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There are two ways in which the separation-of-powers doctrine is violated--either by one branch assuming power that is "more appropriately diffused among separate branches" or by undermining another branch's "authority and independence . . . ." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 382 (1989); see INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). This first prong is not relevant to the present case. Congress did not purport to decide any specific case when it passed the PLRA. A legislature assumes a judicial function when it actually operates as a court, such as the colonial legislatures which acted as "courts of equity of last resort, hearing original actions or providing appellate review of judicial judgments." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 219 (1995). The PLRA's automatic stay is merely a procedural rule, designed to keep courts and litigants on a tight schedule. See Part III B, supra. Although it can be delegated to the other branches, rulemaking is ultimately Congress's responsibility. See Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 386, n. 14.
The Seventh Circuit based its attack against the automatic stay provision on the statute's purported interference with the judicial function. It found that the time limit set by this rule was "an unconstitutional intrusion on the power of the courts to adjudicate cases." French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d 437, 446 (CA7 1999). The court further held that 18 U. S. C. §3626(e)(2) was a rule of decision contrary to United States v. Klein, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). French, 178 F. 3d, at 446-447.
The PLRA's time limit does not unduly hinder a court from reaching any necessary decision. Contrary to the panel's reasoning, time limits on courts are neither rare nor unconstitutional. Since the automatic stay does not prevent a court from rendering its decision in any case, it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Klein can be described as a corollary to the maxim "hard cases make bad law," see, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 106 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring), namely that "strange cases make strange law." The statute struck down in Klein is without a doubt "exceedingly odd." See Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 888, 922 (1998). Klein involved the seizure and sale of cotton from Wilson, a Confederate supporter during the Civil War. Wilson had qualified for a blanket pardon issued by President Lincoln to all rebel supporters who swore an oath of loyalty to the Union. Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 131-132. In an earlier decision, this Court had held that those who qualified for the pardon were entitled to reimbursement for any property seized during the war. United States v. Padelford, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870). The Court of Claims ruled that in light of Wilson's pardon, his estate was entitled to the proceeds of the sale. See Klein, 80 U. S., at 132.
The statute was Congress's attempt to overrule Padelford. See Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1189, 1206-1209. The statute required this Court to remand any cases like Wilson's to the Court of Claims, to treat the pardon as conclusive evidence of disloyalty, and to dismiss the appeals of those seeking to recover the property of these persons. See Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 130-134.
This statute's unconstitutionality is clear. This law was meant to overturn one part of President Lincoln's pardon. "Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this Court has adjudged them to have." Id., at 145. Congress cannot limit the pardon as it is the exclusive province of the Executive. See id., at 148; see also R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 369, n. 22 (4th ed. 1996) (viewing Klein as based on an "invasion of executive power"). This intrusion upon the Executive thus violated the separation of powers.
The Klein Court's holding that the act also violated the Judiciary's constitutional prerogatives is more complex. This Court determined that the statute's use of Congress's power to set jurisdiction was a cover for telling the courts how to rule in these cases. See Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 146. It next concluded that it "prescribe[d] rules of decision to the judicial department in cases pending before it" and therefore violated the separation of powers. See ibid.
This holding is no longer entirely valid. "Whatever the precise scope of Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not hold when Congress 'amend[s] applicable law.' " Plaut, supra, 514 U. S., at 218 (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429, 441 (1992)). Plaut's implicit question about Klein's scope deserves an answer. The best answer is that this part of Klein is very narrow, and unlikely to be repeated.
There is nothing inherently improper about Congress giving the courts a "rule of decision." In the broadest sense, Congress tells the courts how to decide cases each time it enacts a substantive rule of law. Enacting such rules is the very heart of the legislative power. See Scheidegger, supra, 98 Colum. L. Rev., at 909-911. Congress's power to enact procedural rules also gives this branch considerable influence over how courts exercise their power. The Rules of Evidence, subject to other constitutional limitations such as the Confrontation Clause, instructs the courts on what evidence they can and cannot admit. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority"). The federal reversible error rule, enacted by Congress to combat what it saw as the tendency of the federal appellate courts to be "citadels of technicality," is another example of Congress instructing the courts on how to decide cases. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 759 (1946); 28 U. S. C. §2111.
