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This case provides an excellent example of how labeling can cloud analysis. Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 114 (1934) ("tyranny of labels"). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since the standard for qualified immunity of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982) and the standard for evaluating excessive force claims announced in Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989) contained very similar language, an officer who acts unreasonably under Graham must also be deemed unreasonable for the purposes of Harlow's objective standard. See Katz v. United States, 194 F. 3d 962, 968-969 (1999). Although linguistically similar, Harlow and Graham serve distinct purposes and accomplish their separate purposes through separate means. In order to understand why the qualified immunity issue is not the same as the Fourth Amendment reasonable force issue, it is first necessary to understand the policy rationale that forms the basis of this Court's qualified immunity decisions. These policies and the way Harlow advances them clearly distinguish the Harlow standard from Graham.
Although the defense of official immunity itself has strong historical roots, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 638 (1980), modern qualified immunity law is driven by policy considerations. In Harlow, this Court "completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law . . . ." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 645 (1987). "The transformation was justified by the special policy concerns arising from public officials' exposure to repeated suits." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U. S. 158, 170-171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 594, n. 15 (1998).
The Harlow Court's decision to replace the malice-based subjective inquiry found at common law with its objective "legal reasonableness" test, see Anderson, supra, 483 U. S., at 645, was justified by several policies. The most important reason for the change was minimizing the social costs of forcing public officials to defend against numerous damage actions. "As recognized at common law, public officers require this protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." Harlow, supra, 457 U. S., at 806. The threat of suits against innocent officials has many social costs.
"These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.' " Id., at 814.
These interests require that qualified immunity must be more than a mere shield against liability. In order to protect officials and society from the debilitating effects of unnecessary litigation, qualified immunity must stop insubstantial suits well before trial. A successful defense to liability at trial can be a Pyrrhic victory for the beleaguered government official. Trials, even successful ones, can be very expensive. Even reimbursement from the government does not end the official's troubles. "There is still a social stigma attached to being named a defendant in a lawsuit, especially if one is accused of violating someone's constitutional rights. Discovery may well bring out embarrassing facts unrelated to the lawsuit. Furthermore, the disruption, prying, and other aggravation makes the job more stressful." Note, Passing the Buck: The Supreme Court's Failure to Clarify Qualified Immunity Doctrine to Protect Public Officials from Frivolous Lawsuits, Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998), 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 1031, 1047 (1999).
An effective qualified immunity defense is not merely a defense to liability, but a means for avoiding litigation. The early termination of lawsuits is therefore an essential function of qualified immunity. See Harlow, supra, 457 U. S., at 814. This interest led this Court to abandon the common law subjective component of the defense. Since allegations of improper motive could rarely be decided on a summary judgment motion, the subjective element of the good-faith defense was dropped so that qualified immunity could resolve unsubstantial suits before trial. See id., at 816-818. "The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526-527 (1985) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, this Court "repeatedly [has] stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
Society's interest in avoiding burdening government officials with unnecessary trials does not exist in a vacuum. "In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees." Harlow, supra, 457 U. S., at 814. This must be balanced against the substantial social costs that can arise from suits against government officials. Ibid.; Anderson v. Creighton, supra, 483 U. S., at 638. How this Court strikes the balance is the key to understanding the scope of the defense. "Our cases have accommodated these conflicting concerns by generally providing government officials performing discretionary functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson, 483 U. S., at 638. That is, immunity is granted to officials "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." Harlow, 457 U. S., at 818. This is an objective good-faith defense, centered on the status of the law at the time of the act. The Harlow standard does not require an examination of the act's reasonableness itself. Instead, it is only the official's conclusion that the act was legal that must be reasonable.
In addition to minimizing the social costs of suits against government officials, qualified immunity's objective standard is also fair. While "it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law," Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 506 (1978), "officials will not be liable for mere mistakes of judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law." Id., at 507. Government officials are subject to a vast, increasingly complicated set of federal constitutional and statutory restrictions. For example, the major legal treatise on the constitutional provision at issue in the present case runs to five volumes. See W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed. 1996). It is simply unreasonable to expect army privates or police to anticipate changes in the law. Therefore
"focusing on 'the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts,' [citation] avoids the unfairness of imposing liability on a defendant who 'could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor . . . fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful [citation].' " Crawford-El v. Britton, supra, 523 U. S., at 590 (emphasis added) (quoting Harlow, supra, 457 U. S., at 818, 819).
Harlow's reasonableness standard is ultimately a protection from liability due to the retroactive application of new legal standards or unanticipated applications of existing general standards. "The purpose of the doctrine of official immunity is to protect officials from legal surprises." Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F. 3d 145, 151 (CA7 1994) (Posner, J.). The Harlow standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments," protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341, 343 (1986). The defense thus gives officials a margin of error around all but clearly defined rights, a necessity in an increasingly complex legal environment. Cf. Anderson, supra, 483 U. S., at 644 (qualified immunity necessary to protect officers making often difficult Fourth Amendment decisions).
"These officials are subject to a plethora of rules, 'often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such flux that officials can only comply with or enforce them selectively.' See P. Schuck, Suing Government 66 (1983). In these circumstances, officials should not err always on the side of caution. '[O]fficials with a broad range of duties and authority must often act swiftly and firmly at the risk that action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication of office.' " Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 196 (1984) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 246 (1974)).
Since qualified immunity is derived from policy considerations, the defense must be interpreted in light of these policies. The official's margin of error must be preserved by paying careful attention to the state of the law at the time of the act. "This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action has previously been held unlawful, [citation]; but it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderson, supra, 483 U. S., at 640. The court below did not follow the path set out by this Court. Its cursory examination of the relevant law, if upheld, would force many police officers into needlessly involved and expensive defenses against insubstantial claims. The Ninth Circuit's summary conclusion that Private Saucier's alleged acts would violate the Fourth Amendment's excessive force component is the type of surprise to officials that qualified immunity is meant to prevent.
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