|
| United States v. Chaidez |
2/23/13 |
Win |
Habeas Corpus: Retroactivity |
|
United States v. Chaidez:
U.S. Supreme Court case involving the use of a new rule to overturn convictions
entered years ago. Roselva Chaidez was convicted of fraud for her part in an
insurance scam, claiming injuries in an accident that never happened. Immigration
law requires aliens who commit frauds over $10,000 to be deported. Several years
later, she falsely claimed on a naturalization petition that she had never been
convicted of a crime, and the government began deportation proceedings. She now
claims her conviction should be overturned because her criminal defense lawyer
did not advise her of the immigration consequences of a plea, even though that
was not a ground for overturning a plea at the time and even though she made no
claim she did not commit the offense. In 2010, the Supreme Court
created a new rule of law allowing guilty pleas to be attacked on this basis.
The case threatens the
landmark precedent of Teague v. Lane, won by CJLF in 1989. That case held that
new rules of procedure cannot be used to go back and overturn convictions that
are already final. Without this rule, many thousands of final convictions would
be subject to overturning every time the Supreme Court alters the rules of
procedure, as it often does. CJLF entered the case to argue that the rule
against retroactivity strikes the correct balance and should be preserved. The
high court agreed and left the judgment intact.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| United States v. Alvarez |
6/28/12 |
Loss |
Fourth Amendment: Stolen Valor Act |
|
United States v. Alvarez:
U. S. Supreme Court case considering the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, a
law enacted by Congress to prohibit the false claiming of military medals. Xavier
Alvarez, a member of a California water district board, made numerous false claims
about his military record, including being awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
In fact, he has never served in the military. He was convicted under the Stolen Valor
Act and sentenced to probation, a fine, and community service. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction, finding that the
Stolen Valor Act violates the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. In
the Supreme Court, CJLF entered the case, filing a brief on behalf of the Legion of
Valor of the United States and itself. Our brief argues that the Act only prohibits
lies, not mistakes, parodies, or theatrical performances, and that lies are not
protected under the First Amendment. In a splintered decision, the Court decided
that the Act as presently drafted is not constitutional.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Lafler v. Cooper/Missouri v. Frye |
3/21/12 |
Loss |
Counsel: Plea bargains |
|
Lafler v. Cooper/Missouri v. Frye: Two U. S. Supreme
Court cases involving criminal defendants who claim that their convictions should be
overturned because they may have been convicted on lesser charges had their defense
attorneys not given them bad advice. In 2003 Anthony Cooper was charged with attempted
murder for shooting a woman causing serious injury. A police officer witnessed the
shooting. Prior to trial, the state offered Cooper a plea bargain carrying a shorter
sentence than if he were convicted on all charges. His attorney advised against the
deal. Cooper was later convicted by a jury and received the longer sentence. In 2007,
Galin Frye was charged with driving with a suspended license, a felony because of his
multiple prior convictions. Prior to trial, the prosecutor offered to allow Frye to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor and serve 90 days in jail. Frye’s attorney did not
report this offer to his client. Later, Frye pled guilty to the original felony charge
and received 3 years in prison. In Frye, the state appellate court ruled in favor of
the defendant. In Cooper, the state courts rejected the claim but a federal appellate
court overturned the judgment. CJLF has joined the high court review of these cases
to argue that, while a better attorney might have obtained a more favorable deal,
neither criminal was unjustly convicted, and neither is entitled to a second chance
for a better result. The Supreme Court allowed the claims to proceed but said that
the prisoners will not necessarily get their original plea offers back. The high
court left the remedy to the trial judge, who might reinstate the original plea offer
or reimpose the same sentence the defendants received before.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Martinez v. Ryan |
3/20/12 |
Draw |
Habeas corpus: Right to counsel |
|
Martinez v. Ryan: U. S. Supreme Court review of a
child molester’s claim that his conviction should be overturned because his
state-appointed appeals lawyer failed to attack the effectiveness of his trial attorney.
Luis Martinez was convicted of two incidents of sexual conduct with his 11-year-old
stepdaughter on a July morning in 1999. Evidence at trial included the victim’s
videotaped description of the assaults to a social worker and a DNA match of Martinez’s
semen on her nightgown. Following his conviction, Martinez’s claims challenging his
trial and sentencing were rejected by the state courts on direct appeal, and his
appointed lawyer reported that she could find no worthy claims to raise on state
collateral review. Later, represented by a different lawyer, Martinez claimed that
his appellate lawyer was ineffective because she did not find flaws in the performance
of his trial lawyer. This claim was reviewed and rejected by two state courts, the
federal district court and the court of appeals. When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
consider Martinez’s appeal, CJLF joined the case. CJLF argued there is no
constitutional right to a government paid lawyer for collateral review or habeas
corpus, and therefore no right to challenge the effectiveness of a lawyer appointed
for those types of post-conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court's decision retains
the rule we argued for as the general rule. However, it carved out a narrow exception
for states such as Arizona that do not allow ineffective assistance claims to be made
on direct appeal (the first review of a conviction). For these states, ineffective
assistance on the state collateral review will be considered "cause" to raise the
ineffectiveness as trial counsel on federal habeas corpus.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Maples v. Thomas |
1/18/12 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for default |
|
Maples v. Thomas: U. S. Supreme Court review of a
convicted Alabama murderer’s claim that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus review of
his case even though he missed the state deadline for requesting review. Cory Maples was
convicted on strong evidence of the 1995 execution-style murders of two acquaintances and
the theft of the car of one of the victims. In 1997 he was convicted on all charges and
sentenced to death. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the state court of
appeals and supreme court, attorneys from a New York law firm representing Maples pro
bono argued on state collateral review that his trial attorney had been ineffective.
Prior to the state court’s ruling denying these claims, the attorneys who had appeared
in the court quit the firm, and the firm failed to inform the court of the change of
attorneys. As a result, Maples did not receive notice of the ruling, and he missed the
state deadline for filing an appeal, which also prevented review of his claims on
federal habeas corpus.
CJLF has joined the case to argue that Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that
criminals are not entitled to counsel for state collateral review or federal habeas
corpus. While Maples pro bono lawyers certainly failed him, absent compelling evidence
that he is innocent, the post-conviction review of his case should be over. The Court
issued a narrow opinion holding that on the unusual facts of this case, the failings
of the lawyers constitute cause for the default.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Perry v. New Hampshire |
1/11/2012 |
Win |
Evidence: Eyewitness notification |
|
Perry v. New Hampshire: U. S. Supreme Court review
of a habitual thief's claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the
admission of eyewitness testimony in his trial for burglarizing a car. On August 15,
2008, at 2:53 a.m., Barion Perry was caught in the parking lot of an apartment building
carrying stereo equipment stolen from a nearby car. A woman, whose husband reported the
crime, identified Perry as the man she saw break into a car in the well-lit parking lot
and steal the equipment. Her husband also identified Perry as the man he had seen
wandering around the lot looking into parked cars. At trial, Perry challenged the
testimony of the woman arguing her identification of him was unreliable and therefore
violated the 14th Amendment (the Due Process Clause) of the Constitution. The judge
disagreed, the testimony was admitted, and Perry was convicted. Perry’s claims regarding
his identification by the witness were later rejected by the New Hampshire Supreme Court
on direct appeal. When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Perry’s appeal, CJLF
joined the case to argue that, except in cases of police misconduct, the Constitution
leaves rules governing the introduction of evidence to the states. A decision supporting
the thief would have allowed criminals to waste years and millions in tax dollars with
federal court challenges to eyewitnesses. The Supreme Court agreed with our position
and affirmed the conviction by an 8-1 vote.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Davis v. United States |
6/16/11 |
Win |
Search and seizure: Reliance of existing law |
|
Davis v. United States: U. S. Supreme Court decision
rejecting a criminal’s claim that his conviction as an ex-felon in possession of a
firearm was invalid because the police search that uncovered his gun violated the
Exclusionary Rule. The gun was found in Willie Gene Davis’s jacket pocket during
a search after a traffic stop. Davis had left his jacket in the car when police
asked him to step out. While the search was legal at the time, during Davis’s appeal
a new Supreme Court decision changed search rules to prohibit searching belongings
left in a vehicle during a traffic stop. After the appeals court upheld Davis’s
conviction because the police had followed the law at the time of the search, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear his appeal. CJLF joined the case to encourage a
decision finding that searches such as this one should fall under the “good faith”
exception established by United States v. Leon, a high court
decision CJLF helped win in 1984. The Court’s holding adopted that reasoning.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Brown v. Plata |
5/23/11 |
Loss |
Jury trial |
|
U. S. Supreme Court ruling upholding the January 2010 order by a panel of three
federal judges that requires California to lower its prison population by 27%
(currently 33,500 inmates), within two years to
remedy overcrowding, which was determined to violate inmates’ constitutional rights.