The Klein Court did not proscribe all rules of decision, but only those affecting pending cases. See Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 146. As noted above, Klein's retroactivity rule is no longer all it seems. In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429 (1992), this Court confronted an act of Congress which stated that a particular plan for wildlife and forest management "is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements" that were the basis for a named pending case. Id., at 430-431. This Court held this act constitutional, even though it effectively decided a pending case, because Congress changed the applicable law. Id., at 441.
Klein's rule is limited to legislation that does not change the relevant law, but merely dictates the outcome of a pending case under the unchanged law. In Klein, Congress could not change the applicable law, the President's pardon power. Because the law could not be changed, the legislation was no more than an attempt to mandate a result in the case, unconstitutionally infringing upon the Judiciary's power to apply the given law to a particular case. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810); supra, at 9-10.
The automatic stay provision does not tell the court how to decide the specific case before it. This rule changes the applicable law regarding the extent of injunctive relief. A host of decrees were issued at a time when the standard was different. Many, if not most, of those decrees are now illegal. A party should not have to continue to obey an order which is now illegal. The statute gives the issuing court a reasonable opportunity, up to 90 days, to confirm that the order is legal under present law. After that, it relieves the enjoined party from obedience to a probably illegal order unless and until a court determines it is legal.
The court retains full discretion over the final disposition of the case, see Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F. 3d 925, 940 (CA6 1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, Martin v. Hadix, 527 U. S. __, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347, 119 S. Ct. 1998 (1999); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F. 3d 1081, 1089 (CA8 1997) ("The PLRA leaves the judging to the judges and therefore does not violate the Klein decision"). Since the court is not kept from giving "the effect to evidence, which in its own judgment, such evidence should have," Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 147, the automatic stay does not violate Klein. Under the automatic stay, judges still have an "adjudicatory function to perform," United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 392 (1980), deciding whether the decree comports with the PLRA's new requirements. While they can still rule, excessive delay in doing so results in temporary relief for the state. This is constitutional.
Klein is not the only limit on congressional regulation of how the federal courts exercise their Article III power. In Plaut, supra, this Court identified three types of legislation that violate this aspect of the separation-of-powers doctrine: the legislation in Klein, vesting review of Article III courts in the Executive Branch, and the retroactive reopening of final judgments. See 514 U. S., at 218-219.
Commanding the courts to retroactively open final judgments violates the separation of powers by undermining a court's authority to decide cases. Finality is an essential part of the authority to decide cases "because 'a judicial Power' is one to render dispositive judgments." Id., at 219 (quoting Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926 (1990)). Because neither §3626(e)(2) nor the PLRA reopens a final judgment, Plaut is not violated.
The automatic stay implements the modification of injunctions and consent decrees in prisoner civil rights cases. Unlike the litigation reopened by Congress in Plaut, these judgments are never truly final. Plaut dealt with securities fraud suits that had been dismissed as untimely under the statute of limitations. Plaut, supra, 514 U. S., at 213-214. Congress attempted to reopen these cases by retroactively extending the statute of limitations for this class of litigants. See id., at 214-215. The Plaut Court struck this down as violating the Judiciary's power to decide cases. Id., at 218-219.
Plaut must be distinguished from the cases starting with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U. S. (18 How.) 421 (1856), which have consistently held that a court's exercise of its injunctive power does not create a final judgment in this sense. In Wheeling Bridge, a prior decision of this Court had held that a bridge erected across the Ohio River by defendant obstructed the free navigation of the river, and accordingly ordered its removal or the obstruction's abatement. See id., at 425. According to this prior decision, the obstruction violated federal statutes. See id., at 430. After this decision, Congress enacted a law that this bridge was legal and that the company could maintain it at its present height. Id., at 425. Wheeling Bridge confronted the constitutionality of this act.
The Court initially noted that Congress cannot "annul the judgment of the court already rendered, or the rights determined thereby in favor of the plaintiff." Id., at 431. Yet this case was distinguishable from this proposition, see ibid., due to the nature of the remedy imposed to protect the right adjudicated in the prior case.
The right to navigate the river was a "public right" that could support a private action for damages by a private party sustaining special damages from the obstruction. Ibid. The private party could also "file a bill in chancery for the purpose of removing the obstruction." Ibid. Because the right was "public" it was subject to the regulation of Congress. Ibid. A remedy of damages, being a final judgment, was beyond the power of Congress to legislate retroactively. Ibid. An equitable remedy, such as the abatement before the Court, was a different matter.
