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Checkpoints (2) are a limited, but essential, component of public safety. While the automobile is a great source of freedom and convenience to individuals, it also poses significant public safety concerns. The car's mobility and independence can be a boon to criminals, while its power turns every driver into a potential menace.
These problems give the automobile a special status under the Fourth Amendment. Drunk driving's heavy toll strongly supported the constitutionality of drunk driving checkpoints, see Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 451 (1990), and the automobile's aid to illegal immigration helped support illegal alien checkpoints. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 552 (1976). The automobile's mobility justifies suspending the warrant requirement when police have probable cause to search a car. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153-154 (1925). Its relative openness and substantial regulation also work to diminish the expectation of privacy of a vehicle's occupants. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976). These combine to sharply reduce the coverage of the Fourth Amendment in the automobile. For example, one commentator hostile to recent Fourth Amendment automotive decisions has concluded that "it is no exaggeration to say that in cases involving cars, the Fourth Amendment is all but dead." Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556, 556 (1998).
This is an exaggeration. Automobile occupants do not lose all expectations of privacy. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 662 (1979). This was demonstrated when this Court struck down a drug interdiction checkpoint in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32 (2000). While important, Edmond is not a landmark break from precedent. Although this decision confirmed that there were limits on the use of checkpoints, Edmond is much narrower than the reading given to it by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Analysis of Edmond centers on the checkpoint's purpose. The "primary purpose" of the checkpoint in Edmond was "the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics." Id., at 34. Allowing a "general interest in crime control" to justify a checkpoint posed a grave threat to the Fourth Amendment. Since most searches and seizures are intended to control crime, upholding this rationale for suspicionless seizures "would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life." Id., at 42. "The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 554. For most searches and seizures, the individualized suspicion requirement guards against government arbitrariness. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U. S. 325, 342, n. 8 (1985). Suspicionless checkpoint seizures require something else to limit the government.
In Martintez-Fuerte, the special problems presented by illegal immigration created both a need for the checkpoints and an inherent limit on the government's authority to seize drivers and passengers. Policing our long and porous border for illegal aliens presented formidable challenges to the authorities. See 428 U. S., at 552. Automobiles substantially compounded the problem, which made checkpoints an integral part of the Custom Service's efforts to control immigration. See id., at 552-553. Because many of the checkpoints had to be on major traffic arteries, requiring individualized suspicion was impractical in light of the heavy traffic flowing through the checkpoints. See id., at 557. Therefore, the government had a real need for the suspicionless checkpoints.
While these needs helped make the constitutional case for immigration checkpoints, the importance of the public interest is not enough by itself to "justify a regime of suspicionless searches or seizures." Edmond, 531 U. S., at 543. It is necessary to "look more closely at the nature of the public interests that such a regime is designed principally to serve." Ibid. In Martinez-Fuerte, the checkpoint was constitutional because the interest in limiting immigration necessarily limited the spread of similar checkpoints.
The Martinez-Fuerte checkpoints were aimed at curbing illegal immigration from Mexico. See 428 U. S., at 552. This focus was rational since Mexico was estimated to be the source of 85% of all illegal immigration, see id., at 551, and our long southern border with Mexico made automobiles an ideal means of unauthorized entry. Therefore, immigration checkpoints were necessarily limited to a relative handful of strategic areas near our southern border with Mexico. See id., at 552. It would make no sense to set up checkpoints for illegal immigrants from Mexico in places like Nebraska, Hawaii, New York, or Florida.
Because immigration checkpoints could not spread throughout the country unabated, the overall intrusiveness of the regime was minimized. While one or two checkpoints may not be too intrusive, the cost to privacy rises rapidly as they become widespread. A checkpoint capable of universal application also runs the risk of arbitrary placement. Since police do not have unlimited resources to conduct checkpoints, some choice is necessary for their placement. Although "neutral criteria" for the timing and placement of searches and seizures reduces this risk, see Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 323 (1978), neutral criteria may be impossible to develop when the problem addressed by the checkpoint is sufficiently pervasive. The narrow focus of the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte prevents this and distinguishes it from Edmond.
