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The arresting officer in this case was confronted with a mystery. Officer Snyder lawfully found over $700.00 in cash in the glove compartment and what was very likely to be cocaine hidden between the backseat armrest and the backseat of the car. See Pringle v. State, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1019 (Md. 2002). The mystery was which or how many of the three occupants of the car was responsible for the drugs. He had three options: arrest all three and try to sort it out at the police station, unfairly arrest only some of them, or let them all go and allow the crime to go unsolved. His choice of the first option allowed him to solve the crime when the defendant confessed at the police station. See id., at 1019-1020.
The Court of Appeals' analysis focused on the elements of the crime of drug possession. See id., at 1021-1026. One element of the crime of drug possession is the exercise of " 'actual or constructive dominion or control,' " over the narcotics. See id., at 1021. The Maryland high court concluded that because there was no evidence that the defendant exercised such control over the cocaine there was no probable cause to arrest him. See id., at 1027.
This is the wrong approach to arrests involving multiple suspects. The notion that an officer must have evidence of every element of a crime before making an arrest is inconsistent with precedent. There are "established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 419 (1969), overruled on other grounds in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238 (1983). Failure to prove a particular element at this embryonic stage of the criminal process should not necessarily be fatal to continued investigation through a search or seizure. In the context of the criminal trial, a prima facie case is where the prosecution presents enough evidence to overcome a motion to acquit. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U. S. 228, 234 (1987). A prima facie case is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant can still raise a reasonable doubt about any element of the offense. See ibid. While requiring less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a prima facie case still must have some proof of every element of the offense. The statements in Spinelli and Gates at least contemplate that a lack of evidence of one element does not necessarily defeat probable cause to arrest.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972) provides further demonstration. Police Sergeant Connally was patrolling a high-crime area in Bridgeport, Connecticut, one night. At 2:15 a.m. someone known to him "approached his cruiser and informed him that an individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist." Id., at 144-145. Sergeant Connally called for assistance and approached the vehicle. Id., at 145. He tapped on the car window and asked the occupant, Williams, to open the door. Ibid. Williams instead rolled down the window and "the sergeant reached into the car and removed a fully loaded revolver from Williams' waistband." Ibid. It was precisely in the place indicated by the informant. Sergeant Connally then arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm. Ibid. The search incident to the arrest uncovered substantial amounts of heroin on Williams and in the car. Ibid. While the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the search, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted habeas relief in an en banc decision, holding that the evidence was obtained by an unlawful search. See id., at 144.
This Court reversed. First, it found that Sergeant Connally's decision to investigate the tip and to take the gun from Williams were valid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30 (1968). See 407 U. S., at 148. The subsequent search was also valid because it was incident to a lawful arrest.
"In the present case the policeman found Williams in possession of a gun in precisely the place predicted by the informant. This tended to corroborate the reliability of the informant's further report of narcotics and, together with the surrounding circumstances, certainly suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the gun. Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction." Id., at 148-149 (emphasis added).
As Justice Douglas' dissent noted, carrying a pistol is not a crime in Connecticut if the individual has a permit. See id., at 149 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Sergeant Connally did not discern whether Williams had a permit when he made the arrest. The absence of a "lawful explanation" for the handgun was enough to provide the probable cause for the arrest. The fact that an element of the crime of illegal possession was missing from Sergeant Connally's calculus did not negate probable cause.
Even though the Maryland Court of Appeals did not address Adams, it is not necessary to determine the precise relationship between the elements of a crime and probable cause to arrest. In this case, there was evidence of all the elements of drug possession. The cocaine did not get into the car on its own. It was not hidden in a comparatively remote spot such as in the trunk, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 567 (1991), or in an air vent under the dashboard. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U. S. 259, 260 (1982) (per curiam). The armrest in the middle of the rear seat was easily accessible to any of the occupants of the vehicle, making them by far the most likely suspects. The question in this case is not whether the crime of drug possession was committed by one of the occupants, but rather who among them committed it.
The Maryland Court of Appeals' focus on the elements of drug possession misses the key question in this case. What this case really revolves around is whether probable cause for arrest must focus on a single suspect. The correct answer is "no." Confused by its wayward analysis, the Maryland Court of Appeals came to the wrong conclusion. "In a specific case, we apply the elements of the alleged offense to the facts and circumstances of that case to determine whether the police officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of a particular individual for that specific offense." Pringle, 805 A. 2d, at 1027 (emphasis added). In the right circumstances, the police can arrest multiple suspects and use other investigative techniques such as custodial interrogation in order to solve crimes. These circumstances are found in this case.
