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Before we address the merits of the case, there is an important methodology question which has divided the circuits. Should a court addressing an issue subject to 28 U. S. C. §2254(d) decide whether petitioner's claim meets the criteria of that section first, or should it go to the merits of the underlying question first and only address the statutory standard if it disagrees with the state court's conclusion? Compare Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F. 3d 1143, 1154-1155 (CA9 2000), cert. denied, 148 L. Ed. 2d 274, 121 S. Ct. 340 (2000) (sometimes cited as "Van Tran v. Lindsey"), with Bell v. Jarvis, No. 98-7002 (CA4 Dec. 29, 2000) (en banc) (slip op., at 14-16) (criticizing Tran). The difference between the two approaches may not matter much in this individual case, but multiplied over the tens of thousands of habeas cases per year, it is important. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1999, Table 5.70, p. 465 (2000).
The Court has addressed the order of consideration of claims in several different contexts. Resolvability of a claim on one ground may make the answering of another question unnecessary, undesirable, improper, or even illegitimate. Jurisdiction goes to the head of the line, for without jurisdiction there is no legitimate authority to decide anything else. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94, 101-102 (1998). There is also a venerable rule that a case should be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds if the constitutional question, and hence potential or actual conflict with the legislative branch, can be avoided. See Liverpool, New York, and Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885).
In habeas cases, the usual order is to decide "general prerequisites" such as custody, exhaustion, and procedural default first, see Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 524 (1997), although Congress has authorized an exception for the dismissal on the merits of meritless but unexhausted applications. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(2). The rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) follows these determinations but precedes the underlying question. See Lambrix, 520 U. S., at 524; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 329 (1989) ("threshold matter"). The first question in the present case is where the §2254(d) issue is to be resolved.
There is a substantial overlap between the analysis needed to resolve a §2254(d)(1) issue and a Teague issue. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000) (comparing Teague "old rule" with §2254(d)(1) "clearly established"). This overlap suggests an efficiency in addressing these two issues consecutively, before the underlying question. If the claim is barred by either or both rules, there will be no need to address the "merits" of the petitioner's claim.
The practical appeal of this approach is reinforced by both jurisprudential considerations and respect for the intent of Congress. The reason why Teague is a threshold matter is that announcing a new rule in a case where the rule does not affect the outcome would be an advisory opinion. See Teague, supra, 489 U. S., at 316 (plurality opinion). That is, once a court decides that petitioner's proposed rule is new and does not qualify for an exception, the question of whether the rule ought to be adopted has no effect on the outcome of the case before the court. Courts have legitimate authority to make law, especially constitutional law, only in the course of deciding cases. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U. S.) 137, 177-178 (1803); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 360-361 (1911); 1 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law §2.13(b), p. 177 (2d ed. 1999). Once the court decides under Teague that the petitioner would not be entitled to relief even if he were right on the "merits," its legitimate precedent-making authority ends.
In this sense, §2254(d)(1) is the same kind of rule as Teague. Where it applies, it precludes collateral relief regardless of the validity or invalidity of the underlying claim. This issue, like Teague, should therefore be addressed as a threshold matter.
Respect for the intent of Congress and the purpose of the AEDPA also favors this approach. The central purpose of the statute, voiced uniformly by its supporters, is to reduce the unconscionable delays in habeas corpus, particularly in capital cases. See 141 Cong. Rec. 14,734 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); id., at 15,062 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id., at 15,019 (statement of Sen. Specter); id., at 15,036-15,037 (statement of Sen. Nickles). Specifically addressing §2254(d), Senator Hatch, the provision's principal sponsor, noted "Federal habeas corpus proceedings have become, in effect, a second round of appeals in which convicted criminals are afforded the opportunity to relitigate claims already considered and rejected by the state courts." Id., at 15,062, col. 2 (emphasis added); see also K. Scheidegger, Overdue Process: A Study of Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases and a Proposal for Reform 27-28 (1995).
In Williams, Justice Stevens acknowledged that "Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent 'retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law." 529 U. S., at 386 (opinion of Stevens, J.). "That acknowledgment is correct and significant to this case. It cannot be disputed that Congress viewed §2254(d)(1) as an important means by which its goals for habeas reform would be achieved." Id., at 404 (majority opinion).
