 |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
In addition to ignoring the public safety special need, the Ninth Circuit's decision also improperly relied on Detective Hancock's alleged motivation for searching Knights' apartment. The Ninth Circuit asserts that its decision is not based upon the motivation behind the search, but "rather, whether, without another basis for a warrantless home search, there was consent to search in the first place." United States v. Knights, 219 F. 3d 1138, 1143 (CA9 2000). This distinction cannot carry the analytical load that the circuit court gives it. Knights did in fact consent to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his "place of residence . . . by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." Id., at 1141. The Ninth Circuit limited the scope of Knights' consent, holding that "we have made it clear that his consent must be seen as limited to probation searches, and must stop short of investigative searches. We simply have refused to recognize the viability of a more expansive probationary consent to search term." Id., at 1142. This is no more than an inquiry into the motive of the searching officer.
The manner in which the court found the improper investigatory purpose shows that this looks into the searching officer's state of mind:
"Detective Hancock, and his cohorts, were not a bit interested in Knights' rehabilitation. They were interested in investigating and ending the string of crimes of which Knights was thought to be the perpetrator. . . . True, a probation officer may also wish to end wrongdoing by a probationer, but there was no 'also' about Detective Hancock's purpose." Id., at 1143 (emphasis added).
Quoting another Ninth Circuit opinion, the court reiterated, " 'Because the search here clearly was not a genuine attempt to enforce probation but apparently had a motive of avoidance of Fourth Amendment requirements, it is the type of law enforcement conduct that ought to be deterred.' " Id., at 1142 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Merchant, 760 F. 2d 963, 969 (CA9 1985)).
Motive has little place in Fourth Amendment analysis. This Court has repeatedly declined to invalidate an objectively legal search on the basis of the searching officer's allegedly improper motivations. In Maryland v. Macon, 472 U. S. 463 (1985), an undercover officer purchased two obscene magazines from an adult bookstore with marked money to facilitate an arrest and prosecution for selling obscene materials. See id., at 465-466. The fact that the officer intended to recover the marked money did not transform the purchase into a warrantless search. "Objectively viewed, the transaction was a sale in the ordinary course of business. The sale is not retrospectively transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as evidence." Id., at 471.
As this Court emphasized in a plain view doctrine case,
"evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of the warrant or valid exception to the warrant requirement." Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 138 (1990).>
Special needs searches present a more complex version of the general rule. This Court has noted that "an inventory search must not be a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover evidence." Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1, 4 (1990). Similarly, in upholding a warrantless administrative inspection, this Court observed that the search did not seem to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of respondent's violation of the penal laws." New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987).
These statements do not give courts license to second-guess the motives of officers making special needs searches. Instead, these "quoted statements simply explain that the exemption from the need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes." Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 811 (1996) (emphasis in original). Therefore, "our cases dealing with intrusion that occur pursuant to a general scheme absent individualized suspicion have often required an inquiry into purpose at the programmatic level." City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 346, 121 S. Ct. 447, 457 (2000).
In other words, the need behind a special needs search must actually be special, and the search must advance those needs. Since the primary purpose of the checkpoint at issue in Edmond was interdicting narcotics, which is no more than a " 'general interest in crime control,' " the checkpoint was invalid. See id., at 345, 121 S. Ct., at 455 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 659, n. 19 (1979)). Had the program instead been supported by a special need like deterring drunk driving, or policing the borders on checkpoints, it would have been upheld. See id., at 344, 121 S. Ct., at 454-455.
This narrow exception does not allow courts to peer into the minds of the officers executing a special needs search. "Finally, we caution that the purpose inquiry is in this context to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene." Id., at 347, 121 S. Ct., at 457. So long as the "programmatic purpose," or special need, is valid, then search pursuant to that need is legal.
Allowing police officers to execute probation searches advances the public safety special need brought about whenever a felon, drug offender, or other high-risk individual is granted probation. See part I, supra. The fact that "Detective Hancock, and his cohorts, were not a bit interested in Knights' rehabilitation," Knights, 219 F. 3d, at 1143, has no bearing on the legality of Detective Hancock's search pursuant to a valid probation condition. Since the search condition itself was valid, the reasons for undertaking the search are irrelevant. "We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's actions does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). The fact that Detective Hancock was wearing a sheriff's uniform does not allow a court to examine his motivations, or attribute motives to him. Cf. Knights, 219 F. 3d, at 1143. ("True, a probation officer may also wish to end wrongdoing by a probationer, but there was no 'also' about Detective Hancock's purpose").
In addition to being contrary to precedent, this approach is too difficult to apply. Even partisans of the probation/investigation distinction appreciate the difficulty in finding an improper investigatory purpose. See 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §10.10(e), pp. 794-797 (3d ed. 1996). "Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the search are not likely to point inevitably toward one purpose as opposed to the other." Id., at 795. Where both police and probation officers are involved in the search, cf. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 871 (1987) (police tip), courts would have to untangle the different purposes of the different officers. See ibid. The motive issue does not stop at searches involving the police. Probation officers may also conduct searches motivated by public safety concerns. One survey indicates that most searches conducted by probation officers are motivated by public safety concerns. See Rackmill, Community Corrections and the Fourth Amendment, 57 Fed. Probation 40, 44 (Sept. 1993). Logically, every probation search will require an inquiry into the searching officer's motive if the Ninth Circuit's position is upheld.
Inquiries into the subjective intent behind discretionary actions like searches are often far ranging and difficult. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 816-817 (1982) (subjective good faith standard requires a too-complex inquiry for qualified immunity cases). "[W]e believe that 'sending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.' " United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922, n. 23 (1984) (quoting Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U. S. 567, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). Attempts to prevent police pretext are likely to backfire.
As one authority noted in the stop and frisk context, "surely the catch is not worth the trouble of the hunt when courts set out to bag the secret motivations of policemen . . . . A subjective purpose to do something that the applicable legal rules say there is sufficient objective cause to do can be fabricated all too easily and undetectably." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 436, 436-437 (1974) (footnotes omitted); accord, People v. Woods, 21 Cal. 4th 668, 681, 981 P. 2d 1019, 1028 (1999).
Neither the public nor the law is served well by complex, arbitrarily subjective standards. "The people in their houses, as well as the police, deserve more precision." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. __ (No. 99-8508, June 11, 2001) (slip op., at 11-12). This requires a "line" that is "not only firm but also bright." Id. (slip op., at 12). Such a line would be formed by a rule that police officers can conduct searches pursuant to valid probation conditions, without regard to any purported motive.
|
|
||||
|
|
|
|
||