 |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
The District Court in this case held that the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) was violated when the police failed to read Patane the complete warnings, despite his spontaneous assertion that he already knew his rights. See United States v. Patane, 304 F. 3d 1013, 1018 (CA10 2002). The Government did not challenge this holding in the Court of Appeals, see ibid., or in its petition for certiorari. See Pet. for Cert. i. Under these circumstances, this Court will not normally decide the correctness of such a holding. See,e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 623, n. 1 (1991). Although the Court does on occasion consider issues raised only byamici, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 646, n. 3 (1961) (Fourth Amendment raised only by amicus); Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 300 (1989) (plurality opinion) (retroactivity), the present case is more like Hodari D. than Teague.
Even so, the debatable nature of the District Court's finding of a violation is important for two reasons. First, the opinion in this case should be explicit that the "violation" is merely assumed and not decided, as was done in Hodari D. In that case, the state conceded that the police officer did not have "reasonable suspicion" for a stop when Hodari fled at the sight of the officer. By explicitly noting that the point was conceded rather than decided, the Hodari D. Court kept the issue open for another case, in which another state chose to contest it. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119 (2000). The present case is a mirror image of Colorado v. Spring, 479 U. S. 564, 572, n. 4 (1987). In that case, the "fruit" question was conceded, and the case was decided on the legality of the questioning. In this case, the "fruit" question is the question presented, while the alleged Miranda violation should be assumed and expressly not decided. See alsoOregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 315 (1985) (custody conceded and assumed, not decided).
Second, the fact that the propriety of the officers' actions in this case was an open question at the time of the arrest, and indeed remains an open question today, may be significant. More than once in its Miranda jurisprudence, this Court has noted the absence of any intentional misconduct on the part of the investigating officers. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447-448 (1974) (noting questioning occurred before Miranda); Elstad, 470 U. S., at 309 (characterizing officer's belief that suspect was not yet in custody as "error"). The issue of intentional noncompliance is presented in another case presently before the Court, Missouri v. Seibert, No. 02-1371.
The Miranda opinion itself disclaimed any suggestion that the procedures laid out in it were exclusive, and alternatives were expressly allowed so long as they were equally effective. See 384 U. S., at 467. "The purpose of the Miranda warnings . . . is to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and, in so doing, guard against abridgment of the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 425 (1986). An arrestee who interrupts the police warnings to assert that he knows his rights and that the warnings are not necessary has demonstrated both the knowledge that he has rights regarding interrogation and the assertiveness necessary to stand up for his rights. The facts of this case demonstrate a less compulsive atmosphere than the typical case of Mirandacompliance, where the police read rights to a passive subject and get his signature on a waiver form. If an arrestee can waive the constitutional rights protected by the Miranda warning procedure, it would seem very strange that he cannot waive the warnings themselves, particularly where he does so entirely spontaneously. To hold that there was a violation in this case would be to create a rule of "talismanic incantation" of the type this Court rejected long ago. See California v. Prysock, 453 U. S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam).
Courts around the nation are divided on the question of whether the arrestee's spontaneous assertion of knowledge of his rights eliminates the requirement for the police to read them. See 2 W. LaFave, J. Israel, & N. King, Criminal Procedure §6.8(a), p. 572 (2d ed. 1999). A number of cases hold that the assertion does eliminate the warning requirement or, equivalently, that the arrestee has waived the warning. See, e.g., State v. Perez, 157 N. W. 2d 162, 164 (Neb. 1968); State v. Wilson, 268 N. E. 2d 814, 817 (Ohio App. 1971);State v. Thomas, 553 P. 2d 1357, 1363 (Wash. App. 1976); State v. Walden, 336 N. W. 2d 629, 632 (N. D. 1983); contra Dupont v.United States, 259 A. 2d 355, 358-359 (D. C. 1969). While this split need not and should not be resolved in the present case, it cannot be denied that the officers' belief that their actions complied with the Miranda rule was supported by substantial authority.
The Supreme Court precedents which come closest to the present case are Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 452 (1974) and Oregon v.Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 308 (1985). In both of these cases, this Court held that "fruits" of a statement taken without complying with theMiranda rule were admissible. The Court of Appeals in the present case excluded the "fruits" despite these precedents by two means. First, it held that Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000) had "fundamentally altered" the law in this area and "undermined the logic underlying Tucker and Elstad." United States v. Patane, 304 F. 3d 1013, 1019 (CA10 2002). Second, the Court of Appeals read the precedents very narrowly to draw a distinction for this purpose between physical objects and living witnesses, either the defendant's own statement or the identity of another witness. See id., at 1022. The first of these arguments is addressed in this part, and the second in the next part.
The Court of Appeals' thesis that Dickerson "fundamentally altered" the premises of important precedents is a surreal reading of that decision. Dickerson is a resounding affirmation of precedent. The Court made no attempt to defend Miranda as an initially correct decision, but instead declared that "the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now." 530 U. S., at 443. Dickersonquoted with approval the statement of Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 304 (1980) (emphasis added), "I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." Dickerson, supra, at 443. Certainly, to undermine the limitations on Miranda, including Tucker and Elstad, would be to extend it. Yet Dickerson expressly rejected the notion that there was inconsistency between Miranda and the limiting decisions. "If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of Miranda on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief." Id., at 443-444. Dickerson does not undermine any portion of the Mirandabody of jurisprudence, but instead reaffirms it as a coherent whole.
To be sure, the Fourth Circuit in Dickerson did rely on statements in Tucker and other cases to the effect that Miranda was a prophylactic rule for its conclusion that Miranda was not a constitutional rule. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F. 3d 667, 672 (CA4 1999). This reasoning could be stated as a syllogism:
No prophylactic rules are constitutional rules.
