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It is the duty of courts, both state and federal, "to uphold federal law." See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494, n. 3 (1976). Unfortunately, too many federal courts pay too little attention to the habeas reforms of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and this Court's interpretation of that law. Twice this term the Court has summarily reversed in habeas cases for failing to apply the deferential standard for state court decisions required by 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. __, 154 L. Ed. 2d 279, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002) (per curiam); Early v.Packer, 537 U. S. __, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263, 123 S. Ct. 362 (2002) (per curiam). In Visciotti, the Ninth Circuit "mischaracterized" the California Supreme Court's decision in the case, and entertained a "readiness to attribute error [that] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." See 154 L. Ed. 2d, at 286, 123 S. Ct., at 360. Its application of §2254(d)'s "unreasonable application" clause "substituted its own judgment for that of the state court, in contravention of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)." Ibid. Packer addressed a similar failure to follow the AEDPA. There the Ninth Circuit faulted the state court for adhering to a state standard that was even more protective of the defendant's rights than this Court's standard. See 154 L. Ed. 2d, at 270, 123 S. Ct., at 365. The Ninth Circuit also mischaracterized the state court's consideration of defendant's claims and faulted the state court for not following Supreme Court decisions on nonconstituitonal federal law issues, which are not binding on state courts. See id., at 270-271, 123 S. Ct., at 365-366.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in this case is an even more flagrant disregard of Congress's limits on federal habeas corpus. While the Court of Appeals opinions in Visciotti and Packer at least attempted to apply the AEDPA, the Sixth Circuit merely paid lip service to the law. The only "analysis" of the AEDPA was to quote 28 U. S. C. §2254(d) at the beginning of its discussion and to then summarize the §2254(d)(1) standard with a citation to Williams v.Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000). See Vincent v. Jones, 292 F. 3d 506, 510 (CA6 2002). Next, after noting and dismissing Michigan's contention that the Michigan Supreme Court's conclusion that there was no directed verdict was a factual determination governed by 28 U. S. C. §2254(e), see id., at 509, and n. 2, the federal court made no further mention of the AEDPA and completely failed to apply §2254(d). The very brief opinion simply sets forth its analysis of some of this Court's double jeopardy cases, a short analysis of the trial court's statements, and its conclusion that "[b]y later submitting the case to the jury on the open murder charge, the trial judge subjected the petitioner to prosecution for first-degree murder in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id., at 512.
It is as if the AEDPA had not been passed. In addition to ignoring §2254(d), the Sixth Circuit makes no substantive analysis of decisions interpreting this provision, and does not address the Michigan Supreme Court's decision substantively. The opinion makes only one analytical reference to the decision that should be its focus. After determining that whether the trial court acquitted the defendant of first-degree murder was not a finding of fact, the Court of Appeals concluded that "we are not bound by the holdings of the Michigan Supreme Court that the trial judge's statements did not constitute a directed verdict under Michigan law." See id., at 511. While that statement is relevant to the §2254(d)(1) analysis, it does nothing to clarify whether the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion failed either the "contrary to" or "unreasonable application," standards of §2254(d). Michigan's high court engaged in extensive analysis of the double jeopardy issue. It relied on the double jeopardy precedents of this Court, see Part II, infra, and thoroughly analyzed those precedents as applied to this case. See Part III, infra. The Court of Appeals' approach does not "ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible by law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 152 L. Ed. 2d 912, 926, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2002). The Sixth Circuit simply ignored the state court's reasoned opinion and decided the issue on its view of the merits.
This term amicus CJLF has already provided this Court its views on how to improve the administration of the AEDPA. Some standard for assessing when a state court's decision is reasonable can prevent misapplication of §2254(d) by the lower courts. A definition that focuses on whether the opinion was plausible is preferable to the tendency of some courts to examine the acceptable level of "error" in the state court opinion. See Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Lockyer v. Andrade, No. 01-1127, at 22-30. Since this Court will probably issue an opinion in Andrade before it will decide this case, extensive elaboration of the arguments already made in that case is unnecessary. This case can serve to examine one facet of applying the AEDPA.