"But that part of the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, is executory, a continuing decree, which requires not only the removal of the bridge, but enjoins the defendants against any reconstruction or continuance. Now, whether it is a future existing or continuing obstruction depends upon the question whether or not it interferes with the right of navigation. If, in the meantime, since the decree, this right has been modified by the competent authority, so that the bridge is no longer an unlawful obstruction, it is quite plain the decree of the court cannot be enforced. There is no longer any interference with the enjoyment of the public right inconsistent with law, no more than there would be where the plaintiff himself had consented to it, after the rendition of the decree." Id., at 431-432 (emphasis added).
So long as an injunction is in force, it is subject to modification even if it is a final decree. See Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 437 (1976). "A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaption as events may shape the need." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932). The injunction may be continuously modified because the court's jurisdiction over the injunction does not end unless the injunction is terminated. "The source of the power to modify is of course the fact that the injunction often requires continuing supervision by the court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief." System Federation v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 647 (1961). When the law or circumstances significantly change, the injunction must change with them. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 215 (1997); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S. 367, 384 (1992). Indeed, courts have a duty to modify injunctions once the law has changed sufficiently. See Agostini, 521 U. S., at 240. Wheeling Bridge establishes the principle that Congress can change the circumstances, and thus the entitlement to injunctive relief, without violating the separation of powers, even if the injunction is "final."
Although it has the most relevance to the constitutionality of the PLRA's retroactive changing of the standards governing prison injunctions, Wheeling Bridge also supports the automatic stay provision. Since Congress was able to effectively overrule one of this Court's decisions in Wheeling Bridge, it can enact the much lesser intrusion of its temporary stay mechanism. If Congress did not unconstitutionally review this Court's decision in the first Wheeling Bridge case, then the PLRA's automatic stay similarly does not review any federal court ruling. Since the injunction in the present case is not final for the purpose of the separation of powers, Congress may provide for its temporary suspension in the context of the changed circumstances of the PLRA. The Seventh Circuit's holding that the automatic stay unconstitutionally reviews court decisions, see French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d 437, 446 (CA7 1999) is simply incorrect.
It is true that the present case is not identical to Wheeling Bridge. Unlike that case, Congress does not have total control over the right underlying the remedy. Whatever the Constitution requires at minimum Congress cannot limit.(2) This does not change the analysis, however, because the automatic stay involved does not overturn any prior injunction. Although it may suspend the operation of the injunction if the District Court does not rule on its continued validity sufficiently quickly, ultimately those portions of the injunction that satisfy the constitutional minimums will be reinstated. Furthermore, many if not most prison injunctions go well beyond the constitutional minimum. See supra, at 14. If Congress can completely overturn a decision under Wheeling Bridge, then the automatic stay may relieve prison systems from the burden of excessive injunctions until the court decides whether and to what extent the injunction is actually within the legal limit.
This view of Wheeling Bridge is consistent with this Court's interpretations of the decision. Some commentators have distinguished Wheeling Bridge from the PLRA, because prison civil rights litigation does not rely on the public rights mentioned in that case. See, e.g., Decker, Consent Decrees and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Usurping Judicial Power or Quelling Judicial Micro-Management, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 1275, 1290. This misreads the term and its context. In Wheeling Bridge the "public rights" was used in its "discussion[] of the law of nuisance" in which "the Court merely expressed agreement with the proposition that a court of equity could enjoin a public nuisance in a case brought by a private person who sustained specific injury." California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 296, n. 7 (1981). In the context of the separation-of-powers analysis, the fact that the injunction was against a public nuisance was irrelevant. What matters was that the injunction was necessarily "a continuing decree," Wheeling Bridge, supra, 59 U. S., at 431, and therefore subject to modification when Congress changed the legal circumstances. Even between private parties, an injunction is a "continuing decree" that is always subject to adaptation due to changes in the facts or the law. See System Federation, supra, 364 U. S., at 647. The character of the right is irrelevant for the separation-of-powers analysis. The issue here is not the validity or even the source of the legal rule that produced the Article III judgments, but rather the immunity from legislative abrogation of those judgments themselves. Plaut, supra, 514 U. S., at 239. Because Congress can effectively abrogate a continuing injunction, it may temporarily suspend one that goes beyond the constitutional minimum.