Miranda is a prophylactic rule.
Therefore, Miranda is not a constitutional rule.
The Court of Appeals in the present case appears to have assumed that, in rejecting the conclusion of this syllogism, see 530 U. S., at 438, the Dickerson Court necessarily rejected the minor premise. The obvious alternative is that the Court rejected the major premise. It is possible for a prophylactic rule to be a constitutional requirement.
The two-witness rule for treason, see U. S. Const., Art. III, §3, is a prophylactic rule of sorts. Certainly it does not create a substantive right to commit an act of treason which is only witnessed by one person. Like Miranda, it is a bright-line rule of evidence that certain evidence will be required for a particular purpose regardless of how clearly other available evidence may prove the underlying fact. This rule represents a value judgment by the Framers that the danger of erroneous conviction of treason on the word of one liar outweighs the need of the government to obtain convictions in single-witness cases. See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §943, pp. 671-672 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint 1987). Yet this rule is in the Constitution in black and white and not subject to legislative repeal.
Dickerson reaffirms that the Miranda procedures, or equally effective alternatives, are required for the product of in-custody interrogation to be included in the prosecution's case in chief, and that this rule is a constitutional mandate. That holding is consistent with the statements in earlier cases that characterize Miranda as a prophylactic rule, note that it sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself, and state that the warnings themselves are not constitutional rights. Specifically addressing Elstad, Dickersonunmistakably holds that "refusing to apply the traditional 'fruits' doctrine" is not inconsistent with the constitutional status of Miranda. 530 U. S., at 441.
If that were not clear enough from the face of the Dickerson opinion, the recent decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. __ (No. 01-1444, May 27, 2003) eliminated any residual doubt. Interpretation of this precedent is complicated by the fact that there is no majority opinion. Even so, we can see from the separate opinions that Dickerson did not undermine the cases limiting Miranda, including Tuckerand Elstad.
On the Fifth Amendment question, the opinions concurring in the judgment are those of Justice Thomas and Justice Souter. We need not answer the often-difficult riddle of which opinion is "narrower," see Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977); Nichols v.United States, 511 U. S. 738, 745-746 (1994); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. __ (No. 02-241, June 23, 2003) (slip op., at 12-13), because the two are consistent on this point. Indeed, Part I of Justice Kennedy's opinion is also consistent to the extent relevant here.
Justice Thomas' opinion reaffirms that Miranda is a prophylactic rule, even though it is a constitutionally required prophylactic rule. Chavez (slip op., at 8, 10). Tucker and Elstad are cited and relied on as precedent for the same premises that the Court of Appeals in the present case believed had been undermined by Dickerson. Compare id. (slip op., at 9), with 304 F. 3d, at 1019. "Rules designed to safeguard a constitutional right, however, do not extend the scope of the constitutional right itself, just as violations of traditionally crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the constitutional rights of any person." Chavez (slip op., at 10). From this post-Dickersonopinion, we see that Miranda's status as a prophylactic rule remains intact. Asking a question of an arrestee without reading theMiranda warnings, by itself, is not a violation of the arrestee's rights.
Justice Souter's opinion characterizes the Miranda rule as "conditioning admissibility on warnings and waivers to promote intelligent choices and to simplify subsequent inquiry into voluntariness . . . ." Id. (slip op., at 2) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). This correct, complete, yet brief statement may be the best description of Miranda yet. "Conditioning admissibility" designates Miranda as a rule of evidence rather than a rule of substantive law. The policy reasons given for the Miranda rule imply that the rule will be limited when countervailing reasons of policy outweigh the reasons for extending the rule of exclusion. Justice Souter refers to Miranda as a "complementary rule," rather than a prophylactic rule, id. (slip op., at 3), but this variation on the traditional terminology would not seem to make any difference. Cf. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U. S. 523, 528 (1987) ("auxiliary barrier").
In this view, any extension of Miranda's "complementary rule" must be justified by a showing that the extension is necessary because the existing remedies are insufficient to protect the core Fifth Amendment privilege. Chavez, supra, (slip op., at 3) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). For the reasons discussed in Part III, infra, Tucker and Elstad are based on the Court's judgment that extension beyond exclusion of the statement itself is not necessary. Nothing in Dickerson is remotely contrary to that judgment, and hence these cases are still good law.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion is a dissent on the Fifth Amendment question, it is worth noting that this opinion is also consistent with the view that Dickerson did not undermine the limitations on Miranda established in this Court's cases. Dickerson established thatMiranda is "a constitutional requirement." Chavez, supra (slip op., at 2) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That requirement, however, is "a rule of exclusion," ibid., i.e., a rule of evidence and not a rule of substantive law. The pre-Dickersonexceptions to Miranda's rule of exclusion are alive and well. Ibid. (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971)). "The exclusion of unwarned statements, when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient remedy." Ibid. (emphasis added).
The only indication in any of the opinions in Chavez that Dickerson changed anything in the Miranda body of jurisprudence is a statement in footnote 3 of Justice Stevens' opinion that "the Court disavowed the 'prophylactic' characterization of Miranda inDickerson . . . . " This opinion was not joined by any other Justice, and the statement is contrary to those in opinions joined by a majority, as discussed supra.
In short, Chavez confirms that Dickerson did not change the distinction drawn in prior cases between noncompliance with Miranda and actual coercion. The main premise of the Court of Appeals' thesis is therefore false. The physical "fruit" of the questioning of Patane can be suppressed only if Tucker and Elstad can be meaningfully distinguished or if they should be independently overruled. As we will show in the next part, those decisions were correct, and the balancing of costs and benefits that produced those decisions produces the same result here.
|
|
||||
|
|
|
|
||