Analysis of multiple suspect arrests begins by examining the probable cause standard. Both history and modern practice show it to be relatively relaxed and flexible. This standard readily accommodates the effective policing found in this case.
The common law typically required some level of suspicion to support an arrest or search. See Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 465, 479-480 (1984); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 287-289 (1st ed. 1769). For a time in England, suspicionless general warrants were used primarily as a means to stifle the press. See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §1.1(a), p. 3 (3d ed. 1996). While these were resisted in both Parliament and the courts, see id., at 3-4, suspicionless searches were applied to the colonies in the form of the writ of assistance. See id., at 4; Grano, supra, at 479. The Fourth Amendment grew out of dissatisfaction with these practices. See Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100-101 (1959); Grano, supra, at 478-479.
The level of suspicion needed to justify a search or an arrest at the common law had several interchangeable names. See 2 M. Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown *79 (1736) ("suspicion"); id., at *78 ("probably suspected"); id., at *79 ("reasonableness of the suspicion"); id., at *89 ("probable grounds"). Whatever term was used, the required level of suspicion for arrests or searches was quite low. One case upheld a watchman's arrest at ten o'clock one night on a London street because the plaintiff failed to account for a bundle he carried. See Lawrence v. Hedger, 128 Eng. Rep. 6, 6 (C. P. 1810). In another, a constable arrested a man resting by a bridge with a saddle and bridle on his back. The man told the constable that he had just sold his horse at the market, but the constable believed that the man had or was about to steal a horse. This was enough justification for the arrest. See Beckwith v. Philby, 108 Eng. Rep. 585, 586 (K. B. 1827). Similar standards applied to searches. See Grano, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref., at 487-488. The common law did not require the constable to single out one individual from a group of suspects before making an arrest. See id., at 480-481. A particularly vivid example of this is the hue and cry. Under this rule, once a felony was reported to the constable, he "had an obligation to raise a hue and cry so that a search for the offender could be conducted from town to town." Id., at 482. Where the report did not specify the offender's identity, other types of suspicion could justify arrests.
"[A]ll that can be done is for those that pursue the hue and cry, to take such persons as they have probable cause to suspect; as for instance, such persons as are vagrants, that cannot give an account where they live, whence they are, or such suspicious persons as come late into their inn or lodgings, and give no reasonable account where they had been, and the like." 2 Hale, supra, at *103 (emphasis in original).
Common law probable cause was not meaningless. According to Hale, a robbery complaint would not support a general warrant "to apprehend all persons suspected." See id., at *112. When a constable secured a warrant, it was "the duty of the magistrate, and ought not to be left to the officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion." 4 Blackstone, at 288. While it may have been more lenient than modern standards, the common law did restrain the constable.
There is good evidence that the First Congress "shared the common law view that probable cause required only a focused suspicion." Grano, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref., at 488. For example, it passed a statute permitting officials "to enter [and search] any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares, or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed." Act of July 31, 1789, §24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. (3) A search warrant was required for the entry and search of houses or other buildings and could only be obtained when they had "cause to suspect" that such goods were present. See ibid. Acts passed in 1790 and 1799 used identical language. See Act of March 2, 1799, §68, 1 Stat. 627, 677-678; Act of August 4, 1790, §48, 1 Stat. 145, 170. "Congress apparently saw no difference between the probable cause requirement in the fourth amendment and the 'reason to suspect' and 'cause to suspect' standards employed in these statutes." Grano, supra, at 489. "An Act 'passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.' " Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 297 (1988)) If this is true of the original Constitution, it is even more true of the Bill of Rights, which was drafted and prepared by the first Congress itself. See Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This Court's earliest probable cause decisions took a similar approach. The first probable cause cases did not address searches or seizures. A 1799 forfeiture statute required the plaintiff claiming the seized goods to carry the burden of proof that they were wrongfully seized once the government proved "probable cause" for its action. See Act of March 2, 1799, §71, 1 Stat. 627, 678. A plaintiff filing under this Act asserted that the government had to make a prima facie case of forfeiture. This Court disagreed, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
"It may be added, that the term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation; and in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and well-known meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. In this, its legal sense, the court must understand the term to have been used by congress." Locke v. United States, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (emphasis added).
Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U. S. (24 How.) 544 (1861) is another early case addressing probable cause. Here the defendants alleged that the plaintiff stole four horses and secured a warrant for his arrest. The plaintiff, who lawfully owned the horses, was acquitted of the charge and brought a malicious prosecution suit against the defendants. See id., at 546-547. As part of his case, the plaintiff attempted to prove "that the prosecution was groundless, and without any reasonable or probable cause . . . ." Id., at 548. The opinion held that probable cause existed if the defendants had "reasonable grounds for believing" that the plaintiff committed the crime. See id., at 550. Wheeler upheld the trial courts' instruction that probable cause "was the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." Id., at 551-552.
