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The question of what constitutes an acquittal has not been addressed often by this Court. The first modern case addressing acquittals is Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957), in which the jury was instructed on both first- and second-degree murder, and convicted Green of the lesser offense. After the conviction was overturned, he was retried and convicted of first-degree murder. See id., at 186. Green held that the first verdict was an implicit acquittal of the greater charge, and double jeopardy prevented retrial on the first-degree murder count. See id., at 190-191. This holding does not shed any light on the present case. Green posed a relatively simple problem of interpreting a jury's verdict. It is difficult to argue with the logic that silence on the greater offense is an acquittal when the jury convicts on the lesser offense. The present case does not involve a silent verdict, but rather the meaning of the trial court's words and actions. Green's real significance is its holding that a successful appeal by the defendant does not waive double jeopardy. See id., at 191-192.
Acquittal decisions typically come in the context of government appeals. The next decision after Green, Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141 (1962) (per curiam), sets the pattern. The District Court, relying on alleged prosecutorial misconduct, directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. Seeid., at 142. The Court of Appeals set aside the acquittal, holding that the District Court lacked the power to acquit on this ground. See ibid. This Court reversed, holding that an acquittal, even if "based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation" was final and could not be appealed. Id., at 143. Although it does not dwell on what constitutes an acquittal, Fong Foo highlights the importance of that decision. An injustice was perpetrated on the people by the District Court in Fong Foo, one that could not be corrected because of the absolute finality of acquittals.
The first significant discussion of what was an acquittal, rather than the acquittal's effect, is found in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977). Martin Linen addressed whether an acquittal granted by a trial court after a hung jury was appealable. See id., at 566-567. The double jeopardy analysis focused on the need to protect defendants from the threat of a second trial. See id., at 569. Because a successful appeal would require a second trial, it was necessary to "inquire further into the constitutional significance of a [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] Rule 29(c) acquittal." Id., at 571. This Court then established the standard for assessing whether a judge's action is treated as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. What constitutes an
" 'acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's action. Rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Id., at 571 (emphasis added; citations and footnote omitted).
Martin Linen did not require any heavy analytical lifting once this point was made. There was no question that the Rule 29(c) grant satisfied this test. The District Court proclaimed that this was "the weakest [contempt case that] I've ever seen." Id., at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted). When it entered the judgments of acquittal, the court wrote that "the government has failed to prove the material allegations beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the District Court had "evaluated the Government's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction," see ibid., there was an acquittal protected by double jeopardy. See id., at 575.
The Martin Linen test has two components. The first is a warning against allowing labels to mislead the analysis. This is an old and uncontroversial point. Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 114 (1934) ("tyranny of labels"). This is not a grant of power to a reviewing court to superimpose its ideas on that of the trial court. The trial court's statements and the effects of its actions are relevant to the inquiry, as demonstrated by Martin Linen's reliance on the District Court's statement of its reasons for granting the acquittal.
The second part of the test limits the inquiry to the factual elements of the offense. Legal rulings terminating the case in the defendant's favor do not come under Martin Linen's definition of acquittal. In United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332 (1975), this Court allowed the government to appeal a dismissal of the indictment rendered after a guilty verdict. See id., at 333. The defendant had no right to benefit from an error of law where it could be corrected without resorting to another trial. Id., at 345. Martin Linen applies Wilson's distinction to the definition of acquittal.
This distinction was given greater importance in United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978), which allowed the government to appeal dismissals rendered before the verdict. See id., at 84. Double jeopardy did not bar the government's appeal even though success would require retrial. In this context, double jeopardy only protected acquittals, which were limited to Martin Linen's definition, see id., at 97, effectively extending Wilson to midtrial dismissals. Scottexpounded on what constituted an acquittal, noting that acquittals could be based on the prosecution's failure to rebut affirmative defenses, or derived from " 'erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles . . . .' " Id., at 98 (quoting id., at 106, Brennan, J., dissenting). However, an acquittal still must involve a rejection of at least some of the material facts of the crime. (4)
Scott makes this distinction relevant to the present case, which deals with the trial court's actions before the verdict. It also affirms another important, clearly established concept that limits the definition of acquittal. "Where the court, before the jury returns a verdict, enters a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29, appeal will only be barred when 'it is plain that the District Court . . . evaluated the Government's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.' " Id., at 97 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 572) (emphasis added). This limitation naturally flows from the consequences of an acquittal and the nature of the inquiry.