CJLF had joined the case to argue that the release order was invalid because the
selection of three notorious pro-defendant judges as panel members by the Chief Judge
of the Ninth Circuit guaranteed the result, and that once on the panel, the judges
manipulated the process to prevent any objective review of the inmates’ claims.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Cullen v. Pinholster |
4/4/2011 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: New evidence |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the death
sentence of a habitual criminal who killed a man during a home burglary in Los
Angeles. In 1984, Scott Pinholster was convicted on strong evidence, including his
own incriminating statements, and sentenced to death. Over the next 25 years, six
courts reviewed his claim that his defense attorney had failed to adequately present
evidence of his mental health problems. In 2009, after a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit reviewing the case on habeas corpus rejected the claim, a larger en banc
panel accepted it and overturned Pinholster’s death sentence. The en banc panel, after
reviewing a third psychiatric evaluation not presented in state court, ruled that the
California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s claim was unreasonable. CJLF joined
the high court appeal of that ruling to argue that the Ninth Circuit violated federal
law, which prohibits federal courts reviewing a state court decision on habeas corpus
from considering evidence never presented to the state court. The court’s decision
adopted that reasoning.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Tolentino v. New York |
3/29/11 |
Draw |
Search and seizure: Government records |
|
U. S. Supreme Court announcement
that it would not reconsider a New York Court of Appeals decision which denied a
defendant’s claim that police access to his criminal record during a traffic stop
amounted to an illegal search. Last fall, the high court announced it would hear
Jose Tolentino’s claim that because police illegally stopped his car for excessive
noise in 2005, they could not introduce his record, which indicated that he was driving
on a suspended license and had at least 10 prior suspensions. While the legality of
the traffic stop was never determined, the New York court held that the government’s
own records do not fall under the protection of the Exclusionary Rule and cannot be
excluded from trial. Before the Supreme Court, CJLF argued that the rules governing
traffic stops do not prevent police from learning a driver’s identity and checking his
or her criminal record. After reviewing briefs and hearing oral argument, the Court
determined that it would not disturb the lower court’s holding.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Walker v. Martin |
2/23/11 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Adequate state grounds |
|
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court
decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reverse a 2009 Ninth Circuit ruling that had
found California’s deadline for filing state habeas corpus petitions inadequate.
Charles Martin was convicted on strong evidence and sentenced to life in prison for
the 1986 stabbing murder of a Sacramento man. After years of successive attempts to
overturn his conviction, Martin’s final petition raising new claims was dismissed by
both state and federal courts for violating a state rule which requires claims be
filed in a timely manner. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court’s
decisions and granted additional review of Martin’s claims. CJLF joined the appeal
of that ruling to argue that federal courts should not be allowed to ignore state
procedural rules, so long as a defendant had adequate notice of the rule and a
reasonable opportunity to comply with it.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Harrington v. Richter |
1/19/11 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Summary dispositions |
|
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court
decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reverse a 2009 Ninth Circuit ruling that overturned
the robbery/murder conviction of a Sacramento man. After his conviction on strong
evidence, Joshua Richter’s claim, that his attorney had been ineffective, was reviewed
and summarily rejected by the California Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and
a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel. An en banc eleven-judge Ninth Circuit panel overturned
all three courts, finding California’s high court decision unreasonable. In the U. S.
Supreme Court, CJLF argued that the California court’s judgment was reasonable and
entitled to deference. The high court ruling noted this, protecting thousands of
convictions nationwide.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Premo v. Moore |
1/19/11 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Attack on guilty plea |
|
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision
reinstating the conviction of an Oregon murderer. The decision utilized CJLF arguments
to unanimously overturn a 2009 Ninth Circuit ruling which had announced that the
murderer’s lawyer was ineffective. Randy Moore admitted to kidnapping a man and then
killing him with a gunshot to the temple, but claimed that the single-action revolver
went off accidently. His defense attorney negotiated a plea deal which spared Moore from
the possibility of a death sentence. Years later, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the
conviction, ruling that the defense attorney should have sought to have the confession
excluded. CJLF joined the state’s appeal to argue that the Ninth Circuit ruling ignored
key facts and violated limits on its authority.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| United States v. Ghailani |
7/13/10 |
Win |
Speedy trial: Noncriminal custody |
|
Federal District Court decision rejecting the claim of a suspected terrorist, who President
Obama decided to try in civil court, that he detention by the military as an enemy combatant
at Guantanamo Bay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Ghailani, who has
since been convicted of conspiracy in the 1998 bombings of two U. S. embassies killing 223
people, was joined by the Center for Constitutional Rights in arguing that because his
rights were violated, the must be set free. At the invitation of the District Judge in this
case, CJLF introduced argument noting that the suspected terrorist was a military
prisoner being held for national security reasons before the government decided to give
him a trial in civil court. He had no speedy trial right during this period. The
federla judge agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Holland v. Florida |
6/14/10 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Tolling limitations |
|
U. S. Supreme Court ruling upholding a Florida murderer's claim that the time
limit for filing his petition for a fifth review of his case should be waived.