What most concerned the Edmond Court was the potentially unlimited application of drug checkpoints. This fact is key to understanding that case and why narcotics checkpoints differ from other valid checkpoints. There is a superficial similarity between Edmond and the checkpoints upheld by this Court. The two valid checkpoints both prevented crime--illegal immigration and drunk driving. See Edmond, 531 U. S., at 42. The problem is that leaving the analysis at this level of generality would eviscerate the Fourth Amendment. See ibid.
Since drugs are a problem everywhere, upholding drug checkpoints would allow the police to establish them wherever and whenever they chose. "Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life." Edmond, 531 U. S., at 42. The general rule is that searches and seizures must be supported by individualized suspicion. Suspicionless intrusions such as checkpoints or "special needs" searches are an exception to this rule. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U. S. 67, 81 (2001). The broad purpose of drug checkpoints would turn the exception into the rule.
The other checkpoint upheld by this Court, the drunk driving checkpoint of Sitz, is not as easily compatible with Edmond as immigration checkpoints. Drunk driving is a national problem. See Sitz, 496 U. S., at 451. For example, arrests for driving under the influence almost equal the arrests for drug abuse violations. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, Table 4.1, p. 342 (2002). Therefore, the geographical controls found in Martinez-Fuerte are not as pronounced in Sitz. After Sitz, a drunk driving checkpoint can be set up on almost any highway.
Edmond distinguished Sitz on the basis of the sobriety checkpoint's close tie to the roads. Driving under the influence is closely connected to the highways and streets. "Only with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is society confronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz was designed to eliminate." Edmond, 531 U. S., at 43. Narcotics offenses lacked this connection, which distinguished Edmond from Sitz. See ibid. While sobriety checkpoints were tied to the road through drunk driving, narcotics checkpoints lacked any effective limits. The Edmond Court's rationale for distinguishing Sitz shows that Edmond is a limited decision. While sobriety checkpoints were capable of wide application, that alone did not justify their invalidation under Edmond. What distinguished Sitz from Edmond is the greater threat to the Fourth Amendment posed by the narcotics checkpoints. It is this threat that lead to narcotics checkpoints being per se invalid.
The problem with the narcotics checkpoint is that its rationale cannot be confined to the roads or to narcotics. Ships, trains, airplanes, bicycles, and feet are all used to transport drugs. Had Edmond been decided the other way, then suspicionless seizures in these contexts would be equally valid.
Transportation is only one part of the drug problem. Since drugs are not tied to the roads, the checkpoint's rationale could apply to procedures designed to combat the manufacturing, sale, or use of narcotics in buildings, street corners, private residences, or anywhere else. There is no drug exception to the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 393-394 (1997) (rejecting a drug exception to the knock and announce requirement). The checkpoint rejected in Edmond threatened to create one.
The risk to the Fourth Amendment in Edmond did not stop at drugs. Murder, rape, organized crime, and child abuse are among the many serious problems covered by criminal law. If drugs could justify suspicionless seizures, then so could these or other similarly serious criminal problems. The rationale of the narcotics checkpoint, if accepted, threatened to swallow much of the Fourth Amendment. This is why a "primary purpose . . . to advance 'the general interest in crime control,' " Edmond, 531 U. S., at 44 (quoting Prouse, 440 U. S., at 659, n. 18), was constitutionally unacceptable.
The Edmond Court did not categorically exclude crime control interests from justifying roadblocks or checkpoints. Certain emergencies, such as an "imminent terrorist attack" or a "dangerous criminal" fleeing "by way of a particular route" are crime control interests that could constitutionally justify a roadblock. See 531 U. S., at 44. However, even these must be "appropriately tailored," ibid., to ensure that there are constraints on the government's ability to conduct suspicionless searches or seizures.
Edmond is about limits. A checkpoint that does not suggest its own limits is unlikely to withstand scrutiny. As Edmond demonstrated, it is necessary to get underneath the surface of the checkpoint's primary purpose in order to make this determination. Simply labeling an interest as general crime control and striking the checkpoint down without further analysis is a "substitution of words for analysis." United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, this was the extent of the Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning. Closer examination of the checkpoint in this case finds something much more limited than the threat to devour the Fourth Amendment that was struck down in Edmond.
