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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF) ⁽¹⁾ is a non-profit California corporation organized to participate in litigation relating to the criminal justice system as it affects the public interest. CJLF seeks to bring the due process protection of the accused into balance with the rights of the victim and of society to rapid, efficient, and reliable determination of guilt and swift execution of punishment.

The mobility and autonomy of automobiles pose special problems for law enforcement. Sometimes brief suspicionless seizures of vehicles are necessary to address a pressing social problem like illegal immigration or drunk driving. This makes automotive checkpoints an important exception to the rule that seizures must be supported by individualized suspicion.

In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32 (2000), this Court recognized limits to the government's authority to conduct checkpoints. Automotive checkpoints motivated by a general interest in crime control, such as interdicting drugs, were too dangerous to the Fourth Amendment to be permitted. In the present case, the Illinois Supreme Court has expanded Edmond far beyond what this Court intended or good sense allows. Allowing Edmond to strike down the informative checkpoint in this case strips the police of the authority to conduct checkpoints that are reasonable under a balancing of public and private interests. The hamstringing of this important public safety procedure is contrary to the interests of public safety that CJLF was formed to protect.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

On August 30, 1997, police set up a checkpoint on North Avenue in Lombard, Illinois. People v. Lidster, 779 N. E. 2d 855, 856 (Ill. 2002). The checkpoint was set up to get information from passing motorists concerning a fatal hit and run accident that took place at the same spot exactly one week before at approximately the same time of the day. See ibid. This time coincided with people leaving work near the scene of the accident. See Pet. for Cert. 1.

Officers at the checkpoint distributed flyers to alert drivers about the accident and the need for information. Lidster, 779 N. E. 2d, at 856. All east-bound vehicles were stopped for 10 to 15 seconds, so that officers could hand each driver a flyer about the accident. Drivers were not asked for license or registration, nor was any effort made to check for seatbelt violations. See Pet for Cert. 2. Although the checkpoint was not publicized, the accident was well known in the area. See ibid.

Detective Ray Vasil, wearing an orange reflective vest with the word "Police" on it, stood about 15 feet from the checkpoint. Lidster, 779 N. E. 2d, at 856. As each vehicle pulled up to him, he handed a flyer to the driver. The defendant, Robert Lidster, drove up to the checkpoint in his Mazda minivan, nearly hitting Detective Vasil. Detective Vasil then asked Lidster for his driver's license and insurance card. See ibid. Smelling alcohol on Lidster's breath, Detective Vasil directed him to a side street, where Detective Roy Newton administered several sobriety tests. See ibid.

The defendant failed several of the tests and was arrested. See ibid. The trial court found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and sentenced him to one year of conditional discharge. Id., at 857. Lidster also had to participate in counseling, complete a 14-day " 'Sheriff's Work Alternative Program,' " and pay a $200 fine. Ibid.

An Illinois intermediate appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32 (2000). Lidster, 779 N. E. 2d, at 856. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, also holding that the checkpoint violated Edmond. See id., at 861.

This Court granted certiorari on May 5, 2003.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case turns on understanding the limits of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32 (2000). Although privacy is very limited in the automobile, Edmond confirmed that the police do not have unlimited authority to detain motorists. An automotive checkpoint that does not contain its own limits will not pass constitutional muster.

This Court has upheld checkpoints that are aimed against crime when the justifications for these checkpoints also limit their potential growth. The rationale for immigration checkpoints did not extend beyond some traffic arteries near our border with Mexico, and sobriety checkpoints were limited to the roads. The rationale for the drug checkpoint in Edmond could not be constrained. If accepted, the rationale for drug checkpoints would have extended much further than its immediate purpose. Drugs are not tied to the roads, so the checkpoints' rationale would extend to areas where drugs are manufactured or sold. Since illegal drugs are not the only serious crime problem, this rationale would also extend to other serious crimes such as murder or organized crime. Because the drug checkpoint's potential growth threatened the Fourth Amendment, it was struck down.

The informative checkpoint in this case is no threat to the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the drug checkpoint in Edmond, it carries its own limits. This checkpoint is limited to one automotive crime, tying it closely to the roads. The officers conducting the checkpoint also had little discretion in setting its time and place. Since the checkpoint's rationale extends only to a relatively small number of serious automotive offenses, there is no threat of its rationale spreading through the Fourth Amendment like the drug checkpoint in Edmond.

The minimal intrusiveness of the informative checkpoint further distinguishes this case from Edmond. Unlike all prior checkpoint and special needs search cases, this case does not involve an adversarial relationship between the authorities and individuals who are stopped. The police here are not trying to catch drivers committing crimes. Instead, they are simply informing drivers about a fatal accident that took place on the street where they are driving. This is inherently less intrusive than the adversarial checkpoints previously before this Court.

An intrusion can be so minimal as to no longer warrant Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The seizure in this case approaches that point. It was a 10- to 15-second stop that allowed the police to give a leaflet about the accident to drivers. Few stops will be as unintrusive as this, and it is reason enough to distinguish Edmond from this case.

This checkpoint is reasonable in light of the balance between public need and private intrusion. The police are attempting to find out from the public about a proven highway menace--someone who kills and leaves the scene of the accident. Since the only two identifiable witnesses are gone, it makes sense to publicize the incident in order to find out what happened. The checkpoint is an efficient, targeted effort to find someone who saw what happened. In light of the checkpoint's minimal intrusion, it is a reasonable effort. The Fourth Amendment requires no more.

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1. This brief was written entirely by counsel for amicus, as listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions were made to the preparation or submission of this brief.

Both parties have given written consent to the filing of this brief.