Albert Holland was convicted on overwhelming evidence of murdering a Florida
police officer. While Holland's claims of trial error and ineffective assistance
of counsel were reviewed four times by state courts, including two reviews in
the Florida Supreme Court, his lawyer failed to meet the deadline for filing a
petition for re-review of these claims on federal habeas corpus. In the Supreme
Court, Holland and the ACLU claimed that the lower federal courts are entitlted
to waive the time limit to prevent an injustice. At Florida's invitation, CJLF
joined the case to argue that Congress adopted the time limits to prevent
unwarranted delay and specified the exceptions that would be allowed. The Court
ruled to allow exceptions beyond those specified by Congress.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Berghuis v. Thompkins |
6/1/10 |
Win |
Self-incrimination: Implied waiver |
|
U. S. Supreme Court review of a lower court ruling overturning the conviction of a
Michigan murderer. Habitual criminal Van Thompkins was found guilty of the gang-style
shooting of two men, killing one. Following his arrest, Thompkins was read his Miranda
rights and was questioned for three hours. While he did not ask for an attorney, he did
limit his responses to "yeah," "no," or "I don't know." Finally, the detective asked him
if he wanted God to forgive him for the killing. Thompkins answered, "yes." Substantial
evidence of guilt, including his admission, resulted in a guilty verdict. Four courts denied
Thompkins' claim that his admission of guilt should have been excluded from trial because
the questioning violated his right to remain silent. Later, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, announcing that his limited responses to questioning demonstrated that
he did not want to talk to the police. CJLF joined the Supreme Court appeal of that ruling
to argue that the state court had reasonably applied established Supreme Court precedent when
they affirmed Thompkins' conviction, and the Sixth Circuit had erred in reversing it. The
Supreme Court held that the interrogation was proper and reinstated the conviction.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Graham v. Florida/Sullivan
v. Florida |
5/17/10 |
Loss |
Sentencing: Juvenile LWOP |
|
U. S. Supreme Court cases challenging state laws which allow states to sentence repeat
juvenile offenders who commit violent crimes before their 18th birthday to life without
possibility of parole (LWOP). Joe Sullivan had already been convicted of 17 crimes, including
several felonies when, at the age of 13, he robbed and brutally raped an elderly woman. One
month prior to his 18th birthday, Terrance Graham, who was on parole for robbery and assault,
was convicted of an armed home-invasion robbery. Following his arrest, he admitted to four
additional robberies. In the Supreme Court, Graham and Sullivan argue that the LWOP sentences
they received constitute cruel and unusual punishment. At least 15 organizations, including
the NAACP and Amnesty International, have filed briefs asking the Court to prohibit states
from allowing an LWOP sentence for their worst juvenile criminals, at least in nonhomicide
cases. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Constitution has left decisions regarding the
sentencing of criminals to the states and that the public has the right to protect itself from
violent, repeat offenders regardless of their age. In the Graham case, a
bare majority of five Justices created a new rule exempting anyone under 18 from a
life-without-parole sentence for a crime other than homicide. The Court dismissed the
Sullivan case without explanation, a disposition possibly based on CJLF's
argument that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Berghuis v. Smith |
3/30/10 |
Win |
Jury: Cross-section |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision rejecting a murderer's claim that his conviction was
invalid becasue the jury selection process did not maintain a racial quota. Diapolis
Smith was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal shooting of a man during
an argument in a bar in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The address his bias claim, a hearing
was conducted to review the process for summoning citizens to jury duty. Evidence
showed that, while the system was color-blind, the percentageof black excused for
childcare and transportation hardship was greater than for whites. Experts testified
that more blacks than whites in the county were unemployed, single mothers and that
fewer black households owned automobiles. Based upon this, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that there was no systematic bias in the process. Later, the Federal
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Smith's conviction, concluding that there
was racial bias. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Federal court ruling was
improper because, based upon the evidence, the state court's holding was not
unreasonable, and that a requirement for racial quotas would force single mothers and
those without transportation to serve.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Barnett v. Superior Court |
4/8/10 |
Loss |
Discovery: Postjudgment in DP Cases |
|
California Supreme Court case to review a murderer's claim that a state law requires
district attorneys to search for and turn over information (discovery) regarding a
conviction and death sentence handed down 19 years ago. Max Lee Barnett, a habitual
criminal, was convicted on strong evidence of the kidnap, torture, and murder of his
one-time mining partner in a remote area of Butte County. In 1998, the state Supreme
Court denied his claims of trial and sentencing error, and the U. S. Supreme Court
refused his appeal. In 2004, a trial judge granted Barnett's request for discovery
even though he did not have a case pending in that court. The judge ruled that he was
required to grant the request under a law enacted by a simple majority of state
legislators in 2002, which expanded the discovery rights of murderers sentenced to
death. The poorly written statute has given condemned murderers a device to further
delay the review of their cases. After an appeals court issued a ruling upholding some
of Barnett's requests, the California Supreme Court agreed to review it. CJLF joined
the case to argue that the law which expanded Barnett's rights violates a ballot
initiative adopted by the voters in 1990. Prop. 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform
Act, requires that legislation changing the rules of criminal discovery must be passed
by a super majority of the members of the Legislature. The California Supreme Court
decided the issue in another case, People v. Superior Court
(Pearson), and upheld the statute.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger |
3/25/10 |
Win |
Parole: Revocation procedure |
|
Unanimous Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision upholding a key provision
of California's Proposition 9, which changed the state process for revoking the parole
of criminals who violate parole conditions or commit new crimes. Proposition 9
adopted procedures required by the U. S. Supreme Court and utilized by other states.
Since 2004, California's parole revocation process has been governed by a federal
injunction to settle a lawsuit by criminals who claimed that their rights had been
violated. The injunction had granted more rights to parolees than required by the
Supreme Court, added costs to the process, and placed additional burdens on crime
victims and law enforcement. In March 2009, the same federal judge who ordered the
injunction rule that the parole reforms in Proposition 9 were unconstitutional. CJLF
joined the state's appeal of that ruling to argue that the federal judge overstepped
his authority and ignored precedent in order to prevent enforcement of a constitutional
amendment adopted to balance the rights of criminals with those of crime victims
and law-abiding Californians.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Maryland v. Shatzer |
2/24/10 |
Win |
Counsel: Interrogation |
|
U. S. Supreme Court case involving a habitual sex offender found guilty of molesting
his 3-year-old son. In 2003, while Michael Shatzer was in prison for molesting another
child, his son told a social worker about an incident involving oral sex with his father.
When a police investigator met with Shatzer in prison to question him, Shatzer invoked his
Miranda rights and refused to discuss the matter without an attorney present. Because the
3-year-old victim was the only witness, the case was closed. Three years later, when
Shatzer's son, then six, was more capable of describing the incident, the case was
reopened and another detective visited Shatzer in prison. This time Shatzer waived his
Miranda rights and admitted that he had molested his child. Following his
failure to suppress the confession, Shatzer was convicted. Maryland's highest court
overturned the conviction on appeal, citing a Supreme Court holding in Edwards v.
Arizona, which involved a second interrogation of a suspect the day after he had
refused to answer questions. When the Supreme Court agreed to review that ruling, CJLF
joined the case to argue that the Edwards decision did not apply because Shatzer was
already a prison inmate with no expectation of being set free if he cooperated and
because 2½ years had lapsed between the two interviews. The high court agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Wood v. Allen |
1/20/10 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: State court findings |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision rejecting an Alabama murderer's claim that his three
state-appointed defense attorneys failed to properly represent him in his sentencing
hearing. In 1993, habitual criminal Holly Wood killed his exgirlfriend with a shotgun.
At the time, he was on parole for attempting to murder another former girlfriend.
Because there was no question regarding Wood's guilt, his defense attorneys considered
a mental defense. The evaluation indicated that Wood was slow but no retarded, and it
also revealed his inability to control his temper. Because this information could
damage the defense, Wood's counsel asked the court to suppress it. Wood was convicted,
and, although his counsel argued for mercy, the jury recommended a death sentence.
In his appeal, Wood claimed that the psychiatric evidence might have persuaded the
jury to sentence him to life. Accepting Alabama's invitation to join the case, CJLF
argued that the state court had already decided the claim and reasonably found that
the lawyers made a strategic decision to keep out double-edged evidence. The court
agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| McDaniel v. Brown |
1/11/10 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: New evidence and 2254(d) |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision in the case of a Nevada child rapist. Troy Brown was
convicted and sentenced to prison for the brutal forcible rape of a nine-year-old
girl in Carlin, Nevada. Evidence introduced at trial included testimony of witnesses
who saw Brown in the vicinity of the victim's home at the time of the rape, the
victim's description of her attacker, and two DNA tests on two separate semen samples
that matched Brown's DNA and established odds of 3 million to one and 10 thousand to
one against the DNA matching at random. Ten years later, a federal district judge
conducted his own evidentiary hearing and, after deciding to disregard the DNA
evidence, overturned the jury's verdict. Later, the Ninth Circuit upheld that ruling.
When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to consider Nevada's appeal, CJLF joined the
case to argue that the lower federal courts ignored precedent and an Act of Congress
in order to overturn this child rapist's conviction. The Court's unanimous per
curiam opinion agreed, overturning the Ninth Circuit ruling.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Beard v. Kindler |
12/8/09 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Procedural default |
|
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the death
sentence of a brutal Pennsylvania murderer. Joseph Kindler, and accomplices beat,
electric shocked, and finally drowned a witness who identified him in a burglary. The
jury convicted him on overwhelming evidence and sentenced him to death. When Kindler
escaped from jail, the judge dismissed challenges to the verdict, concluding that by
escaping Kindler had waived his ability to challenge the verdict. Years later, after
Kindler was recaptured, his attorney petitioned to revive these claims. The trial
judge denied the motion, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, citing the
state's fugitive forfeiture law. After a federal district judge and appeals court
brushed aside the state's forfeiture law and overturned Kindler's death sentence,
the Philadelphia District Attorney invited CJLF to join the high court appeal.