Probable cause changed little as it entered the early twentieth century. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), famous for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, also contained extensive probable cause analysis. Prohibition agents set up a liquor buy with the two defendants which failed when the two did not show up. See id., at 134-135. More than two months later, the agents saw the defendants driving in the same car they had when the buy had been set up. See id., at 135. This, along with the fact that they were coming from Canada, a known source of contraband alcohol, provided probable cause for the stop and search. See id., at 160. This is consistent with the limited, suspicion-based view of probable cause found in the common law and this Court's early decisions. See Grano, supra, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref., at 492.
The modern standard for probable cause was set in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), a case which closely followed Carroll. See id., at 170. The decision is most notable for its often-quoted description of probable cause:
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Id., at 175; see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. S. 727, 732 (1984) (per curiam); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 231 (1983).
This Court also indicated that the standard for probable cause was higher than it was originally. After quoting with approval from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Locke, the Brinegar Court stated that "[s]ince Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion . . . ." 338 U. S., at 175 (footnote omitted). (4) While probable cause is more than unadorned suspicion, Brinegar does not exact a strict standard.
Most importantly for this case, the Brinegar Court notes that probable cause accommodates errors by the police. "Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part." Id., at 176. While the mistake must be that which a reasonable officer would make, see ibid., Brinegar accepts that officers must be allowed to make mistakes if public safety is to be maintained by appropriately aggressive law enforcement.
Probable cause is a compromise between public safety and privacy. "These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interference with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." Ibid. This reflects the reasonableness that is "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment," see United States v. Knights, 534 U. S. 112, 118 (2001), in which the interests of privacy and public needs are balanced. See id., at 118-119; Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300 (1999).
The inherent balancing of the probable cause determination helps to explain why there is no precise standard for measuring it. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 695 (1996). A hard and fast rule could not deal with the endless factual situations presented by searches and seizures or enforce the compromise between privacy and public needs. A result of the flexible, undefined nature of probable cause is that it can be difficult to apply. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 644 (1987). While it is not possible to say what probable cause precisely is, it is possible to say what it is not.
Probable cause does not require a preponderance of the evidence. "Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision" on the existence of probable cause. Gates, 462 U. S., at 235. The preponderance standard is inappropriate for probable cause not just because it is too precise, but also because it is too high. A standard this high would needlessly frustrate society's ability to investigate crime. See American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Commentary, 294-295 (Proposed Draft 1975); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §3.2(e), p. 65 (3d ed. 1996).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) confronted whether a criminal defendant who has been arrested and held for trial is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for detention and whether that hearing must be adversarial. See id., at 111. While the defendant was entitled to a hearing, see id., at 119, it did not have to be adversarial. See id., at 123. An important reason for this holding was the nature of probable cause.
"The use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt." Id., at 121 (emphasis added).
There are two possible explanations for this passage. The first is that the Court defined probable cause as less than a preponderance of evidence. The alternative is "that probable cause does not require 'the fine resolution of conflicting evidence,' because the hearing is generally held ex parte; thus there is no need for determinations regarding credibility." See Comment, Considering the Two-Tier Model of the Fourth Amendment, 31 Am. U. L. Rev. 85, 109 (1981). Since the reasoning behind the second interpretation is circular, see ibid., the better argument is that this Court meant what it said in Gerstein. Probable cause, though incapable of precise definition, is less than a preponderance of evidence.
Recent decisions show that probable cause is still applied in a manner to accommodate legitimate police interests. While the factual nature of probable cause means that one probable cause finding is rarely a useful precedent for another, see Ornelas, 517 U. S., at 695, the cases reflect a general approach to probable cause that is relevant to the present case.
Brinegar's notion of reasonable mistake is relevant to modern probable cause analysis. In Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797 (1971), officers had probable cause to arrest Hill and went to his apartment to make a warrantless arrest. Id., at 799. The person who answered the door was not Hill, but matched Hill's physical description. See ibid. The man claimed that he was not Hill and produced identification indicating that he was named Miller, but the officers still arrested him. See ibid. The police were unimpressed and proceeded to search the apartment for " 'a couple of hours,' " and found evidence used to convict Hill. See id., at 799-800. The fact that the officers were mistaken in the identity of the arrestee did not negate probable cause to arrest. See id., at 802. The fact that the officers were "quite wrong," id., at 804, did not render the arrest illegal, as "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment . . . ." Ibid. An officer's judgment does not have to be correct, it must only be reasonable. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177, 184 (1990).
