard is too difficult for him to meet and should not apply to his case. CJLF joined the case to argue for a decision reaffirming the existing standard. The Supreme Court, unanimous on this point, agreed.

Roper v. Weaver (Decided: 5/21/07)
United States Supreme Court case to review a federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling which overturned the death sentence of William Weaver. A Jackson County, Missouri jury found Weaver guilty on substantial evidence of murdering Charles Taylor, a key witness in a federal drug case in July 1987. Among Weaver's claims on appeal was that in closing argument at his sentencing hearing the prosecutor made allegedly improper statements which invalidated his sentence. Specifically, the prosecutor told the sentencing jury that he supported the death penalty, that it was their duty, like soldiers, to sentence Weaver to death, and that a death sentence would deter others from committing murder. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the claim and upheld Weaver's conviction and sentence. In 2001, a federal district judge accepted the claim and overturned the sentence. That ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals last year. CJLF joined the state's appeal of that ruling to argue that the federal law prohibited the Eighth Circuit court from overturning the Missouri Supreme Court decision unless it misapplied clearly established law or Supreme Court precedent. CJLF pointed out that there is no Supreme Court precedent finding similar statements made in closing argument unconstitutional, and that the Missouri court's review of Weaver's claim was reasonable. The Court decided that, due to some unusual procedural issues in the case, it would not decide the question presented but instead dismiss the case as "improvidently granted." This decision effectively leaves the Eighth Circuit decision requiring a new sentencing hearing in place, but it does not set a Supreme Court precedent either way.

Schriro v. Landrigan (Decided: 5/14/07)
The United States Supreme Court reversed a 2006 Ninth Circuit ruling and reinstated the death sentence of a man who brutally murdered an acquaintance in Arizona, after escaping from an Oklahoma prison where he was serving time for an earlier murder. At his sentencing hearing, Jeffrey Landrigan announced in open court that he would not allow his attorney to present evidence mitigating his responsibility for the murder. Over a span of 15 years, three courts and a panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that his death sentence was unconstitutional because his attorney failed to present the evidence. However, a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit accepted it. Before the Supreme Court, CJLF argued that this violates an Act of Congress which forbids setting aside the facts found by the state courts unless the finality is unreasonable. The Supreme Court agreed in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas.

Smith v. Texas, No. 05-11304 (Decided: 4/25/07)
U. S. Supreme Court decision to require the resentencing of LaRoyce Smith for the 1991 murder of a Dallas Taco Bell shift manager during a robbery. At trial, the defense attorney asked the judge to declare the Texas death penalty unconstitutional based upon a recent Supreme Court decision striking down the state’s sentencing jury instructions. The judge instead modified the jury instructions to accommodate a recent high court decision and asked the defense attorney if he wanted to suggest any improvements. The defense attorney did not and raised no objection to the new instructions. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later ruled that the modified instructions complied with the recent decision. Later on habeas corpus, the same court denied Smith’s claim that the instruction violated a subsequent high court decision on jury instructions. In 2004, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the Texas court decision and sent the case back for further review of Smith’s claim. A year later, the Texas court ruled that the disputed instruction did not require overturning his death sentence. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Smith’s challenge to that ruling, CJLF joined the case to argue that the standard for review of trial errors not objected to by the defense has been historically left up to the state courts. The Court's 5 to 4 ruling held that the instruction given in this case did not satisfy its requirements and that the defense lawyer's initial objection was sufficient to preserve the issue.

Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275 (Decided: 3/6/07)
Federal Ninth Circuit decision overturning a district judge’s ruling ordering the parole of San Francisco murderer Carl Irons. In 1984, Irons received a 17-years-to-life prison sentence for shooting and stabbing a neighbor to death then dumping his body in the ocean. In 2001, Irons appealed a decision by the Board of Prison Terms to deny him parole. The state Court of Appeal reviewed the case, deciding that the Board’s decision was proper. When he appealed to the federal court, a magistrate was appointed to consider his claim. In 2004, the magistrate recommended that Irons be released based on Ninth Circuit precedent not accepted by the California courts or required by the U.S. Supreme Court. When a federal district judge adopted this recommendation and ordered Iron’s release, California appealed. CJLF joined the case to argue that federal rules adopted by Congress prohibit federal courts from overturning a state appeals court decision, unless the state court misapplied United States Supreme Court precedent. Because there was no misapplication of law or binding precedent by the California Court of Appeal, the federal judge had no authority to re-decide Irons’ claim. The Ninth Circuit decision agreed.