CJLF argued for a decision reinstating Kindler's sentence and clarifying the standards
which state rules must meet to prevent the lower federal courts from ignoring them.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts cited the CJLF brief for providing a
key argument in the case.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Kansas v. Ventris |
4/298/09 |
Win |
Counsel: Jailhouse informant |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding the use of a cellmate’s testimony to impeach the
defendant, even though the cellmate’s testimony may have been obtained in violation of the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In January 2004, Donnie Ray Ventris and his
live-in girlfriend devised a plan to rob an acquaintance. The pair went to Ernest Hicks home, and
Hicks was shot and killed. Ventris and his girlfriend left the scene with Hicks’ wallet,
approximately $300, his cell phone, and his pickup truck. At trial, both Ventris and his girlfriend
accused the other of killing Hicks. In rebuttal to Ventris’s testimony, his cellmate, Johnnie
Doser, testified that Ventris told him that he was the triggerman. Doser admitted that he had been
placed in Ventris’s cell and was told to keep his ears open. The defense was unable to
convince the judge to strike Doser’s testimony, and the jury convicted Ventris of aggravated
robbery and burglary. CJLF joined the case to argue that the Kansas Supreme Court had misinterpreted
Supreme Court precedent, which allows testimony of a jailhouse informant that does not question the
defendant, but only listens. An opinion authored by Justice Scalia held that Doser’s
statements could be used to impeach Ventris because “[t]he interests safeguarded by such
exclusion are ‘outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the
trial process.’ ”
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Cone v. Bell |
4/28/09 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Procedural default |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision to uphold Cone's conviction and
death sentence. Gary Cone was convicted fourteen years ago of beating an elderly Memphis couple to
death during a two-day crime spree. Cone's sole defense was that he was temporarily insane at the
time of the murders. Although the defense attorney appealed for mercy, the jury sentenced Cone to
death. On appeal, Cone alleged his attorney was incompetent. The claim was thoroughly reviewed and
denied in the state courts. When Cone appeared before the Sixth Circuit for the third time, he
alleged that prosecutors had improperly withheld evidence of his drug use, which he believed would
have encouraged sympathy from the jury. The Sixth Circuit rejected his claim as procedurally
defaulted and meritless. The Foundation joined the case to argue that Cone's claim had been given
more consideration than required by law, and further delay was not warranted. In a 5-1-1-2 decision,
with Justice Stevens speaking for the majority, the Court remanded the case to the District Court to
decide whether the evidence of Cone's drug use was reasonably likely to have affected the sentence.
Under the unusual procedural history of this case, the federal court was required to make this
determination itself.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Rivera v. Illinois |
3/31/09 |
Draw |
Equal protection: Review of Batson claims |
|
Unanimous U. S. Supreme Court decision that a criminal conviction may stand if a juror was wrongly
seated after being opposed by a defense lawyer's peremptory challenge. The Court reasoned that
because it is within the state's province to grant or withhold peremptory challenges, states are free
to decide on their own what remedy should follow such error. Michael Rivera, the "Chief Enforcer" of
a Chicago gang, shot and killed Marcus Lee as Lee walked down the street. During jury selection,
Rivera tried to strike an African American female from the jury because she worked at a facility that
also treated gunshot victims. The trial judge was not satisfied by counsel's explanation and
challenged the strike. He overruled use of the peremptory strike. Defense counsel later remarked
he was striking the juror because he wanted more men on the jury. The Illinois Supreme Court found
the trial judge had erred in overruling the strike without proof of discrimination, but also found
the error was harmless. The Foundation joined the case to argue that the trial judge had not erred
in finding discrimination. The Supreme Court found that the judge's refusal to excuse the juror did
not violate Rivera's right to a fair and impartial jury.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Philip Morris v. Williams |
3/31/09 |
Draw |
Procedural default: Adequate state ground |
|
U. S. Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted, leaving undecided the issue of when
a state court's holding that a party had failed to properly preserve his federal claim could also
preclude federal court review of the question. CJLF filed a brief in Philip Morris because this
question often arises in federal court review of state criminal convictions. The Oregon Supreme
Court held that Philip Morris lost its federal claim of excessive damages by not using a state
procedure required to preserve its claim. Philip Morris claimed the state rule departed from the
state's previous rulings on the rule, and could not be used to block a federal claim. The Foundation
had asked the Court to define a clear standard to apply in this confused area of law, but the Court
did not use this opportunity.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Arizona v. Johnson |
1/26/09 |
Win |
Search and seizure: Frisk of passengers |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding the authority of a police officer to pat down a suspicious
passenger for weapons during a traffic stop. The search occurred after Tucson police pulled over an
uninsured vehicle in a neighborhood frequented by drug gangs. One officer noticed that the backseat
passenger was dressed head to toe in local gang colors and had a police scanner sticking out of his
pocket. After he told the officer he was recently released from prison, she asked him to step out
of the car and frisked him for weapons. The search uncovered a handgun and drugs. Following his
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and drugs, the defendant won an appeals
court ruling that the search was unlawful, because, as the passenger, he was not the subject of the
traffic stop. When the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to consider Arizona’s appeal, CJLF joined
the case to argue that the appeals court had misinterpreted precedent, which gives police officers
the authority to pat down a person confronted in the line of duty if there is a reasonable suspicion
that the person might be armed. The Foundation pointed out that an ex-con wearing the colors of a
local drug gang, with a police scanner, meets this criterion. The Supreme Court unanimously
agreed.[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Oregon v. Ice |
1/14/09 |
Win |
Sentencing: Jury for consecutive |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision upholding a judge’s authority to require a defendant convicted of
multiple felonies to serve the sentences for each crime consecutively. Thomas Eugene Ice, an
apartment manager, was convicted for twice using his pass key to burglarize a resident’s unit
and molest her 11-year-old daughter. Ice was convicted on two counts of first-degree burglary and
four counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The defense argued that the jury must make the findings
that Oregon law requires before a judge may order that sentences run consecutively. Unconvinced,
the judge ordered the consecutive sentences. Oregon’s Court of Appeals affirmed the decision;
but the state supreme court later overturned that holding and Ice’s sentence, ruling that
earlier U. S. Supreme Court decisions supported the defendant’s claim. CJLF joined the
Supreme Court’s review of the case to argue that the Oregon court improperly extended a rule
announced to prevent judges from punishing the defendant for a higher offense than the jury found.