The "deceptively plain language" of the Double Jeopardy Clause (2) is surrounded by a subtle and complex body of precedent. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U. S. 28, 33 (1978). This often opaque field is an excellent candidate for analyzing how to determine what is the relevant body of "clearly established" Supreme Court precedent, see part II, infra, and how to determine whether that law is reasonably applied. See part III, infra.
A. General Principles.
Because the Sixth Circuit did not apply the AEDPA, it is necessary to start with the first principles of this law. Determining the clearly established law is the threshold question in AEDPA cases. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 390 (2000). What qualifies as an "old rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) will qualify as "clearly established" under AEDPA so long as the inquiry is limited to this Court's precedents. Williams, supra, at 412. Determining first what is clearly established limits the scope of the reviewing court's analysis. A court that carefully examines this Court's precedents for clearly established principles may be less likely to grant habeas due to a simple disagreement with the state court over the proper constitutional rule.
The common law development of double jeopardy began sometime in the thirteenth century and by the seventeenth century had evolved "into four common law pleas: autrefois acquit (former acquittal), autrefois convict (former conviction), autrefois attaint (former attainder), and pardon." See Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Acquittals (1987), reprinted in 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 831, 843-844 (1989). The common law pleas were described in some detail by Blackstone. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 329-332 (1st ed. 1769). The Double Jeopardy Clause "tracked Blackstone's statement of the principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict," United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 341-342 (1975), rooting the clause in the common law pleas. See United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 87 (1978).
The purpose of the clause is derived from its history.
"The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." United States v. Green, 355 U. S. 184, 187-188 (1957); accord Scott, 437 U. S., at 87.
The history and purpose of the Clause have only limited use in its modern application. "These historical purposes are necessarily general in nature, and their application has come to abound in often subtle distinctions which cannot by any means all be traced to the original three common law pleas . . . ." Scott, 437 U. S., at 87. The problem is that modern criminal procedure is radically different from criminal procedure at the common law or the founding. For example, the present case turns on the meaning of the trial court's response to defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution's evidence, a procedure that did not exist at either the common law or the founding. Directed verdicts first appeared in criminal cases in this country after the Civil War. See Phillips, The Motion for Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 Yale L. J. 1151, 1152, n. 8 (1961); Sauber & Waldman, Unlimited Power: Rule 29(A) and the Unreviewability of Directed Judgments of Acquittal, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 433, 439 (1994). It was not codified by Congress until the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, see Sauber & Waldman, supra, at 440. Much of this Court's precedent on acquittals and double jeopardy concerns the prosecution's right to appeal when the case ends in something other than a judgment of guilt. The two double jeopardy cases cited by the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977) and Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140 (1986), see Vincent v. Jones, 292 F. 3d 506, 511 (CA6 2002), both involve this type of appeal. See Martin Linen, supra, at 566-567; Smalis, supra, at 141. The Michigan Supreme Court relied on these cases and Wilson, supra, another government appeal case, see 420 U. S., at 333, in its much more extensive double jeopardy analysis. SeePeople v. Vincent, 565 N. W. 2d 629, 633-636 (Mich. 1997). (3) The right to appeal is also a relative latecomer to criminal procedure. The defendant had no right to appeal in criminal cases until the late nineteenth century, and the United States did not have a real right to appeal until 1971. See Sauber & Waldman, 44 Am. U. L. Rev., at 440. The lack of government appeals stunted this Court's analysis of acquittals and their effects. See Scott, 437 U. S., at 89-90. This aspect of double jeopardy law did not begin to develop until Congress gave the United States full appellate rights in criminal cases in 1971 and the Double Jeopardy Clause was applied to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 796 (1969).