Double jeopardy is unique in constitutional law. See Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U. S. 294, 302 (1984). No matter how erroneous or unjust, the prosecution cannot overcome the decision of a trial court to take the case away from the jury and order an acquittal. While Ernesto Miranda was reconvicted of rape after this Court reversed his conviction, see L. Baker, Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics 191-193 (1983), Fong Foo walked away a free man even though the United States never had a real chance to prove its case against him. Given the extreme consequences of an acquittal, it only makes sense to require that the trial court's actions clearly satisfy the Martin Linen test before being cloaked in double jeopardy's invincible armor.
This requirement also alleviates the strongest criticism of Scott's fact/law distinction, that this standard will be too difficult to apply in a principled manner. See Scott, 437 U. S., at 110-111 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3919.5, p. 655 (2d ed. 1991). The Scott majority foresaw no problem in making this distinction, see 437 U. S., at 99, n. 12, and this prediction has proven accurate. See 5 W. LaFave, J. Israel, & N. King, Criminal Procedure §25.3(a), p. 666 (2d ed. 1999). The plain statement requirement assures this result. If the trial court does not clearly state the reasons for the termination of the action, determining whether the termination was a dismissal or an acquittal will be much more difficult for an appellate court. See Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, §3919.5, at 683-684.
The remaining significant acquittal cases reaffirm these principles. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54 (1978), decided on the same day as Scott, held that an acquittal based upon an erroneous evidentiary ruling could not be appealed. See id., at 77-78. In Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140 (1986), the trial court dismissed certain charges on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. Id., at 141. The fact that this was labeled a demurrer rather than an acquittal was irrelevant. The finding that the evidence could not support a conviction was an acquittal for the purpose of invoking double jeopardy. See id., at 144.
The relevant clearly established law governing this case is that: 1) while acquittals terminate the prosecution, not all terminations favoring the defendants are acquittals; 2) what is an acquittal is not decided by the label attached to it, but by determining whether the action resolved, in the defendant's favor, some or all of the factual elements of the crime; 3) other terminations of the case, whether before or after the verdict, are not protected by double jeopardy; 4) in order to invoke double jeopardy it must be plain that the action terminating the case was an acquittal. The next question is whether the Michigan Supreme Court "correctly identifie[d] the governing legal rule." Williams, 529 U. S., at 407.
The Michigan Supreme Court identified the correct double jeopardy principles established by this Court's precedents. A state court decision does not violate the "contrary to" clause of §2254(d)(1) unless "the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 152 L. Ed. 2d 912, 926, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002). Since this Court has not addressed a set of facts materially indistinguishable from this case, the only question is whether the Michigan Supreme Court applied the correct rules.
Michigan's high court relied on three United States Supreme Court opinions in its decision. It cited Martin Linen, supra, and Wilson, supra, for the proposition that the trial court's label and characterization of its actions did not determine whether they constituted an acquittal. See People v. Vincent, 565 N. W. 2d 629, 632-633 (Mich. 1997). Instead, "what we must determine is 'whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' " Id., at 633 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 571). The decision also cited Smalis, supra, for the principle when the trial court enters an acquittal, further proceedings are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid. (citing Smalis, 476 U. S., at 142). These are the first three clearly established principles governing the double jeopardy issue in this case. Seesupra, at 20.
The Michigan Supreme Court also applied the remaining clearly established rule, that the acquittal must be plain. See supra, at 20. It held that there must be a "clear statement" or a "signed order of judgment" articulating why the motion was granted so that it was "evident that there has been a final resolution of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Vincent, 565 N. W. 2d, at 636. The opinion may not have cited Martin Linen or Scott, or used the same language, but the effect is the same--requiring the acquittal to be plain or evident before invoking double jeopardy. A state court does not have to cite this Court's precedent to avoid violating the "contrary to" standard. So long as the correct principles are applied, their justification is not a concern. See Early v. Packer, 537 U. S. __, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263, 269-270, 123 S. Ct. 362, 365 (2002). Requiring the order to unambiguously resolve factual elements of the crime in defendant's favor before being classified as an acquittal simply follows the law set forth by this Court.
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision is not "contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law . . . ." If habeas can be granted in this case, it will be granted only if that court applied the correct principles unreasonably to the facts of this case. As we will show in the next part, the state court's decision here was not merely reasonable, it was right.
