 |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
The United States argues that in order to avoid rendering the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) automatic stay provision unconstitutional, courts must have the discretion to enjoin it from operating automatically. See French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d 437, 442 (CA7 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F. 3d 925, 936-937 (CA6 1998), rev'd on other grounds, Martin v. Hadix, 527 U. S. __, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347, 119 S. Ct. 1998 (1999). This is an unacceptable use of a statutory canon in circumstances where it is unnecessary. The statutory language cannot support this proposed interpretation. Furthermore, this argument is unnecessary as the automatic stay provision is constitutional as it is written. See Part IV, post.
The discussion of any interpretation of the PLRA's automatic stay begins and ends with the statutory language of 18 U. S. C. §3626(e)(2)-(3). See Appendix.
The provision's heart is in one word in its first sentence: "Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief under subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during the period . . . ." §3626(e)(2) (emphasis added). This mandatory language unambiguously states that the stay is automatic. The only discretion given to the court is whether to delay the stay for "not more than 60 days" after finding good cause. The narrowness of subdivision (e)(3)'s exception undermines any alternative reading. If "good cause" only justifies a 60-day extension, Congress could not have meant to allow the court to take the "normal equitable considerations," French, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 442, into account before exercising its discretion to issue a longer stay.
"Shall" means "shall." It does not mean maybe. Although it is acceptable to interpret statutes to avoid "serious constitutional problems," see e.g, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988), this is not a license to rewrite statutes. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 841 (1986). The canon of avoiding unconstitutional construction will not extend " 'to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute' . . . or judicially rewriting it." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 211 (1961)). This canon has two requirements, a "serious likelihood that the statute will be held unconstitutional," and "the statute must be genuinely susceptible to two constructions . . . ." Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 238 (1998). The United States' argument fails on both grounds.
Before deciding whether the PLRA's automatic stay violates the doctrine of separation of powers, it is necessary to understand what this doctrine protects and why it does so. Fortunately, this Court and the founders have cleared a relatively straightforward path through the potentially confusing thicket of the diverse interests and responsibilities of the three branches. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit strayed from this path, jumping into its discussion without a proper analysis of the rationale behind the separation-of-powers doctrine. Its opinion lacks the necessary understanding of the permissible interdependence among the three branches, sacrificing an act of Congress to an excessive protection of judicial prerogatives.
Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary are separated primarily to protect against the threat to liberty posed by an excessive accumulation of power in one branch. Even before the Constitution's founding, separation of powers was a known bulwark against tyranny. See Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 756 (1996). The founders adopted this perspective. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, p. 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). This principle is found throughout this Court's separation-of-powers decisions. See, e.g., Loving, 517 U. S., at 756; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 380 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 685-696 (1988); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 950-951 (1983); id., at 960-961 (Powell, J., concurring); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 721-722 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 121 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Separating the three branches does not only protect liberty; a lesser, but still important benefit is the enhanced operation of the government. "By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the framers created a National Government that is both effective and accountable." Loving, supra, 517 U. S., at 757. By assigning each branch its own sphere of responsibilities, greater efficiency is achieved through the expertise that comes with experience. At the same time, the public knows which branch is responsible for any particular policy, ensuring accountability. See id., at 757-758.
The Constitution's accommodation of liberty, effectiveness, and accountability is achieved through the means used to separate the three branches. It does not achieve these goals through the absolute division of the three branches. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown, supra, 343 U. S., at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). A government that seals the three branches off from each other cannot function. As the framers understood, a "hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Buckley, supra, 424 U. S., at 121. Therefore, any separation-of-powers analysis must take a "pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power . . . ." Mistretta, supra, 488 U. S., at 381.
The Constitution maintains a balance of power between three interdependent branches. Therefore, "the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others." The Federalist No. 51, pp. 321-322 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Liberty, efficiency, and accountability are thus simultaneously advanced by a "carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch." Mistretta, supra, 488 U. S., at 381; see also Buckley, supra, 424 U. S., at 122 (the framers "built into the tripartite Federal Government . . . a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other"); Chadha, supra, 462 U. S., at 951.
Instead of forbidding any intermixing of powers, separation of powers actually requires the branches to exert some power in the others' spheres of influence.
"Separation of powers, [Madison] wrote, 'd[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,' but rather 'that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.' " Mistretta, supra, 488 U. S., at 380-381 (quoting The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison)) (emphasis in original; some brackets in original).
Therefore, "our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a duty of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence, as well as independence . . . ." Id., at 381.
It is not enough to simply proclaim a separation-of-powers violation upon the mere finding that the act of one branch overlaps with the power of another. Instead, proper analysis looks to the nature and the extent of the alleged unconstitutional intrusion, looking to the respective powers, duties, and competencies of the respective branches. At the same time, the goals of the separation-of-powers doctrine, preserving liberty, while maintaining the government's effectiveness and accountability, must be kept in mind.
At an abstract level, separation of powers is violated in one of two ways. "One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to the other." Chadha, supra, 462 U. S., at 963 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see Mistretta, supra, 488 U. S., at 382.
Separation-of-powers analysis starts with the relative functions of the potentially conflicting branches. The spheres of influence of Congress and the Judiciary are explained in The Federalist. Congress has the authority to "prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated" while "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts." The Federalist No. 78, pp. 465-467 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 222 (1995). In practice, Congress is the generalist, prescribing the general rules to regulate society and the legal system, while the courts are the particularists, applying these given rules to the specific cases. "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.); see Plaut, 514 U. S., at 241-242 (Breyer, J., concurring).
This still leaves Congress with considerable authority over the Judiciary. Congress has broad authority to enact procedural rules. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 472 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 9 (1941). Congressional authority extends very far into both what a court decides and how it reaches its decision. For example, this Court has invited Congress to formulate its own rules to replace its judicially created Fifth Amendment prophylactic, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467 (1966), and to provide it with a rule for defining harmless constitutional error. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 21 (1967). So long as Congress does not "prescribe the rules of decision to the judicial Department of a case pending before it," United States v. Klein, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872), place review of an Article III court's decision in officials of another branch, or command the courts to retroactively reopen final judgments, it is not likely to unconstitutionally intrude upon the Judiciary. See Plaut, supra, 514 U. S., at 218.
A proper analysis of 18 U. S. C. §3626(e)(2) takes these principles into account. Amicus submits that the PLRA's automatic stay is a rule that neither assumes a judicial function nor "interfere[s] impermissibly" with the Judiciary. See Chadha, supra, 462 U. S., at 963 (Powell, J., concurring). This rule does not decide any specific case, and it does not effect a review of an Article III court. It is no more than a mechanism to ensure the expeditious review of some of the longest and most invasive cases in American jurisprudence after Congress changed the law underlying the courts' power to issue injunctive relief in prison cases. Congress has only exerted the partial authority over the courts that is both its duty and its due. See The Federalist No. 47, pp. 302-303 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
|
|
||||
|
|
|
|
||