The court’s 5-4 decision agreed, in a decision that consecutive sentencing remains within the
trial judge’s discretion.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Hedgpeth v. Pulido |
12/2/08 |
Win |
Harmless error: Standard of review |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision to overturn a 2007 Ninth Circuit ruling, which had voided the
conviction of California murderer Michael Pulido. Pulido was convicted on strong evidence of
killing a gas station cashier during a 1992 robbery. Because both Pulido and his accomplice blamed
each other for the killing, the jury could not agree on who actually fired the gun, but
California’s felony-murder rule provides that accomplices to murder during the commission of a
felony can both be found guilty of the murder. Fifteen years after his conviction, the Ninth Circuit
sidestepped federal rules to invalidate Pulido’s conviction due to a minor jury instruction
error previously deemed harmless by the California Supreme Court. CJLF joined the state’s
appeal to argue that precedent (won by CJLF) requires that a claim of trial error raised on federal
habeas corpus must be supported by substantial evidence that the error prejudiced the
defendant’s case. No such evidence was presented to support the Ninth Circuit ruling. The
high court agreed.[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Bell v. Kelly |
11/17/08 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Deference standard |
|
U. S. Supreme Court order refusing to reconsider a federal court ruling upholding the death sentence
of Virginia cop killer Edward Bell. In 2001, Bell, an illegal immigrant and drug dealer, was
convicted on strong evidence of murdering a police sergeant by shooting him in the face. On appeal,
Bell claimed that his attorneys did not adequately represent him at his sentencing hearing. After
the Virginia Supreme Court rejected this claim, Bell added additional evidence to support his claim
to his petition for review on federal habeas corpus. A federal District Court rejected the claim,
and later the federal Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Earlier this year, the high court
agreed to review Bell’s appeal based upon his false claim that the Virginia Supreme Court had
refused to consider the evidence he added to his federal petition. CJLF had joined the case to argue
that Bell had never presented the new evidence to the Virginia Court and that the federal courts
reviewing his new evidence ruled that it did not support his allegation of lawyer incompetence. When
the Supreme Court learned the truth, it dropped Bell’s case. Bell was executed on February 19,
2009. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| People v. Hernandez |
8/27/08 |
Win |
Jury trial: Sentencing Factors |
|
Hernandez was convicted of evading an officer with reckless driving and resisting the officer's
performance of duty. He was sentenced to the upper term of three years for evading an officer with
reckless driving. At sentencing, the trial court imposed the upper-term sentence based on
Hernandez's prior convictions, prior prison term, the fact that he was on parole at the time he
committed the charged offenses, and because his past performance on probation and parole had been
unsatisfactory. In its brief to the California Supreme Court, CJLF argued Hernandez's sentence was
consistent with the U. S. Supreme Court's holding in Cunningham v. California. CJLF argued
Hernandez's sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment protections of Almendarez-Torres,
Apprendi, and Cunningham because a prior conviction is still an aggravating factor
that can be found by the trial court to impose an upper-term sentence. The California Supreme
Court's decision in People v. Towne, S125677 (June 26, 2008), affirmed this reasoning. In
People v. Towne, the California Supreme Court ruled the trial court may find the aggravating
circumstance that a defendant served a prior prison term, was on parole, or on probation at the time
of the crime. Furthermore, a trial judge may find the aggravating factor of unsatisfactory
performance on parole or probation if the unsatisfactory performance is established through a record
of prior convictions. However, a right to a jury trial will attach if the poor performance on
probation or parole can be established only by finding facts other than prior convictions, such as
failed drug tests or failure to appear for appointments. The conclusions reached by the California
Supreme Court in Towne were consistent with the amicus brief submitted by CJLF. In
its brief, CJLF argued that Apprendi v. New Jersey required a jury to find the defendant
eligible for an upper-term sentence. However, once a jury found a single fact making the defendant
eligible, past convictions and unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole could be found by a
trial judge and applied at his discretion to determine whether the defendant actually received the
upper-term sentence.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Indiana v. Edwards |
6/19/08 |
Win |
Counsel: Competency for self-representation |
|
U.S. Supreme Court case on whether the Constitution requires states to allow a mentally ill defendant
to act as his own attorney. The case involves the 2005 conviction of Ahmad Edwards, a thief who shot
a security guard and a bystander at an Indianapolis department store. Edwards spent several years in
state mental institutions until doctors determined that, with the aid of an attorney, he was
competent to stand trial. However, the trial judge denied the defendant's request to represent
himself. On appeal, the defendant won an Indiana Supreme Court ruling overturning his conviction,
announcing that an earlier U. S. Supreme Court decision (Faretta v. California) required the
trial judge to grant the defendant's request. When the nation's highest court agreed to hear
Indiana's appeal, CJLF joined the case. The Foundation argued that the Faretta decision did
not prohibit states from setting limits on the right to self-representation to prevent mentally ill
defendants from turning the trial into a mockery of justice. The Supreme Court agreed, enabling
trial judges to preserve the fairness and reliability of the trial.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Boumediene v. Bush / Al Odah |
6/12/08 |
Loss |
Habeas Corpus: Enemy Detainees |
|
In companion cases before the United States Supreme Court, CJLF filed an amicus curiae brief
to demonstrate that the writ of habeas corpus was never meant to extend to prisoners of war
designated as enemy combatants. CJLF filed its brief in response to the claims of two groups of enemy
combatants, as well as 23 groups representing the interests of the combatants. The combatants, and
their amicus, challenged their detention at a United States naval base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. The groups claim the United States Constitution requires the government to allow them to file
habeas corpus petitions in federal court. The groups also claim Congress does not have the authority
to prohibit federal courts from hearing habeas claims, and that Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs), created by an Act of Congress in 2006 to determine the status of the detainees,
unconstitutionally denied the petitioners due process rights. CJLF's brief examined the history of
habeas corpus going back to the English common law to show that a writ of habeas was never meant to
extend to military prisoners with no prior connection to the United States. A narrow majority of the
Supreme Court disagreed and extended the protection of the United States Constitution to enemies it
was never intended to protect.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) |
5/12/08 |
Win |
Evidence: DA and Victim privacy |
|
California Supreme Court case to review lower court rulings that had disqualified a public prosecutor
for opposing the disclosure of an 8 year-old sexual abuse victim's confidential psychotherapy
records. Both the mother of the victim and the victim's therapist objected to the disclosure of the
records. However, the victim's father, who is also the accused molester's brother, consented to the
release of the records. The prosecutor believed that the father's consent should not be sufficient
for disclosure because of the father's conflict of interest in the case. The prosecutor then objected
to the consent and filed a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for the victim. The court denied the
prosecutor's motion, and later granted the defense's motion to disqualify the prosecutor. The court
found the prosecutor had incurred a conflict of interest by seeking to represent the victim's
interests. The appellate court later agreed with this ruling. CJLF joined the appeal to the
California Supreme Court to argue the lower courts had misinterpreted the duties of the prosecutor.
The prosecutor had a duty to enforce the law as a representative of a party to the case, and as such,
the prosecutor had the right to participate in litigation affecting the proceeding. CJLF argued a
prosecutor acts within the lawful range of his or her duties by acting as a zealous advocate for both
the victim and the people of California. The lower courts had an obligation to respect the
prosecutor's duty, as well as the rights and interests of crime victims. The California Supreme
Court unanimously agreed that the prosecutor's actions were proper and not a conflict of interest.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Baze v. Rees |
4/16/08 |
Win |
Death penalty: Lethal injection |
|
U.S. Supreme Court case to review a legal challenge to Kentucky's lethal injection protocol by two
double-murderers facing execution. Ralph Baze shot and killed a county sheriff and his deputy in
1992. Thomas Bowling shot and killed a Lexington couple and wounded their two-year-old son in 1990.
In a federal lawsuit, they, along with several anti-death penalty groups, claim that the lethal
injection process used in 37 states is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. CJLF joined
the case to argue that the Constitution does not guarantee condemned murderers a painless execution
and that, properly administered, the lethal injection process is painless. Procedures now in place
in Kentucky and elsewhere are sufficient to minimize the chance of error. The Foundation also argues
that the delays caused by legal challenges to a method of execution that pro-criminal groups
insisted was humane 20 years ago, adds to the pain and suffering of the families of murder victims
and denies justice to the law-abiding public. The Supreme Court agreed, and executions should
resume shortly in most states.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Medellin v. Texas |
3/25/08 |
Win |
International law: Vienna Convention |
|
U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction and death sentence of Jose Medellin, a Mexican
national convicted of the 1993 rape and murder of two teenaged girls in Houston. The case involved
Medellin's claim that when the police failed to notify the Mexican Consulate following his arrest,
they violated an international treaty signed in 1963. He also argued that the Texas courts'
rejection of his claim violated a 2004 World Court decision and that decision required that the
judgment be set aside. CJLF joined the case on behalf of one of the murdered girl's parents to
argue that this murderer's international rights claim had already been considered and rejected by
the Texas Courts, and that no further delay of his sentence was required. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Texas court.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Allen v. Siebert |
11/5/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Limitations, tolling |
|
U.S. Supreme Court decision reinstating the death sentence of Alabama serial murderer, Daniel
Siebert. Siebert had admitted to, and ultimately been convicted of the murders of Sherri Weathers
and her son, as well as the murder of Linda Jarman. Siebert was sentenced to death for both murders
in 1987. In 1992, after both convictions had been affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court, Siebert
filed state petitions for habeas relief. He filed his state petitions three months past the state
filing deadline, and the circuit county court rejected both petitions. In 2001, Siebert filed
federal petitions for habeas corpus review. The petitions were dismissed as they were filed after
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) filing deadline for habeas corpus
petitions had lapsed. In 2005, while Siebert’s appeal of the dismissal was pending in the
Eleventh Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “time limits, no matter their form, are
filing conditions,” and an untimely state petition does not suspend federal time limits. Two
years later, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Alabama’s time limits did not prevent
federal court review of Siebert’s claims. CJLF argued as an amicus curiae that the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling was “demonstrably erroneous” and summary reversal was
appropriate. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, and stated, in a 7-2 decision, “[w]hen a
postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter . . . .”
