SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

The defendant attacked the victim, William Madden, in his hotel room, taking his wallet and keys. People v. Solomon, 560 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Mich. App. 1996) (amended opinion). The defendant was pursued by Madden and others. Ibid. During the pursuit the defendant again attacked Madden, this time in front of eyewitnesses. Ibid. He was finally caught with Madden's keys in his possession and the wallet nearby. He was convicted of unarmed robbery. Ibid.

At trial, the defendant asserted his right to testify after counsel rested the defense case, but the trial court denied the request. Id. at 654. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that this violated his right to testify, but was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Ibid. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted petitioner's habeas petition, holding that applying harmless error to a violation of the right to testify was " 'contrary to' clearly established Supreme Court precedent." Solomon v. Curtis, No. 98-73867 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2000).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) should be construed and applied to streamline the resolution of habeas corpus cases. The central purpose of the statute is to expedite habeas corpus petitions, particularly in capital cases. A second purpose is to protect correct state court judgments from erroneous nullification. Any interpretation of the act that delays rather than expedites habeas cases, or increases the burden of relitigation, or allows federal habeas courts to substitute their own views on constitutional issues for that of the relevant state court is contrary to Congress's intent.

The state court's selection of the governing rule stands unless it is contrary to a Supreme Court precedent which clearly applies to the issue before the court. Although the correspondence is not exact, questions of pure law will generally be considered under the "contrary to" branch of § 2254(d)(1), while mixed questions fall under the unreasonable application branch. What is clearly established Supreme Court precedent is often a matter of scope. As was true under Teague v. Lane, where the applicability of a Supreme Court precedent on the issue is not clear at the time of the decision, that decision is not subject to collateral attack. Although lower court precedent is not controlling, it is still relevant to this inquiry.

Analysis of questions of law should begin and generally end with § 2254(d)(1). Processing of habeas cases will be aided by a systematic approach. With respect to questions of law, the law of the case doctrine provides the best analogue. Once a court finds that a coordinate court's prior resolution of the question is plausible, the inquiry is finished. Applying this approach to habeas will advance the efficiency Congress sought with no loss to the rights of habeas petitioners.

The rule petitioner seeks to apply, i.e., that a right-to-testify violation is "structural" error, is not "clearly established." Constitutional rights are presumed to be amenable to harmless error analysis. Exceptions to this presumption are rare. They are limited to violations which are so prejudicial to the defendant that a fair trial is impossible and rights that do not affect the guilt determination, such as the right to self-representation. Improperly denying the defendant's right to testify is no more than the suppression of evidence, a classic trial error that is subject to harmless error analysis. This conclusion is reinforced by the overwhelming lower court precedent finding the right to testify amenable to harmless error analysis.