There are many general principles that govern this recently developed body of law. The passage from Green quoted above is the most noteworthy. A "primary purpose" of the Clause is to "preserve the finality of judgments." Crist v. Bretz, 437 U. S. 28, 33 (1987); see also Scott, 437 U. S., at 92 ("integrity of a final judgment"). "But it has also been said that 'central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials' is the barrier to 'affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.' " United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 128 (1980) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 11 (1978)). DiFrancesco, "[t]he most complete discussion by the Supreme Court of the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause," 5 W. LaFave, J. Israel, & N. King, Criminal Procedure §25.1(a), p. 630 (2d ed. 1999), summarizes other double jeopardy principles developed by the court. Justice Blackmun's opinion notes that "[a]n acquittal is accorded special weight" so that " '[i]f the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair,' "DiFrancesco, 449 U. S., at 129 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497, 503 (1978)), but that the government can proceed again "where the trial has not ended in an acquittal." See id., at 130. Finally, the government may retry defendants who successfully appeal unless the reversal was based on an insufficiency of the evidence. See id., at 131.
Although clearly established, these principles do not define the relevant body of law for the §2254(d) inquiry. The statements are too abstract to govern the question presented by this case--what constitutes an acquittal with respect to double jeopardy. Accepting abstract principles like these as the relevant body of precedent would compromise the deferential standard of §2254(d).
This Court has addressed the issue of abstraction and reasonableness in closely related contexts. The most instructive example is found in the application of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227 (1990) held that analyzing the Teague issue at too high a level of abstraction would destroy the rule. The case addressed whether Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985) was a new rule under Teague. See Sawyer, supra, at 229. Caldwell had held "that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's capital sentence rests elsewhere." Id., at 233. The petitioner in Sawyer asserted thatCaldwell was dictated "by the principal of reliability in capital sentencing." See id., at 236. Although reliability in sentencing was a thoroughly established principle at the time his conviction was final, see id., at 235, it could not govern the Teague analysis. "But the test would be meaningless if applied at this level of generality." Id., at 236. Any rule that does not contradict one of this Court's decisions can be justified by some sufficiently general legal principle.
Sawyer took its cue from the qualified immunity case of Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987). See 497 U. S., at 236. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions by "shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson, supra, at 638. This is a test of "objective legal reasonableness" which is examined under the law that was "clearly established" at the time of the allegedly unlawful action. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818-819 (1982). Anderson involved a warrantless search of a house conducted by Officer Anderson and other officers because they thought a suspected bank robber might be there. 483 U. S., at 637. The Court of Appeals' analysis "consisted of little more than an assertion that a general right Anderson was alleged to have violated--the right to be free from warrantless searches of one's home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances--was clearly established." Id., at 640. It did not address "the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which Anderson was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances." Id., at 640-641 (emphasis in original). Allowing this level of generality to establish the standard of legal reasonableness would destroy the test. "For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said about any other constitutional or statutory violation." Id., at 639. The circuit court's refusal to examine the more specific applications of the Fourth Amendment "was erroneous." Id., at 641.
This analysis also governs §2254(d). Teague's new rule analysis is already closely connected to the AEDPA's clearly established inquiry. See Williams, 529 U. S., at 412. Teague, qualified immunity, and the AEDPA each protect reasonable government actions from federal judicial review. See Sawyer, 497 U. S., at 234; Anderson, 483 U. S., at 639; 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Setting the clearly established law at too high a level of generality would subvert the AEDPA as readily as it would Teague and qualified immunity. The principles previously surveyed, see supra, at 10-13, are too general to govern this case. Instead, it is necessary to determine what is clearly established about the meaning of acquittal in the context of the facts of this case.
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2. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U. S. Const. Amdt. 5.
3. The Michigan Supreme Court also relied on state and intermediate federal appellate decisions. See ibid. Since the law must be clearly established from
this Court's precedents, see 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1), these cases have only limited bearing on the issue of what law is clearly established.