The decision affirmed the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544
U.S. 408 (2005).
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| People v. Taylor |
10/23/07 |
Loss |
Death penalty: NY Law |
|
New York's Court of Appeals upheld its 2004 People v. LaValle decision that a jury instruction that
was a part New York's sentencing scheme was invalid because the instruction might influence a jury
to recommend the death sentence instead of deadlocking. Under the New York scheme, a deadlocked jury
would allow the judge to sentence the defendant to 20 to 25 years with the possibility of parole.
Before his trial, Taylor challenged the sentencing scheme. Taylor had been convicted for the robbery
of a Wendy's franchise in Flushing, New York and the murder of five Wendy's employees in 2000.
Taylor was sentenced to death under the New York death penalty law that required the challenged
instruction. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argue
that New York's entire death penalty scheme should not be overturned because of one jury
instruction. CJLF argued the Court of Appeals should give effect to the Legislature's intent, and
remove the improper instruction while leaving the other provisions of New York's death penalty
statute in place. CJLF argued the New York law contained a severability provision for the purpose of
allowing constitutional provisions to remain in effect while striking any unconstitutional
provisions. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court found the jury instruction to be
"inextricably interwoven with the sentencing procedure and necessary to effectuate the legislature's
intent." The Court held the death penalty sentencing statute to be unconstitutional on its face and
vacated Taylor's death sentence. Taylor's case was remitted for resentencing.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
United States v. Lujan
United States v. Meier |
10/2/07
9/28/07 |
Win |
DNA Testing: Suspicionless searches |
|
In companion cases Lujan and Meier, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the petitioner’s claims that Oregon’s DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000 (DNA Act) violated Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Lujan’s
claims that Oregon’s Act violated the ex post facto clause of the constitution, was an
unconstitutional bill of attainder, and that the Act violated the Constitution’s separation of
powers principles. Both Lujan and Meier claimed the Oregon Act violated their Fourth Amendment
rights because it authorized a probation officer to demand the collection of a blood sample as a
condition to a convicted criminal’s supervised release. Petitioners had pled guilty to one
count of unarmed bank robbery in May 1999. They were each sentenced to prison time and three years
supervised release. Oregon law stated supervised release was subject to standard conditions,
including those conditions imposed by the DNA Act. CJLF’s amicus brief argued the
DNA Act should survive petitioners’ Fourth Amendment challenges. CJLF argued that as a
convicted criminal subject to supervised release, petitioners had a diminished expectation of
privacy. The United States Supreme Court had stated a probationer’s diminished privacy was
part of society’s special need to supervise probationers. In its brief, CJLF urged that when
examining society’s special need, a court should consider circumstances such as: the
convicts’ substantially diminished expectation of privacy; the minimal intrusiveness of blood
testing; and the enormous benefit to society of maintaining DNA databanks of convicted murderers and
sex offenders. The Ninth Circuit agreed and relied on its 2004 decision in United States v.
Kincaide, 379 F.3d 813, that a “totality of the circumstances” could justify
compulsory DNA collection.
[CJLF brief in Lujan.]
[CJLF brief in Meier.] |
| Getsy v. Mitchell |
7/25/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Clearly established law |
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case involving hired hit man Jason Getsy. An
Ohio jury found Getsy guilty of the contract killing of Ann Serafino, whose son had a business
dispute with John Santine. Getsy was sentenced to death. A separate jury convicted Santine of
murder, but Getsy's confession was not admissible in that trial, the jury did not find murder for
hire had been proved, and Santine was not sentenced to death. A panel of the Sixth Circuit found
that this difference in sentences required that Getsy's death sentence be overturned. CJLF submitted
a brief arguing that no current rule of law authorizes a federal court to overturn a state sentence
on this basis, and Congress has forbidden lower federal courts from making up new rules in such
cases. The full Sixth Circuit agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| People v. Hernandez/Sandoval |
7/19/07 |
Win |
Jury trial: Sentencing factors |
|
Companion cases before the California Supreme Court involving criminals who received upper-term
sentences under the state’s determinant sentencing law. The law had allowed a trial
judge to sentence criminals to one of a range of three terms (such as 2, 4, or 6 years), based upon
mitigating or aggravating factors related to the crime or the defendant. In 2007, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled, in Cunningham v. California, that aggravating factors used to
make a defendant eligible for the upper term must be found by a jury, rather than the judge.
The state Supreme Court is reviewing these two cases to determine the extent that the
Cunningham decision disrupts California sentencing. Joel Hernandez and Aida
Sandoval were both convicted of felonies and sentenced to upper terms. Hernandez had a number
of prior felonies, which the judge considered during sentencing for reckless driving and evading a
police officer. Sandoval did not have priors, but the judge gave her an upper term and
required her to serve her sentences consecutively, after considering the particularly cold-blooded
nature of the circumstances of her crimes of voluntary manslaughter which left two people dead and
her attempt to kill a third victim. CJLF argues that the Cunningham
decision does allow judges to base an upper-term sentence upon a defendant’s prior
convictions and require that multiple sentences be served consecutively. Further, once a single
aggravating factor has been properly found, the judge may find and consider additional factors in
deciding whether to impose the upper term. In deciding Sandoval's case and another case, the
California Supreme Court agreed with each of the major points of CJLF's brief. Hernandez's case is
still pending. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Panetti v. Quarterman |
6/28/07 |
Loss |
Death penalty: Competency |
|
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a Texas double-murderer’s claim that he cannot be executed
because he is mentally ill. In 1992, the defendant, Scott Panetti, murdered his wife's
parents with a sawed-off shotgun in front of his wife and three-year-old daughter, who had moved in
with the victims to escape his violent behavior. Following his arrest, he confessed to the
murders. After being found mentally competent to stand trial, Panetti insisted on
representing himself. He presented an insanity defense, claiming that an alternate
personality named “Sarge” committed the murders. After his conviction, sentence,
and multiple appeals, the state court found him competent to be executed. The federal
District Court and Court of Appeals later affirmed his competency and his death sentence.