The Seventh Circuit also found that the automatic stay unconstitutionally interfered with the court's ability to decide cases by impermissibly placing power over the status quo of the litigation in the hands of the party moving to terminate the decree. French, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 444. Congress can and does place courts under automatic rules. It also has the authority to set strict deadlines to the pace of the litigation. The Seventh Circuit's decision to strike down Congress's schedule betrays a misplaced sense of constitutional priorities.
Judge Easterbrook's dissent lists the many ways in which Congress limits the Judiciary's administrative independence, and would thus run afoul of the Seventh Circuit's holding. See id., at 451-452 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The dissent correctly notes that §3626(e)(2) is no different from these valid exercises of congressional power. As the dissent notes, the Seventh Circuit operates in a constitutional vacuum. "I am not aware of any decision by the Supreme Court holding, or even suggesting, that statutes requiring judges to adjudicate with dispatch pose constitutional problems." Id., at 450.
Amicus will add only a few points to Judge Easterbrook's dissent. The Seventh Circuit distinguishes the automatic stay in bankruptcy law, 11 U. S. C. §362, because that statute preserves "the court's equitable powers over the entirety of the bankruptcy estate, not superseding or undermining them." French, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 443. While the stay may preserve the status quo of the case before the bankruptcy court, it severely disrupts the powers of other courts over the cases before them. Thus a civil plaintiff could not execute against the surety on a supersedeas bond when automatically stayed by the bankruptcy filing. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U. S. 300, 301 (1995). The filing in the Celotex case stayed over 141,000 suits, 100 appeals, and $70 million in supersedeas bonds. See id., at 302, n. 2. This massive interference with the proceedings of other courts is triggered by a party filing a petition without a judicial decision. See 11 U. S. C. §362(a).
There is nothing unconstitutional about Congress giving the courts a set of standards they must follow. Section 3626(e)(2) sets a deadline. Deadlines require hard and fast limits. "But '[d]eadlines are inherently arbitrary' while fixed dates 'are often essential to accomplish necessary results.' " United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 94 (1985) (quoting United States v. Boyle, 469 U. S. 241, 249 (1984)). For every deadline there is always someone who must be a day late, but courts cannot ignore the mandate of Congress's deadline in order to obtain " 'optimal' policy results." Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 430 (1996). The federal courts cannot use their inherent rulemaking power to overcome a specific rule of procedure. See id., at 426. The fact that a congressional rule leads to a seemingly harsh result is irrelevant. The courts must follow Congress's command. Locke, 471 U. S., at 101.
Congress has often set priorities for courts to rule on cases by informing the Judiciary to rule quickly or grant expedited review in various classes of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310, 313, n. 2 (1990) (expedited review for federal flag burning statute under 18 U. S. C. §700(d)(2)); United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 742-743 (1987) (expedited review for pretrial detention orders under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U. S. C. §3141(b)(c)); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 487-488 (1985) (expedited review of constitutional attacks on the Federal Election Commission Act under 28 U. S. C. §437(h)(a)); NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, 354 (1973) (under 42 U. S. C. §1971(g), when the Attorney General sues to enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the United States may request a three-judge court which must " 'cause the case to be in every way expedited' "). This Court has never questioned Congress's authority to order the Judiciary's priorities in deciding litigation. It is the Legislative Branch's prerogative to define a category of cases as too important for the courts to ignore or delay. See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U. S. 870, 881 (1984). The only difference between the automatic stay and the many expedited review statutes upheld by this Court, is that §3626(e)(2) contains a specific deadline. This distinction has no constitutional significance.
The automatic stay does not mandate the result in any specific case. It merely requires the court to act expeditiously or effectively grant temporary relief to the party injured by the delay. One may disagree with the place Congress struck the balance between the states' and prisoners' interests, but that is Congress's prerogative, to order priorities in federal litigation. Most importantly, it is Congress's duty to check the excesses of the federal Judiciary, by relieving prisons from excessive court orders.
The decision of the Seventh Circuit should be reversed.
February, 2000
Respectfully submitted,
Charles L. Hobson
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
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Footnote 2. And in fact, Congress has not limited injunctive relief below the constitutionally required minimums. See 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1). Congress can
eliminate federal equity power in an entire area, relegating aggrieved parties to state remedies, see, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1341 (Tax Injunction Act),
but it has not done so here.