Whorton v. Bockting, No. 05-595 (Decided: 2/28/07)
U. S. Supreme Court decision to reinstate the 1988 conviction of a Nevada child molester. A jury found Marvin Bockting guilty of engaging in various sex acts with his six-year-old stepdaughter. Because the child was too emotionally upset to testify, her tape-recorded description of the incident was introduced at trial in addition to medical evidence and Bockting’s incriminating statements. The applicable federal rules at the time allowed the child’s taped statement (hearsay) in lieu of her direct testimony. Two years later, the Supreme Court sent Bockting’s case back for a determination of the statement’s trustworthiness under a new standard. In 1993, the Nevada Court ruled that the statement was trustworthy. In 2003, the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington announced a new rule barring “testimonial” hearsay statements from trial. In February 2005, the Ninth Circuit applied the new rule retroactively to overturn Bockting’s conviction. Before the Supreme Court, CJLF argued that only rules fundamental to a fair trial can be applied retroactively and that the change in hearsay does not meet that standard. The high court agreed.

Burton v. Stewart, No. 05-9222 (Decided: 1/9/07)
United States Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reject a Washington sex offender's challenge to his sentence. The case involved a 47-year-sentence given to Lonnie Burton for the rape and robbery of a 15-year-old boy and the burglary of his parents' home. Because of Burton's multiple prior felony convictions, he qualified for an increased sentence under Washington law. While a challenge to his sentence was being reviewed by the state's highest court, Burton launched a separate challenge to his conviction in federal court on habeas corpus. Federal law generally allows only one round of habeas corpus review of a criminal judgment. After his state challenge failed, Burton asked the federal court to consider claims against his sentence on habeas corpus. The federal court agreed to hear the case, but refused to overturn his sentence. In 2004, after the U.S. Supreme Court announced new sentencing rules in Blakely v. Washington, Burton amended his appeal to claim that the Blakely ruling applied retroactively to invalidate his sentence. CJLF joined the high court review of the case to argue that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review Burton's second petition. The Court's decision said exactly that.

Carey v. Musladin, No. 05-785 (Decided: 12/11/06)
United States Supreme decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the murder conviction of an abusive husband who gunned down his estranged wife's fiancé in front of several witnesses. In 2005, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had overturned the murderer's sentence, ruling that it was unconstitutional for members of the victim's family to wear buttons with the deceased's picture on it during the trial. Prior to Mathew Musladin's trial, the judge refused Musladin's request to prevent Studer's family from wearing the photo buttons. Following his conviction, Musladin appealed, claiming that the buttons prejudiced the jury against him. The Court of Appeal denied the claim, as did the federal District Court on habeas corpus. But a divided panel of the federal Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and announced that the buttons violated Musladin's constitutional rights. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the state's appeal, CJLF joined the case to point out that, once again, the Ninth Circuit's ruling sidestepped Congressional limits on its authority in order to overturn a reasonable state court decision.

Ex parte Medellin, No. AP-75,207 (Decided: 11/15/06)
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision to deny further review of a foreign national's claim that the failure to notify the Mexican government of his arrest and trial for murdering two young girls invalidates his conviction and death sentence. In 2005, CJLF won a U.S. Supreme Court decision which rejected the murderer's request for federal court review of this claim. When the case was sent back to the Texas court, CJLF argued that the claim was reviewed and rejected in state court years ago and no further consideration is required. The Texas court rejected Medellin's claim on a different ground, and he has since asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case again.

Ayers v. Belmontes, No. 05-493 (Decided: 11/13/06)
United States Supreme Court decision reinstating the death sentence of a California man who, in 1981, beat a 19-year-old girl to death with a metal bar while burglarizing her home. The Court's decision overturned a 2005 Ninth Circuit ruling which announced that the instructions given to the murderer's sentencing jury 25 years ago were unconstitutional. CJLF joined the review of that ruling to argue that two prior Supreme Court decision (both won by CJLF) held that the jury instructions were proper. The Court held that they were.