Panetti, along with the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the American Bar Association, and
the American Psychological Association, is seeking a decision to broaden the standard for
incompetence for execution. The present standard requires that the murderer be able to understand
that he committed the murder and will be executed for it, which the federal court found Panetti
does. At the request of the Texas Solicitor General, CJLF has joined the case to argue for a
decision to maintain the current standard. The Court sent the case back to the lower courts to
reconsider, but it did not adopt the sweeping rule proposed by the ABA and others.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Fry v. Pliler |
6/11/07 |
Win |
Habeas Corpus: Harmless Error |
|
The United States Supreme Court affirmed a murderer's conviction. The defendant, drug dealer John
Fry, was convicted on strong evidence of killing a Vacaville couple in 1992. On appeal, he claimed
that his conviction was invalid because a witness who claimed that her cousin admitted to killing
two people was not allowed to testify. The state court rejected the claim, finding that in light of
the weakness of this evidence, excluding it was within the trial judge's discretion. The federal
courts reviewed the claim on habeas corpus applying a standard of review announced by the Supreme
Court's 1993 decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson (won by CJLF) and also concluded that the
exclusion was error, but harmless. Before the Supreme Court, Fry argued that the Brecht standard is
too difficult for him to meet and should not apply to his case. CJLF joined the case to argue for a
decision reaffirming the existing standard. The Supreme Court, unanimous on this point, agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Roper v. Weaver |
5/21/07 |
Draw |
Due Process: Prosecutor Argument |
|
United States Supreme Court case to review a federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling which
overturned the death sentence of William Weaver. A Jackson County, Missouri jury found Weaver guilty
on substantial evidence of murdering Charles Taylor, a key witness in a federal drug case in July
1987. Among Weaver's claims on appeal was that in closing argument at his sentencing hearing the
prosecutor made allegedly improper statements which invalidated his sentence. Specifically, the
prosecutor told the sentencing jury that he supported the death penalty, that it was their duty,
like soldiers, to sentence Weaver to death, and that a death sentence would deter others from
committing murder. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the claim and upheld Weaver's conviction and
sentence. In 2001, a federal district judge accepted the claim and overturned the sentence. That
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals last year. CJLF joined the state's appeal of that ruling
to argue that the federal law prohibited the Eighth Circuit court from overturning the Missouri
Supreme Court decision unless it misapplied clearly established law or Supreme Court precedent. CJLF
pointed out that there is no Supreme Court precedent finding similar statements made in closing
argument unconstitutional, and that the Missouri court's review of Weaver's claim was reasonable.
The Court decided that, due to some unusual procedural issues in the case, it would not decide the
question presented but instead dismiss the case as "improvidently granted." This decision
effectively leaves the Eighth Circuit decision requiring a new sentencing hearing in place, but it
does not set a Supreme Court precedent either way.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Schriro v. Landrigan |
5/14/07 |
Win |
Death penalty |
|
The United States Supreme Court reversed a 2006 Ninth Circuit ruling and reinstated the death
sentence of a man who brutally murdered an acquaintance in Arizona, after escaping from an Oklahoma
prison where he was serving time for an earlier murder. At his sentencing hearing, Jeffrey Landrigan
announced in open court that he would not allow his attorney to present evidence mitigating his
responsibility for the murder. Over a span of 15 years, three courts and a panel of the Ninth
Circuit rejected the claim that his death sentence was unconstitutional because his attorney failed
to present the evidence. However, a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit accepted it. Before the
Supreme Court, CJLF argued that this violates an Act of Congress which forbids setting aside the
facts found by the state courts unless the finality is unreasonable. The Supreme Court agreed in a
5-4 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Smith v. Texas |
4/25/07 |
Loss |
Death penalty: Jury Instructions |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision to require the resentencing of LaRoyce Smith for the 1991 murder of a
Dallas Taco Bell shift manager during a robbery. At trial, the defense attorney asked the judge to
declare the Texas death penalty unconstitutional based upon a recent Supreme Court decision striking
down the state's sentencing jury instructions. The judge instead modified the jury instructions to
accommodate a recent high court decision and asked the defense attorney if he wanted to suggest any
improvements. The defense attorney did not and raised no objection to the new instructions. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later ruled that the modified instructions complied with the recent
decision. Later on habeas corpus, the same court denied Smith's claim that the instruction violated
a subsequent high court decision on jury instructions. In 2004, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed
the Texas court decision and sent the case back for further review of Smith's claim. A year later,
the Texas court ruled that the disputed instruction did not require overturning his death sentence.
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Smith's challenge to that ruling, CJLF joined the case to
argue that the standard for review of trial errors not objected to by the defense has been
historically left up to the state courts. The Court's 5 to 4 ruling held that the instruction given
in this case did not satisfy its requirements and that the defense lawyer's initial objection was
sufficient to preserve the issue. [CJLF
brief in PDF.] |
| Irons v. Carey |
3/6/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Constitutionality of 2254(d)(1) |
|
Federal Ninth Circuit decision overturning a district judge's ruling ordering the parole of San
Francisco murderer Carl Irons. In 1984, Irons received a 17-years-to-life prison sentence for
shooting and stabbing a neighbor to death then dumping his body in the ocean. In 2001, Irons
appealed a decision by the Board of Prison Terms to deny him parole. The state Court of Appeal
reviewed the case, deciding that the Board's decision was proper. When he appealed to the federal
court, a magistrate was appointed to consider his claim. In 2004, the magistrate recommended that
Irons be released based on Ninth Circuit precedent not accepted by the California courts or required
by the U.S. Supreme Court. When a federal district judge adopted this recommendation and ordered
Iron's release, California appealed. CJLF joined the case to argue that federal rules adopted by
Congress prohibit federal courts from overturning a state appeals court decision, unless the state
court misapplied United States Supreme Court precedent. Because there was no misapplication of law
or binding precedent by the California Court of Appeal, the federal judge had no authority to
re-decide Irons' claim. The Ninth Circuit decision agreed.
[CJLF
brief in PDF.] |
| Whorton v. Bockting |
2/28/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Retroactivity of Crawford |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision to reinstate the 1988 conviction of a Nevada child molester. A jury
found Marvin Bockting guilty of engaging in various sex acts with his six-year-old stepdaughter.
Because the child was too emotionally upset to testify, her tape-recorded description of the incident
was introduced at trial in addition to medical evidence and Bockting's incriminating statements. The
applicable federal rules at the time allowed the child's taped statement (hearsay) in lieu of her
direct testimony. Two years later, the Supreme Court sent Bockting's case back for a determination
of the statement's trustworthiness under a new standard. In 1993, the Nevada Court ruled that the
statement was trustworthy. In 2003, the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v.
Washington announced a new rule barring "testimonial" hearsay statements from trial. In
February 2005, the Ninth Circuit applied the new rule retroactively to overturn Bockting's
conviction. Before the Supreme Court, CJLF argued that only rules fundamental to a fair trial can be
applied retroactively and that the change in hearsay does not meet that standard. The high court
agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Burton v. Stewart |
1/9/07 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Retroactivity of Blakely |
|
United States Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reject a Washington sex
offender's challenge to his sentence. The case involved a 47-year-sentence given to Lonnie Burton for
the rape and robbery of a 15-year-old boy and the burglary of his parents' home. Because of Burton's
multiple prior felony convictions, he qualified for an increased sentence under Washington law. While
a challenge to his sentence was being reviewed by the state's highest court, Burton launched a
separate challenge to his conviction in federal court on habeas corpus. Federal law generally allows
only one round of habeas corpus review of a criminal judgment. After his state challenge failed,
Burton asked the federal court to consider claims against his sentence on habeas corpus. The federal
court agreed to hear the case, but refused to overturn his sentence. In 2004, after the U.S. Supreme
Court announced new sentencing rules in Blakely v. Washington, Burton amended his
appeal to claim that the Blakely ruling applied retroactively to invalidate his sentence. CJLF joined
the high court review of the case to argue that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review
Burton's second petition. The Court's decision said exactly that.
