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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF) ⁽¹⁾ is a non-profit California corporation organized to participate in litigation relating to the criminal justice system as it affects the public interest. CJLF seeks to bring the due process protection of the accused into balance with the rights of the victim and of society to rapid, efficient, and reliable determination of guilt and swift execution of punishment.

This case addresses the standard for probable cause to arrest. The Maryland Court of Appeals' myopic standard asks the wrong questions and gives the wrong answers when addressing whether police can arrest multiple suspects for a single-suspect crime. Arrests are not the end of the investigation. Often an arrest can greatly aid the police in solving crimes with more than one suspect. Where there is more than one suspect for a crime, and further investigation is needed, then an officer should be allowed to arrest all of the suspects. The Maryland Court of Appeals' restrictive reading of the Fourth Amendment would prevent this. This needless hamstringing of police investigation is contrary to the interest of public safety, and therefore CJLF has an interest in this case.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

On August 7, 1999, at about 3:16 a.m., Officer Jeffrey Snyder of the Baltimore County Police Department stopped a vehicle for speeding and because the driver was not wearing a seat belt. See Pringle v. State, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1019 (Md. 2002); J. A. 4-5. The driver and owner of the vehicle was Donte Carlos Partlow, Otis Calvin Smith was the back seat passenger, and the defendant, Joseph Jermaine Pringle, was the front seat passenger. See Pringle, supra, at 1019. When Partlow opened the glove compartment to get his registration, Officer Snyder noticed that it contained a large roll of cash. See ibid. He said nothing about this, but went back to his patrol car to check Partlow's license and registration for outstanding violations. Finding none, Officer Snyder returned, had Partlow exit the car, and issued a verbal warning. See ibid.

Another patrol car arrived at this time and Officer Snyder asked Partlow if he had any drugs or weapons in the car. See ibid. Partlow responded that he did not. Officer Snyder then obtained Partlow's permission to search the vehicle. See ibid. The three occupants were seated at the curb during the search. See ibid.

The search revealed $763.00 in the glove compartment and five baggies containing what appeared to be cocaine concealed behind the armrest in the backseat. See ibid. ⁽²⁾ Officer Snyder then questioned the three about the money and drugs, telling them that he would arrest all three if none of them admitted to ownership. See ibid. When none of the three offered any information, they were all placed under arrest and taken to the police station. See ibid. Sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m., Officer Snyder met with Pringle, and after obtaining a Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) waiver, Pringle confessed. See 805 A. 2d, at 1019-1020.

The trial court denied the defendant's suppression motion and a jury convicted him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. See id., at 1020. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction. See ibid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. It held that Officer Snyder lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant because at the time of the arrest he had no evidence that the defendant exercised dominion or control over the cocaine, an element of the crime of cocaine possession. See id., at 1027. This made the arrest illegal and invalidated the confession as fruit of the illegal arrest. See id., at 1028. This Court granted certiorari on March 24, 2003.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Maryland Court of Appeals incorrectly focused its probable cause analysis on the elements of the crime of drug possession. It is unnecessary to have proof of every element of a crime before making an arrest. For example, this Court does not require the officer to have a prima facie case before making an arrest. It has also upheld an arrest where evidence of one element of the crime was missing. The real issue in this case is whether probable cause for arrest must focus on a single suspect. The correct answer is "no."

The relaxed standard of probable cause is inconsistent with requiring the arresting police to narrow their suspicion to a single suspect. The common law generally required some level of suspicion to justify a search or seizure. While it may seem low by modern standards, early probable cause was far from toothless. The hue and cry demonstrates that the common law permitted arresting multiple suspects for one crime. The Fourth Amendment was not a reaction to the level of suspicion required by the common law, but rather the suspicionless general warrant searches imposed against the colonies. The common law's definition of probable cause crossed the Atlantic, as shown by statutes from the First Congress and this Court's early probable cause decisions.

While probable cause has moved from its common law roots, it has been a short journey. Starting with Brinegar v. United States, this Court has enunciated a practical, flexible standard that accommodates the reasonable mistakes of police officers. While this standard cannot be defined precisely, it is possible to determine that probable cause requires less than a preponderance of the evidence. The combination of reasonable mistake and the less than a preponderance standard together strongly favor allowing multiple suspects to be arrested for a single-suspect crime.

This is consistent with the investigative function of arrests. An arrest is often the beginning of the investigation. A host of investigative techniques, such as custodial interrogation, identification by the victim, fingerprinting, and DNA testing, are much easier to employ after an arrest. The importance of continued investigation played an important role in the decision of many authors and noted scholars to reject a preponderance standard for probable cause. Where further investigation would be useful, logic argues strongly in favor of allowing the arrest of multiple suspects for a crime.

No decisions support a bright-line rule against multiple-suspect arrests. Johnson v. United States and Wong Sun v. United States both involved arrests with minimal suspicion and an unknown number of potential suspects, and are thus distinguished from the present case. Mallory v. United States is irrelevant because it did not address probable cause. Since probable cause is not susceptible to bright-line rules, none of these cases can support a categorical exemption against multiple-suspect arrests.

There was probable cause to arrest all three occupants of the car. While hypotheticals addressing multi-suspect arrests only discuss arresting two suspects, this number is too low. The fact that the police narrowed the universe of suspects to these three is itself a significant accomplishment that strongly supports probable cause.

The placement of the drugs behind the rear seat armrest and money in the car glove compartment, while strongly implicating at least one of the occupants, did not point to any one occupant. The location of the drugs and money also strongly suggests that more than one occupant knew about the drugs. Any claim that innocents were arrested along with the guilty must be read in this context. The Maryland Court of Appeals' claim that upholding the arrests in this case would sanction arrests involving vastly more suspects is spurious because this Court's decisions require each probable cause case to be decided on its own unique facts.

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1. This brief was written entirely by counsel for amicus, as listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions were made to the preparation or submission of this brief.

Both parties have given written consent to the filing of this brief.

2. "At the time of the stop, the armrest was in the upright position and flat against the seat. When Officer Snyder pulled down the armrest he found the drugs, which had been placed between the armrest and the back seat of the car and, absent the pulling down of the armrest, were not visible." Id., at 1019, n. 2.
 
August 2003