Once the relevant clearly established law is ascertained, the reasonable application standard should be comparatively simple to apply. The AEDPA does not ask if the federal court agrees that the state court was correct, but only if the state court made a reasonable application of the clearly established law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. __, 154 L. Ed. 2d 279, 287-288, 123 S. Ct. 357, 361 (2002) (per curiam). Reaching the "wrong" result is not the same as an unreasonable application. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000). If the state court has identified and applied the clearly established law, then its interpretation of these precedents is likely to be reasonable.
This Court has not provided any detailed test to determine whether a state court's decision is reasonable. Instead, it has simply concluded after examining the relevant law that the state court decision was either reasonable, see, e.g., Visciotti, supra; Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 152 L. Ed. 2d 912, 931-932, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2002); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782, 795 (2001) (Fifth Amendment claim), or unreasonable. See Penry, supra, at 803-804 (Eighth Amendment claim); Williams, 529 U. S., at 397. Some circuit courts try to flesh out the §2254(d) standard. The Seventh Circuit has stated, "The statutory 'unreasonableness' standard allows the state court's conclusion to stand if it is one of several equally plausible outcomes . . . . Some decisions will be at such tension with governing U. S. Supreme Court precedents, or so inadequately supported by the record, or so arbitrary, that a writ must issue." Hall v.Washington, 106 F. 3d 742, 748-749 (CA7 1997). Adopting a standard like this would be helpful in guiding the federal courts' application of §2254(d). See Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Lockyer v. Andrade, No. 01-1127, at 22-26.
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision satisfies any test of reasonableness. This case was not simple. The trial court's conduct was less than exemplary. It acted equivocally about the single most important motion it had to rule on. Furthermore, the decision to delay ruling on the directed verdict motion violated Michigan law. See People v. Vincent, 565 N. W. 2d 629, 631, n. 1 (Mich. 1997). Granting the double jeopardy claim would erase the jury's verdict and deprive the state of a retrial.
The greatest problem is posed by the tension between the trial court's words and actions on the day the directed verdict motion was made. Had it done nothing else that day, the statement made after the motion, see supra, at 3, would indicate that the trial court would dismiss the first-degree murder charge. See id., at 631 (quoting analysis of the Michigan Court of Appeals). The trial court's actions immediately after the statement eliminate this possibility. Allowing the prosecution to make its case the next day is inconsistent with an intent to immediately acquit the defendant. The trial court's statement came at the end of the defendant's argument supporting the directed verdict motion. See id., at 630. The prosecution had not yet responded, and the trial court gave the prosecution this opportunity after indicating an initial agreement with the defendants' position. In this context, the Michigan Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court was simply thinking out loud, see id., at 634, was correct.
None of this Court's double jeopardy cases have addressed a similar set of facts. In each of the cases a motion had been clearly granted and the jury dismissed. See part I-B, supra. The question was the effect of the granted motion rather than whether a motion had been granted. Presented with this set of facts, the Michigan Supreme Court performed admirably.
The rule that a court's labeling of a motion does not control the double jeopardy analysis, see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 571 (1977), does not change the result. Rejecting labels means that there are no magic words that automatically transform a trial court's actions into an acquittal that terminates jeopardy, or a dismissal that contemplates a government appeal and possible retrial. "The word [acquittal] itself has no talismanic quality for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Serfass v. United States, 420 U. S. 377, 392 (1975). Instead, reviewing courts must look to what was done and the reasons given for the trial court's actions. In Martin Linen, there was an acquittal in both form by the clear grant of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) motion to acquit and dismiss the jury, see 430 U. S., at 566, and in substance, by the District Court's reasons for granting the motion. See id., at 572. In this case, while the trial court's initial motion indicated acceptance of the defendant's position, every other action it took in the trial was to the contrary. It allowed the prosecution to rebut the defendants' claims the next day, see Vincent, 565 N. W. 2d, at 630, it decided to reserve its ruling on the motion after hearing the prosecution's rebuttal, see id., at 630-631, it stated that it had not directed a verdict, see id., at 631, it never applied the legal standard for directing a verdict in its initial statement, see id., at 634, it never entered a final order of acquittal, see id., at 633, and it allowed Vincent to be convicted of first-degree murder. See id., at 631.