[CJLF
brief in PDF.] |
| Carey v. Musladin |
12/11/06 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Deference |
|
United States Supreme decision utilizing CJLF arguments to reinstate the murder conviction
of an abusive husband who gunned down his estranged wife's fiancé in front of several
witnesses. In 2005, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had overturned the murderer's
sentence, ruling that it was unconstitutional for members of the victim's family to wear buttons with
the deceased's picture on it during the trial. Prior to Mathew Musladin's trial, the judge refused
Musladin's request to prevent Studer's family from wearing the photo buttons. Following his
conviction, Musladin appealed, claiming that the buttons prejudiced the jury against him. The Court
of Appeal denied the claim, as did the federal District Court on habeas corpus. But a divided panel
of the federal Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and announced that the buttons
violated Musladin's constitutional rights. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the state's appeal,
CJLF joined the case to point out that, once again, the Ninth Circuit's ruling sidestepped
Congressional limits on its authority in order to overturn a reasonable state court decision.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Ex parte Medellin |
11/15/06 |
Win |
Habeas corpus: Vienna Convention |
|
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision to deny further review of a foreign national's claim that
the failure to notify the Mexican government of his arrest and trial for murdering two young girls
invalidates his conviction and death sentence. In 2005, CJLF won a U.S. Supreme Court decision which
rejected the murderer's request for federal court review of this claim. When the case was sent back
to the Texas court, CJLF argued that the claim was reviewed and rejected in state court years ago and
no further consideration is required. The Texas court rejected Medellin's claim on a different
ground, and he has since asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case again.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Ayers v. Belmontes |
11/13/06 |
Win |
Death penalty: Catch-all instruction |
|
United States Supreme Court decision reinstating the death sentence of a California man who, in 1981,
beat a 19-year-old girl to death with a metal bar while burglarizing her home. The Court's decision
overturned a 2005 Ninth Circuit ruling which announced that the instructions given to the
murderer's sentencing jury 25 years ago were unconstitutional. CJLF joined the review of that ruling
to argue that two prior Supreme Court decision (both won by CJLF) held that the jury
instructions were proper. The Court held that they were.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Hamdan v. Rumsfeld |
6/29/06 |
Loss |
Habeas corpus: Detainee Treatment Act |
|
The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
and held that accused terrorists held in Guantanamo Bay could not be tried by military tribunal
under current law. CJLF had argued that Congress had repealed the Court’s jurisdiction to
hear this claim in the Detainee Treatment Act.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon |
6/28/06 |
Win |
Evidence: Vienna Convention |
|
The United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, upholding the
conviction of Moises Sanchez-Llamas for the attempted murder of a police officer. Sanchez-Llamas made
incriminating statements shortly after his arrest and before he was informed of his right to have the
Mexican Consulate notified of his arrest. CJLF argued and the Court held that suppression of evidence
is not an available remedy for enforcement of the Vienna Convention, the treaty that requires
consular notification. Suppression of the truth in a criminal trial is a drastic remedy, it is not
required by the treaty, and no other country suppresses evidence on this basis. Further, there is
no causal connection between the treaty violation and the defendant’s statements, because he
had no right to have the consulate notified before the interrogation.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Kansas v. Marsh |
6/26/06 |
Win |
Death penalty: Aggravating = Mitigating |
|
The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court and reinstated the
death penalty in Kansas. In 1995, Marsh murdered a young mother and set the house on fire, burning
her 19-month-old daughter to death. The state court had held that the state’s death penalty
statute was unconstitutional because it required a verdict of death in the extremely unlikely event
that the jury found the aggravating and mitigating factors precisely equal. CJLF argued and the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a capital sentencing statute from operating in this
manner. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Washington v. Recuenco |
6/26/06 |
Win |
Jury trial: Blakely & Harmless error |
|
The United States Supreme Court reinstated the sentence of a Washington man who had threatened his
wife with a gun, reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of Washington. Arturo Recuenco was
convicted by a jury of assault, and the jury also found he had used a deadly weapon. The judge
sentenced him to an additional three years for using a gun, in accordance with Washington law.
After the trial, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Blakely v. Washington that sentence
enhancement facts such as these must be found by the jury. The Washington Court of Appeals found
that the error was harmless, because the jury found he had used a weapon and the gun was the only
weapon at issue in the trial. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that
“Blakely error” can never be harmless. CJLF argued, and the U.S. Supreme Court
held, that errors such as this do not require reversal where it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the result would have been the same in the absence of the error.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Samson v. California |
6/19/06 |
Win |
Search and Seizure: Parole search condition |
|
California’s policy of requiring parolees to be subject to search at any time was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court. The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, and in
most cases that means the police must have probable cause before conducting a search. However,
there are exceptions, and even law-abiding people are subject to search when entering a courthouse or
boarding an airplane. Convicted felons are subject to search at any time while in prison, and the
state may reasonably require that prisoners released on parole, but still officially in custody, also
be subject to search. [CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Hudson v. Michigan |
6/15/06 |
Win |
Search and Seizure: Knock-notice & excl. rule |
|
The United States Supreme Court decided that evidence obtained in a valid search of a house, i.e.,
made pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause, need not be suppressed because the police did
not wait long enough to enter after announcing their presence. The opinion discussed the high social
cost of suppressing the truth in criminal cases and decided that the exclusionary rule should not be
extended into new territory.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Hill v. McDonough |
6/12/06 |
Loss |
Death penalty |
|
In this case, the United States Supreme Court decided that a death row inmate could use a civil suit
under the Civil Rights Act to challenge the state’s method of execution and thereby postpone
his execution. CJLF had argued that invoking the Civil Rights Act for this purpose was an end-run
around the limitations that Congress had placed on habeas corpus for the specific purpose of limiting
such last-minute litigation.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Muntaqim v. Coombe |
6/1/06 |
Win |
Voting: Felon disenfranchisement |
|
Convicted killers in New York prisons claimed that they had the right to vote,
despite New York law, under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. CJLF joined an amicus
brief to oppose this claim, noting the history of felon disenfranchisement laws nationwide before
and after the Voting Rights Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Rice v. Collins |
1/18/06 |
Win |
Jury: Batson review |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments
to overturn a Ninth Circuit ruling, which had found racial bias during jury selection
in the trial of a habitual criminal. The defendant, who had prior convictions of
forcible rape and robbery, received a 25 years to life sentence for his third felony
conviction on drug dealing charges. On appeal, he claimed that the prosecutor exercised
racial bias in excusing two black jurors, although two other blacks were accepted and
served. After the trial judge, the state appellate court and the federal District Court
found no bias, the Ninth Circuit discovered it in a 2003 ruling. When the Supreme Court
agreed to review the ruling, CJLF joined the case to argue that federal rules and
precedent require that the lower courts give great deference to the findings of the
trial judge regarding racial bias claims. The high court's precedent-setting decision agreed.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Brown v. Sanders |
1/11/06 |
Win |
Death penalty: Invalid aggravators |
|
U. S. Supreme Court decision utilizing CJLF arguments to
reinstate the death sentence of a man who beat a Bakersfield woman to death in 1981.
While California law requires a jury to find at least one special circumstance related
to a murder to qualify the killer for a death sentence, the jury in this case found four.
On appeal, the state Supreme Court ruled that two of the four special circumstances
were invalid, but the death sentence was upheld. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit overturned
the death sentence. Before the high court, CJLF argued that the sentence was proper
because two special circumstances remained valid, and all of the facts considered by the
jury were properly considered under unchallenged circumstances. The invalid circumstances
were therefore redundant and made no difference in this case. The Court's decision
incorporated this argument.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
| Maryland v. Blake |
11/14/06 |
Draw |
Self-incrimination |
|
U. S. Supreme Court dismissal of a case it had accepted for
review of a Maryland appeals court ruling suppressing incriminating statements made by a
juvenile accomplice to a murder. When the actual murderer (Tolbert) blamed his juvenile
accomplice for the killing, the accomplice (Blake), who had previously refused to talk to
police, agreed to make a statement "to set the record straight." In his statement, Blake
admitted his involvement but identified the older Tolbert as the murderer. Prior to trial,
Blake's attorney won a Maryland appeals court ruling that excluded Blake's incriminating
statements, concluding that he had been badgered into making them. CJLF joined the high
court appeal of that ruling to argue that there was no evidence of badgering by police and
that Blake's statements were voluntary. The Supreme Court dismissed the case without
deciding the issue.
[CJLF brief in PDF.] |
|
|