A. Intent.
Accurate analysis of the checkpoint in this case begins by understanding what happened on August 30, 1997, on North Avenue in Lombard, Illinois. The police conducted an informative checkpoint. Its purpose was to inform motorists of a specific hit and run homicide that took place on the same street one week ago in order to get leads on the perpetrator. This checkpoint was no different than officers asking the community for information through the newspapers, television, or door-to-door canvassing.
The informative checkpoint in this case is unique among the suspicionless search or seizure cases before this Court. All three checkpoint cases involved attempts to find evidence of criminality from the stopped motorists, or to deter people from using vehicles to commit crimes. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 34 (2000) (illegal narcotics); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 447 (1990) (drunk driving); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 543 (1976) (illegal immigration). Special needs searches are similar. Sometimes the search is intended to find criminal evidence from the target of the search. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 870 (1987) (probation search). While the results of other special needs searches are not turned over to the police, the searches have adverse consequences for those being searched. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U. S. 822, 833 (2002) (failing drug test limits middle and high school students' ability to participate in extracurricular activities); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 651 (1995) (possible suspension from school sports for positive drug test); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 661 (1989) (loss of promotion of position transfer for drug test failure); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 611 (1989) (results of breath or urine tests may be used in disciplinary proceedings against the tested railroad employees). The special needs searches struck down under the Fourth Amendment also involved potentially adverse consequences for those searched. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U. S. 67, 72-73 (2001) (possible use of drug tests of pregnant women in criminal prosecutions); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305, 309 (1997) (positive drug test disqualifies candidate for public office). Administrative searches are similarly adverse for their subjects. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 694-696 (1987) (criminal prosecution from fruits of administrative search).
The checkpoint in this case has a different position with respect to its subjects. No adverse consequences were intended for anyone going through the checkpoint. The officers did not ask for license, registration, or other identifying information from the drivers. See supra, at 2. Nor did they question the drivers or make a visual inspection of the vehicles' interiors. If the perpetrator of the hit and run drove through the checkpoint, the officers would not be able to find this out absent a spontaneous confession. The defendant in this case was arrested for drunk driving for reasons unrelated to the purpose of the checkpoint. Nearly hitting an officer with a vehicle during the slowed traffic of a checkpoint can only raise a justifiable suspicion that something is wrong with the driver. Had Lidster not driven so badly, his intoxication would have remained undiscovered. (3)
The unique context of the informative checkpoint is important for two reasons. First, the nonadversarial nature of the stop diminishes the invasion of privacy. The means needed to inform citizens in this case are less invasive than those used to ferret out drug dealers, a topic discussed later. See Part II-B, infra. Informative stops are simply inherently less invasive than adversarial checkpoints.
Secondly, the informative checkpoint's purpose limits its potential scope. It was intended to find eyewitnesses to a single highway crime. The most logical place to find eyewitnesses to the accident is on the street on which it happened. Its timing is as constrained as its location. Conducting the checkpoint at the same time and day of the week as the incident maximizes the chance of finding a motorist who was driving near the accident as part of his or her regular commute from work. See supra, at 2. Since people can have different driving patterns for each day of the week, it made sense to conduct the checkpoint on the same day of the week that the accident happened. Once the police decided to establish the checkpoint, there was little discretion as to when or where it would take place, thus achieving a key purpose of the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653-654 (1979) ("The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials").
Although the checkpoint was set up to solve a crime, it does not carry the danger to the Fourth Amendment found in the general crime control interest of Edmond. First, this checkpoint is focused on a traffic crime, tying it to the roads. This closely parallels what distinguishes the constitutionally acceptable drunk driving checkpoint from the unconstitutional narcotics checkpoint. Edmond distinguished the interest in apprehending drunk drivers in Sitz from a general interest in crime control by the sobriety checkpoint's close connection to highway safety. See Edmond, 531 U. S., at 43 ("immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb"). The person sought in the present case had already killed someone on the highway, demonstrating a clear and present danger to motorists and pedestrians. That driver's lack of responsibility in leaving the scene compounded the threat.