For §2254(d)(1) to achieve its purpose, it is not enough to preclude relief; it must preclude relitigation. The state's primary interest in habeas reform was not to block relief in cases where it is warranted. But see infra, at 13 (problem of erroneous grants of federal relief in cases correctly decided by state courts). Rather, it was to reduce the "burden of federal relitigation of state decisions . . . ." S. O'Connor, Local Control of Crime, Address to the Attorney General's Crime Summit 5 (Mar. 4. 1991), reprinted in Habeas Corpus Issues: Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Serial No. 39, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 192, 197 (1991). In habeas, as in immunity, once the respondent is forced to litigate the question, most of the value of the protection is lost. Cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985).
Determining whether another court's decision is within reason is typically much easier and faster than deciding the underlying question de novo. The doctrine of law of the case, as applied to decisions of coordinate courts, is analogous to §2254(d). See Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 888, 914-916, 953 (1998). In that context, this Court admonished the courts of appeals not to "squander private and public resources." Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U. S. 800, 818-819 (1988). Instead, once the second court finds the first court's decision "plausible, its . . . inquiry is at an end." Id., at 819.
Tran offered three reasons for deciding the underlying question first. None is persuasive. First, Tran noted that Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U. S. 225 (2000) decided first that the state court decision was correct, and only then addressed the AEDPA limitation. See Weeks, at 237; Tran, supra, 212 F. 3d, at 1155. The obvious reason is that Williams v. Taylor, supra, was pending but not decided at the time, and decision in this order avoided the not-yet-resolved issue of the §2254(d)(1) standard. That reason no longer applies.
The second reason was a reference to the qualified immunity cases. Tran, supra, 212 F. 3d, at 1155. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 232 (1991) decided that "determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all" first "permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test . . . ." But see id., at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Qualified immunity differs from §2254(d) in that "clearly established" is determined at a greater level of specificity. In Williams v. Taylor, supra, 529 U. S., at 413-414 (opinion of O'Connor, J.), the "reasonable probability" standard for ineffective assistance was "clearly established," while in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639-641 (1987) "probable cause" was deemed too general. See Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Saucier v. Katz, No. 99-1977, pp. 25-26 (contrasting meaning of "clearly established" in the two contexts). The basis of Siegert is that the decision of a "purely legal question," Siegert, 500 U. S., at 232, is typically more expeditious than the case-specific inquiry needed to ascertain whether the officer's actions violated the alleged right and therefore provides the quicker path to resolution of the case. The merits of the habeas claim, in contrast, is typically not a "purely legal question." Tran simply ignores the underlying rationale of Siegert, which points in the opposite direction for application of §2254(d).
The final reason given by Tran is to "provide[ ] guidance for state courts . . . ." 212 F. 3d, at 1155. In the federal courts of appeals, where most habeas cases will end, this "guidance" is not worth the delay, expense, and dubious legitimacy of writing opinions on points which do not affect the outcome. The opinions are not binding on state courts. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 58-59, n. 11 (1997); id., at 66, n. 21; Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364, 375-376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). There is certainly no shortage of case law on constitutional criminal procedure. Questions bypassed on habeas can be considered in due course on direct review. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 486 (1990) (resolving issue left open in Teague). The federal courts of appeals "have no reason to presume state courts are in need of [their] guidance in interpreting and applying the controlling Supreme Court precedents." Bell v. Jarvis, No. 98-7002 (CA4 Dec. 29, 2000) (en banc) (slip op., at 16). Tran's mandate to write pointless opinions sends an unfortunate and incorrect message that federal courts do not have enough to do. Cf. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 274 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). It should be expressly disapproved.
As we will show in the following parts of this brief, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the correct precedents for this case and applied them reasonably to the facts. That is sufficient to preclude relief under §2254(d)(1). Having decided enough to determine the outcome, a habeas court should stop. There is no justification for delaying a decision to opine on questions which do not affect the outcome, and such delay would be contrary to the purpose of Congress in enacting this statute.
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