The crux of the Michigan Supreme Court's analysis is that the trial court's actions were not explicit enough to acquit the defendant of the first-degree murder count. "When ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, a court must generally give a more particularized detailed analysis on the record of the evidence and reasoning that forms the basis of the decision and a clear statement that the motion is either granted or denied." Id., at 634. This follows from the fourth clearly established principle, that the acquittal must be plainly evident before double jeopardy bars further action. See supra, at 20. Requiring clarity helps to limit the injustices caused by the irrevocable nature of acquittals. If equivocal or ambiguous statements are to be treated as acquittals, then the Double Jeopardy Clause becomes a trap rather than a right. "But neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor any other constitutional provision exists to provide unjustified windfalls." Jones v. Thomas, 491 U. S. 376, 387 (1989). If double jeopardy is to be administered as an ancient right rather than as a technicality, see ibid., then its drastic sanction should be reserved for actions that are clearly acquittals.
With the language "[w]e hold that in order to qualify as a directed verdict of an acquittal . . . ," see Vincent, 565 N. W. 2d, at 636, the Michigan Supreme Court also recognized state rules governing directed verdicts. This does not conflict with the principle that even erroneous acquittals are protected by double jeopardy. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam). The Michigan Supreme Court did not merely hold that the trial court's action was procedurally erroneous. The equivocal nature of the trial court's acts made it impossible to find a resolution of some or all of the material elements of the crime in the defendant's favor, see Vincent, supra, at 636, removing the case from the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The trial court's statements lacked the finality that double jeopardy requires. An "acquittal 'represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' " Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U. S. 294, 309 (1984) (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 571) (emphasis added in Lydon). There was no final judgment of acquittal in this case. The Michigan Supreme Court's conclusion that the "judge's thinking process should not have final or binding effect until formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, or judgment," Vincent, 565 N. W. 2d, at 635, is a common sense interpretation of double jeopardy. A prime purpose of double jeopardy is "to protect the integrity of final judgments." See United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 92 (1978). In United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 (1896), this Court held that double jeopardy did not prevent retrial after the conviction was reversed on appeal. See id., at 671-672. This decision "effectively formulated a concept of continuing jeopardy that has application where criminal proceedings have not run their full course." Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 326 (1970). Acquittals terminate jeopardy "whether they are 'express or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense.' " Lydon, 466 U. S., at 308 (quoting Price, supra, at 329).
When a jury returns a verdict of acquittal the proceeding is ended, even if a final judgment cannot be entered because of a defective indictment. See Ball, 163 U. S., at 669, 671. Judicial pronouncements are different. In Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), a finding by an appellate court that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds. See id., at 18. However, this is only true if the appellate court's ruling is left undisturbed by a higher court. See Lydon, 466 U. S., at 308-309. If the appellate case is capable of being reversed by a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing en banc, or by certiorari to this Court, then there is no final judgment, and jeopardy has not ended.
Similarly, a trial court's actions do not become an acquittal that terminates jeopardy until a final judgment is entered. Since there is nothing resembling that in this case, there was no acquittal.
The rules promulgated by the Michigan Supreme Court will help prevent cases like this from arising again. This is not an attempt to crush the defendant through repeated retrials, but rather an attempt to prevent him from reaping an undeserved windfall. The rules are consistent with the intent and spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause, along with this Court's more specific applications of this provision. The Michigan Supreme Court's decision is a good faith effort to solve a problem not directly addressed by Supreme Court precedent and is both plausible and reasonable. It is the type of decision that Congress meant to protect when it enacted the AEDPA. Had the Sixth Circuit applied the AEDPA, it would not have upheld the grant of habeas corpus.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should be reversed.
February, 2003
Respectfully submitted,
Charles L. Hobson
Attorney for Amicus Curiae|
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4. The Scott Court also stated the double jeopardy "may" attach when "the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not
related to factual guilt or innocence." Id., at 92. This is dicta, Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U. S. __ (No. 01-7574, Jan. 14, 2003) (slip op., at 12), and
cannot be a clearly established rule for the §2254(d) inquiry. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) (" 'clearly established Federal law' . . .
refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta").
Sattazahn is one of this Court's cases applying double jeopardy to capital sentencing proceedings that "have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence." See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430, 439 (1981). In such proceedings, decisions not to impose the death penalty are deemed acquittals that bar the imposition of that sentence in any future proceedings. Ibid. This unique departure from double jeopardy as applied to sentencing, see, e.g.,Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919), has little relevance to the acquittals on guilt addressed in this case.