Accommodation of reasonable mistake is key to a proper understanding of multiple-suspect arrests. The argument against such arrests is that they sweep too broadly, arresting the innocent along with the guilty. This is the essence of the objection to the arrest raised by the Maryland Court of Appeals. Because Officer Snyder had no evidence of Pringle exercising dominion and control over the drugs, the argument goes, see Pringle v. State, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1027 (Md. 2002), he arrested an "innocent" man. The reasonable mistake doctrine of Brinegar and subsequent decisions refutes this claim. While at some point the number of potentially innocent suspects will be too high for probable cause to sanction, that decision must be made on a case-by-case basis. The fact that an officer arrests both the innocent and guilty when arresting multiple suspects does not invalidate the arrest if the "mistakes" were reasonable.
Another example of probable cause's flexibility is Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), a companion case to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Off-duty Officer Lasky heard a noise outside the door to his apartment. After taking a telephone call, he looked through the peephole and "saw 'two men tiptoeing out of the alcove toward the stairway.' " Sibron, supra, at 48. He called the police and put on civilian clothes and his service revolver. See ibid. He returned to the peephole and "saw 'a tall man tiptoeing away from the alcove and followed by this shorter man' . . . ." Ibid. Believing the two strangers to be burglars, Officer Lasky opened the door, entered the hallway, and loudly slammed the door. Id., at 48-49. The two fled down the stairs and Lasky pursued, catching Peters, whom he patted down, finding burglary tools. See id., at 49. Peters was convicted of possessing burglary tools. See id., at 44.
This Court held that the tools were properly seized, finding that by the time Officer Lasky caught up with Peters, there was probable cause to arrest him. See id., at 66. The strange noises, the fact that the two were strangers, the furtive tiptoeing, and the flight were deemed to be the strongest grounds for arrest "short of actual eyewitness observation of criminal activity." See ibid.
Although this conclusion is correct, it should be understood in the context of the innocent explanations for Peters' actions, and the incomplete information possessed by Officer Lasky. While flight from uniformed police is certainly suspicious, see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 124 (2000), Officer Lasky was in civilian clothes and armed when Peters fled from him. "[F]light at the approach of a gun-carrying stranger . . . is hardly indicative of mens rea." Sibron, 392 U. S., at 75 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority's conclusion to the contrary, see id., at 66, was correct because Officer Lasky only needed to satisfy the probable cause standard. Even though there was an innocent explanation for the suspect's flight, this did not prevent Officer Lasky from arresting Peters so that he might prevent a crime from being committed and further investigate the activity.
Officer Lasky had less information at the time of arrest than would seem to satisfy the Maryland Court of Appeals. As the majority opinion implicitly notes, Officer Lasky did not see a crime being committed. See ibid. ("short of actual eyewitness observation of criminal activity"). The crime of possession of burglary tools could not be discovered before the arrest and frisk. Although he had an incomplete picture of what the two had done and were up to, this Court's definition of probable cause allowed Officer Lasky to make an arrest so that he could investigate further.
There are other examples of the flexibility and comparative lenience of probable cause when an officer is confronted with uncertain information. Brinegar is one example. The fact that one of the defendants had previously been arrested for transporting liquor, had a reputation for transporting it, and was in an automobile about to enter a dry state, see 338 U. S., at 166, provided probable cause to arrest for illegally transporting liquor into a state. See id., at 171. The Court found this case to be indistinguishable from Carroll, see id., at 165, a case involving similarly thin evidence. See supra, at 12. While Brinegar professed to move beyond the common law conception of probable cause, the result in that case shows that this move was a very short journey. See Grano, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref., at 492-493.
The history and more recent treatment of probable cause open the door for multiple suspect arrests. The common law hue and cry demonstrates that even more aggressive practices were accepted. The definitions of probable cause promulgated by the first Congress and Chief Justice Marshall did not vary from the common law. Modern probable cause may be stricter, but not by much. The fact that this flexible standard is less than a preponderance of the evidence clears the way for multiple suspect arrests. If it had to be more probable than not that suspects were guilty, then police could never arrest more than one suspect at a time for a one-perpetrator crime. Probable cause's accommodation of reasonable mistake is also consistent with multiple suspect arrests. As the next section demonstrates, the constitutionality of such arrests is reinforced by the importance of the arrest to investigating crime.
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3. Congress submitted the Bill of Rights to the states less than two months later. See 1 Stat. 97 (1789).
4. This passage discounts the passage in Locke stating that probable cause " 'imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant
suspicion.' " Id., at 175, n. 14 (quoting Locke, 11 U. S., at 348).
August 2003