This Court has recognized that it may be possible to obstruct a road in order to apprehend a felon. Dicta in Edmond stated that police may block a particular route in order to catch a fleeing dangerous criminal. See 531 U. S., at 44. In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 599 (1989), this Court left open whether a roadblock that led to the death of the fleeing criminal violated the Fourth Amendment. A sufficient criminal law interest should allow the authorities to restrict traffic in order to catch a criminal.
"If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
While the exigency is less in this case, so is the intrusion. Amicus is not asking that the police be allowed to block a road and search motorists at will. When there is a serious accident, an informative stop may be reasonable after the appropriate Fourth Amendment interests are balanced. See Part III, infra.
The Illinois Supreme Court tried to rationalize its holding with a slippery slope argument:
"Should the police have been allowed to set up roadblocks to obtain information from potential witnesses for each murder? What of a robbery, an aggravated criminal sexual assault, an arson or any other serious crime? According to the State, for a period of at least a week after each crime, police could set up roadblocks with the specific purpose of making inquiries of persons who were possibly witnesses to a crime. The troubling specter then arises that the streets of Cook County, or at least the streets of Chicago, would be adorned with roadblocks, an outcome clearly unacceptable under Edmond." People v. Lidster, 779 N. E. 2d 855, 860 (Ill. 2002).
This substitutes hyperbole for analysis. The checkpoint was set up to find information about an automotive homicide. Although automobiles are a significant source of criminal conduct, the vast majority of serious crimes are not automobile related. The crimes of "robbery . . . aggravated criminal sexual assault [or] arson," see ibid., are unlikely to be committed on the road with a vehicle. Crimes involving automobiles are most likely to be violations of hit and run regulations, collisions leading to homicide or assault charges, vehicle theft, flight from some other offense, transporting contraband or illegal immigrants, driving under the influence, or misdemeanor traffic offenses like reckless driving. Two of these crimes, driving under the influence and transporting illegal immigrants, can support checkpoints, while transporting contraband cannot. Of the remainder, traffic offenses and motor vehicle thefts are not serious enough to warrant a checkpoint, while certain fleeing felons can be stopped with checkpoints or roadblocks. Only hit and run, vehicular homicides, or serious assaults with vehicles are implicated by the informative checkpoint in this case.
The Illinois Supreme Court's slippery slope argument also imperils Sitz, as drunk driving checkpoints can be established throughout the country. See supra, at 9. What distinguishes Sitz from Edmond is the sobriety checkpoint's close tie to the road, see supra, at 9, the same feature that is present in this case.
The checkpoint's focus on a narrow band of automotive crime will keep it from consuming the Fourth Amendment. It is focused on a particular area, a particular time, and on a small, discrete set of criminal activity. This is a far cry from what the Edmond decision sought to stop.
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2. The Illinois Supreme Court called the operation a "roadblock." See People v. Lidster, 779 N. E. 2d 855, 856 (Ill. 2002). This was
inaccurate. A roadblock is the complete blocking of a road in order to prevent any traffic from continuing on the path. It is "[a]
barricade or an obstruction across a road set up to prevent the escape or passage, as of a fugitive or enemy troops." American Heritage
Dictionary 1559 (3d ed. 1992). What was done in this case, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32 (2000), Michigan Dept. of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444 (1990), or United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976) was not a roadblock, as passage
through the obstruction was possible after dealing with the authorities. It was a checkpoint. The complete blocking of passage makes a
roadblock a more intrusive seizure than a checkpoint. Calling checkpoints "roadblocks," see, e.g., Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U. S. 67,
83, n. 21 (2001), inaccurately prejudices them and should be avoided.
3. Because Lidster's bad driving provided a basis of individualized suspicion prior to his actual stopping, there may have not been a
suspicionless seizure in this case. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 629 (1991). However, the state did not petition for
certiorari on this point.