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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF) ⁽¹⁾ is a non-profit California corporation organized to participate in litigation relating to criminal justice in order to protect and advance the rights of victims of crime and the law-abiding public.

This case threatens to extend the costly rule of Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964) to strike down an otherwise valid confession as derivative evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. The threat to society of lost convictions and frustrated investigations from extending Massiah is contrary to the interests of justice and public safety that CJLF was formed to protect.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

After the defendant, John J. Fellers, was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, two police officers went to Fellers' house to arrest him on the charge. See United States v. Fellers, 285 F. 3d 721, 723 (CA8 2002). The officers told Fellers that they were there pursuant to an indictment and that they wanted to discuss his involvement in the conspiracy. See ibid. Fellers indicated that he had associated with the people named by the officers and that he had used methamphetamine. See ibid. The officers did not give Fellers any Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) warnings at this time. See Fellers, supra, at 723. Fellers was then taken to jail, where he was given Miranda warnings, signed a waiver and talked to the officers, reiterating his inculpatory statements and admitting to his association with several more co-conspirators. See ibid.

Fellers was tried in Federal District Court. The magistrate judge found that Fellers was in custody at the time of the first statement and that both statements should be suppressed. Ibid. ⁽²⁾ The district judge suppressed the statements made at Fellers' home, but admitted those made at the jail. See ibid. A jury convicted him of conspiracy to distribute between 50 and 500 grams of methamphetamine. See ibid.

The Court of Appeals, citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985), affirmed the conviction and sentence. See Fellers, 285 F. 3d, at 274. This Court granted certiorari on March 10, 2003.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Sixth Amendment entitles the defendant to counsel in certain critical stages of the prosecution where an attorney's advocacy or legal expertise is necessary to preserve a fair trial and a reliable verdict. The encounters regulated by Massiah v. United States do not call for the legal expertise or advocacy of counsel. This is particularly true in the case of encounters between the police and the accused, which are now governed byMiranda v. Arizona. At best, Massiah creates a right to fairness by preventing the defendant from compromising his or her defense after the prosecution begins. This departure from Sixth Amendment principles comes at a high cost in lost voluntary admissions of guilt and delayed prosecutions. Massiah pushes the boundaries of the Sixth Amendment so far that it should not be extended any further.

The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is applied only when it preserves the core values of the underlying right that was violated. As an extension of the already costly exclusionary rule, the fruits doctrine should only be imposed when it is absolutely necessary.

There are instances where suppressing derivative evidence is not controversial. Where the government gains knowledge about other tangible evidence through an illegal act and then exploits that knowledge to gain possession over the newly discovered evidence, the fruits doctrine must apply. Since the causal connection between the illegal act and the derivative evidence is inseparable in these cases, failing to suppress the derivative evidence would fatally undermine the underlying right.

Applying the fruits doctrine to confessions is not as simple. Since a valid confession is a voluntary act, the causal connection between the constitutional violation and the allegedly derivative confession is more difficult to find. These cases involve a more detailed analysis which turns on constitutional policy. Fifth Amendment interests drove the decision not to extend the fruits doctrine to an otherwise valid confession that followed an earlier Miranda violation. The analysis of confessions following Fourth Amendment violations follows the same pattern. This type of analysis governs the application of the fruits doctrine in this case.

No legitimate Sixth Amendment interest is served by suppressing a confession that satisfies Miranda simply because it follows a Massiahviolation. Massiah itself serves no core Sixth Amendment principles, and since suppressing voluntary confessions is costly to society, the balance of interests tips heavily against suppression.

Massiah should no longer apply to direct confrontations between the police and the accused. Massiah's cost to society, inconsistency with Sixth Amendment principles, and minimal reliance interest all support a partial reconsideration of Massiah. Miranda renders Massiah redundant in direct encounters between the police and the accused. Removing Massiah from these cases would minimally alter existing precedent and prevent defendants from accruing windfalls.

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1. This brief was written entirely by counsel for amicus, as listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions were made to the preparation or submission of this brief.

Both parties have given written consent to the filing of this brief.

2. This case illustrates, once again, how the vague definition of custody has failed to give police clear guidance. See Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in United States v. Patane, No. 02-1183, at 14.