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INTEREST OF AMICUS

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF)⁽¹⁾ is a non-profit California corporation organized to participate in litigation relating to the criminal justice system as it affects the public interest. CJLF seeks to bring the constitutional protections of the accused into balance with the rights of the victim and of society to rapid, efficient, and reliable determination of guilt and swift execution of punishment.

The present case involves an attempt to remove from the people the power to decide when valid, probative evidence taken in compliance with the Constitution may be admitted in evidence. Such a result would be contrary to the interests CJLF was formed to protect.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

Defendant Charles Dickerson has been indicted for the 1997 robbery of the First Virginia Bank in Alexandria, Virginia, among other offenses. J. A. 32. Dickerson accompanied FBI agents to the field office and gave a statement there. J. A. 141-142. The District Court suppressed this statement, finding that Dickerson was in custody, even though not formally arrested, and had not received the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona. J. A. 151-155.

On motion for reconsideration, the government argued, "At all events, since there is no evidence or even serious allegation that Dickerson's statements were involuntary, the statements are admissible under 18 U. S. C. 3501(a), which provides that 'in any criminal prosecution brought by the United States . . . a confession shall be admissible if it is voluntarily given' (emphasis added)." J. A. 87. The District Court denied the motion. J. A. 156. The court refused to consider the government's additional evidence on the ground it was available at the time of the original hearing. J. A. 159-160. The District Court did not address the §3501 argument.

The government appealed. However, it reversed its position on §3501, on which it had previously relied, and asserted that the statute was unconstitutional, J. A. 163, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F. 3d 667, 671 (CA4 1999). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court was within its discretion to refuse to consider belated evidence. J. A. 164, 166 F. 3d, at 671. Regarding §3501, the Court of Appeals noted, "Over the past few years, career federal prosecutors have tried to invoke §3501 in this Court only to be overruled by the Department of Justice." J. A. 187, 166 F. 3d, at 681. The court nonetheless proceeded to decide the issue. J. A. 191, 166 F. 3d, at 683; cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 294, n. 1 (1967) (case decided on retroactivity, even though raised only by amicus); Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 300 (1989) (plurality opinion) (same).

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding §3501 was valid and that the District Court had implicitly held that the statement was voluntary. J. A. 211-212, 166 F. 3d, at 692. This Court granted certiorari, limited to Question 1. That question is the constitutionality of §3501. Pet. for Cert. i. The denied questions were the propriety of the Fourth Circuit's consideration of the issue and a Fourth Amendment claim. Ibid.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Miranda rule is a rule of evidence. That case did not create any new constitutional rights. This Court's repeated characterizations of the Miranda rule as nonconstitutional are holdings, not dicta, necessary to the decisions in those cases.

The federal courts can create federal common law in certain specific cases of "uniquely federal interests." The federal law so created prevails over state law to the extent of any conflict, and when decided by the Supreme Court is binding precedent in state courts. Enforcement of federal constitutional rights is one of those areas.

A decision in this case upholding §3501 would open the door to a fresh round of democratic debate on the admissibility of confessions. Further congressional action would be needed to lift the yoke of Miranda from state courts, but a favorable decision on §3501 would provide the needed assurance that Congress can replace the Miranda rule. The legislative branch has superior flexibility to achieve a proper balance of interests.

If the Court is truly forced to a choice between constitutionalizing Miranda or overruling it, then it should overrule it. Either choice involves overruling precedents, so stare decisis does not indicate one choice over the other. The Miranda rule is not required by the Constitution.

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1. This brief was written entirely by counsel for amicus, as listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions were made to the preparation or submission of this brief.

Both parties have given written consent to the filing of this brief.