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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF)⁽¹⁾ is a non-profit California corporation organized to participate in litigation relating to the criminal justice system as it affects the public interest. CJLF seeks to bring the constitutional protections of the accused into balance with the rights of the victim and of society to rapid, efficient, and reliable determination of guilt and swift execution of punishment.

The automatic stay component of the Prison Litigation Reform Act is an important part of Congress's effort to limit excessive judicial intrusion in prison management. The cost of compliance with court orders in these cases threatens the ability of states to continue the tough sentencing policies that have dramatically reduced crime and saved many innocent persons in recent years. The Seventh Circuit's decision to strike down the automatic stay is thus contrary to the interests CJLF was formed to protect.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

This case started over 20 years ago with prisoner-initiated, class action litigation over the conditions at what is now Pendleton Correctional Facility in Indiana. French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d 437, 438 (CA7 1999). The District Court found that the prison conditions violated both Indiana law and the United States Constitution. The remedy was a permanent injunction ordering "detailed changes" in prison conditions. French v. Owens, 777 F. 2d 1250, 1251 (CA7 1985). The Seventh Circuit affirmed much of the order. See id., at 1258. The prison has been operating under this injunction ever since, subject to periodic modifications. 178 F. 3d, at 438.

The current round of litigation comes from Indiana's attempt to modify the injunction to conform to the new standards of the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). See 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1). Under 18 U. S. C. §3626(e)(2), the decree is automatically stayed if the District Court does not rule on the motion to modify within 30 days. Subdivision (e)(3) allows the court to postpone the automatic stay for up to 60 days "for good cause," other than a congested docket.

On June 5, 1997, Indiana filed a motion to terminate the decree. French v. Duckworth, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 440. On June 30, 1997, the prisoners responded with a motion asking the court to stay the automatic stay provision of §3626(e)(2). Id., at 440. The trial court granted the prisoners a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") on July 3, 1997, suspending the automatic stay provision. The court converted the TRO to a preliminary injunction on July 11, 1997. Indiana appealed from that order.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. The panel held that subdivision (e)(2)'s self-executing time limit was "an unconstitutional intrusion on the power of the courts to adjudicate cases." Id., at 446. The Seventh Circuit further held that the automatic stay imposed a rule of decision on a pending case contrary to the holding of United States v. Klein, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). French, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 446-447.

The Seventh Circuit denied Indiana's motion for a rehearing en banc, with Judges Easterbrook, Posner, and Manion dissenting. See id., at 448. On December 6, 1999, this Court granted Indiana's and the United States' certiorari petitions.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The PLRA's automatic stay provision cannot be construed to give courts the discretion to ignore it. Its language is unambiguous, and the automatic stay is constitutional as written. This Court should decline the United States' invitation to rewrite the statute.

The separation-of-powers doctrine does not hermetically seal the three branches from each other. This doctrine, although designed primarily to protect against the tyrannical aggregation of power by one branch, also promotes a capable and accountable government. The founders reconciled these interests by separating the powers through the Constitution's system of checks and balances. The Constitution does not seal off the three branches, but creates a duty of interdependence between them.

In the relationship between Congress and the Judiciary, Congress is the generalist, creating broad rules of general application, while the Judiciary is the particularist, applying the given rules to specific cases. This leaves Congress with considerable power over the operation of the courts. The rules of evidence and the federal harmless error rule are examples of congressional authority over a court's decisionmaking. Because the automatic stay neither impermissibly interferes with the Judiciary's function of deciding cases, nor assumes that function, it does not violate the separation of powers.

The PLRA is Congress's attempt to check the excesses of the federal Judiciary in prison civil rights litigation. Too many courts have used their equitable powers to remake and manage prisons in these cases. Judicial authority has been involved in every aspect of running a prison system, from the type of cleaner to be used to clean the prison to the design and construction of entire prisons. Every state and the federal government have had at least some prisons or jails under judicial control. The comprehensive usurpation of prison management by federal district court judges is a direct assault against both federalism and the separation of powers.

The automatic stay is an important part of Congress's solution to this constitutional problem. Federalism and the separation of powers are continuously violated so long as prison systems operate under decrees that exceed the constitutional minimums. The automatic stay places the federal courts on a schedule in order to promptly relieve penal institutions from the burden of improper judicial interference with their operations. Nothing in the Constitution prevents this rule of procedure.

The automatic stay does not violate United States v. Klein. Klein is an unusual case that has since been limited. This case now applies only when Congress tells a court how to decide a pending case without changing the underlying law. The automatic stay does not come under this holding. Courts still retain the authority to decide cases. The statute involves the rights and duties of the parties pending the decision. Furthermore, Congress can and has changed the underlying law, making the present case even more removed from Klein.

The statute in the present case neither retroactively reopens a final judgment, nor effects a review of an Article III court. A long line of cases starting with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. have held that a court's exercise of its injunctive power does not create a final judgment. In Wheeling Bridge, Congress was allowed to effectively overturn one of this Court's decisions because an injunction is a continuing decree and therefore subject to subsequent changes in the law. From a separation-of-powers perspective, the PLRA's automatic stay is comparatively minor compared to what Congress was allowed to do in Wheeling Bridge. Because Congress can effectively terminate a continuing injunction, it surely may suspend one pending a determination of whether it is legal under current law.

Placing a court on a schedule through the mechanism of an automatic stay is consistent with the separation of powers. The Seventh Circuit's holding would strike down many congressional limits on the Judiciary's administrative independence, including the bankruptcy law's automatic stay. Congress has often set priorities for courts to rule on cases. The only difference is that now Congress has set a specific time limit. This distinction has no constitutional significance.

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Footnote 1. Rule 37.6 Statement: This brief was written entirely by counsel for amicus, as listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions were made to the preparation or submission of this brief.

Both parties have given written consent to the filing of this brief.  
 
February 2000