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Because the police are the only individuals likely to be held civilly liable for Fifth Amendment violations, see supra, at 9, Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) would be the source of any civil rights case for alleged Fifth Amendment violations. While that landmark decision dramatically expanded the Fifth Amendment's reach, it did not add any new remedies. Miranda is a rule of evidence given constitutional force through the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege. The product of an interrogation that does not comport with Miranda and its permutations, see, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), is presumed to be involuntary without regard to whether it was in fact involuntary. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 304, 307, n. 1 (1985). This rule of evidence should only be implemented by an exclusionary rule, and, like its Fifth Amendment source, it is only violated at trial by the improper admission of incriminating statements.
Although the 50-plus page opinion sprawls over a wide range of topics, in the end Miranda is simply an exclusionary rule. The Court summarizes its own holding as this: "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384 U. S., at 444 (emphasis added).
Miranda is not a rule separating voluntary from involuntary confessions. Instead, it creates a conclusive presumption that confessions not taken in accordance with its dictates are deemed involuntary without regard to whether they are in fact involuntary. "A Mirandaviolation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements." Elstad, 470 U. S., at 304, 307, n. 1 (emphasis in original). Miranda's presumption reflects this Court's choice of the appropriate balance between the suspect's protection from interrogation and society's need to solve crimes. See, e.g., Moran v.Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 433, n. 4 (1986) ("the [Miranda] decision . . . embodies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect boththe defendant's and society's interests" (emphasis in original)); New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 658 (1984). While the opinion declared that voluntary confessions were a "proper element in law enforcement," Miranda, 384 U. S., at 478, the Miranda Court chose to tilt the balance sharply in favor of the criminal defendant. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1417, 1469-1472 (1985). This balance executes this Court's policy concerning police interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.
Miranda and its subsequent decisions have noted the "inherently compelling pressures" of the interrogation room. See Miranda, 384 U. S., at 467; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 176 (1991); Moran, 475 U. S., at 420. But this does not change the fact that theMiranda rule is only a presumption. While there may be some inherent pressure in any custodial interrogation, it must not be too compelling since Miranda still allows waivers under these circumstances. See 384 U. S., at 535-536 (White, J., dissenting).
There are many instances in which a suspect can give an unwarned, but still voluntary custodial confession. In his Miranda dissent, Justice White constructed a hypothetical where an unwarned suspect in police custody may blurt out a confession after being asked a single question such as " 'Do you have anything to say?' " or 'Did you kill your wife?' " This confession, while voluntary in fact, is suppressed under Miranda. See id., at 533-534 (White, J., dissenting). As Judge Henry Friendly noted, "the books are full of instances, of which the Court must have been well aware through petitions for certiorari, where it is evident that in-custody interrogation did not represent the exercise of compulsion." H. Friendly, Benchmarks 272-273 (1967); see also id., at 273, and nn. 33-36 (listing examples). In many cases after Miranda, confessions have been found or conceded to be voluntary even though they were taken contrary to theMiranda procedures. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U. S., at 318; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 723 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 449 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 224 (1971).
The policy that ties Miranda's many strands together is dissatisfaction with administering the voluntariness standard. See Gardner, Section 1983 Actions under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to Avoid Interrogation, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1277, 1281-1282 (1993). This explains Miranda's focus on custody. A station house can be very difficult for judicial scrutiny to penetrate. The Mirandarule finesses the problems with custody by overprotecting the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Like its Fifth Amendment source, Miranda advances its policies through the exclusionary rule. See Elstad, 470 U. S., at 306. Mirandais only violated when incriminating statements are improperly admitted at trial. Thus, "courts should not care whether or not Miranda is violated so long as no evidence obtained from the violation is introduced against the person from whom it was obtained. Similarly, no police officer should be subject to a law suit for obtaining a confession in violation of Miranda." Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 907, 917 (1989).
The case for limiting Miranda violations to improperly admitted testimony is even stronger than it is for Fifth Amendment violations in general. While a confession contrary to the Fifth Amendment must involve some sort of improper compulsion, Miranda can and does exclude voluntary confessions. Assessing civil damages through Miranda's burdensome presumption is thus both unnecessary and unfair because the rule sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment.
Any doubt that Miranda is exclusively a trial right is dispelled by its exceptions. While confessions obtained contrary to the Mirandarules are excluded from the government's case-in-chief, such statements are admissible for impeachment purposes. See Harris, 401 U. S., at 226. Exclusion from the main case provided enough of a deterrent to police. See id., at 225. If a Miranda "violation" occurred at the time of the interrogation, then the fruits of the violation should be inadmissible under any circumstances. How can an officer who does not follow Miranda be found to violate the Constitution and be held liable for damages if it is constitutionally permissible to admit the product of that same interrogation for impeachment? In this hypothetical case, while the defendant has been incriminated, albeit indirectly by impeaching evidence, the interrogating officer who obtained this evidence could be found personally liable to the defendant, even though an appellate court would not overturn the defendant's conviction.
This demonstrates that Miranda did not establish a right to avoid interrogation. A suspect who gives an unwarned but voluntary statement "has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm." Elstad, 470 U. S., at 307. The Fifth Amendment is not violated until the statement taken contrary to Miranda is improperly admitted into evidence. While it is common to refer to a suspect's "Miranda rights" and to the conduct of police as a "Miranda violation," these are misnomers. "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). While they are usually harmless, such terms should not deflect the focus from Miranda as a trial right. As "Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right,' " the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 691 (1993) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 264 (1990)) (emphasis added in Withrow), "a simple failure to administerMiranda warnings is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment." Elstad, supra, at 306, n. 1. This exclusionary rule no more supports civil liability than the Fifth Amendment it serves.
Just like the Fifth Amendment it serves, the Miranda presumption does not create a right to be free from questioning, "The evil theMiranda Court meant to eliminate arises not from the privacy intrusion--the questioning of the suspect--but from the use of compelled statements against him. Such use is the gravamen of a violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule--A Critique, 35 Hastings L. J. 429, 451-452 (1984). The Ninth Circuit's arguments to the contrary, see Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F. 3d 852, 857 (CA9 2001), are simply incorrect.
The fact that this Court recently affirmed Miranda's constitutional status in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000), does not change the analysis. Dickerson struck down 18 U. S. C. §3501, Congress' attempt to supplant Miranda with a totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness. The Dickerson Court noted that language in some cases implied that the Miranda rule was not a constitutional right. See Dickerson, supra, at 437-438. The doubts about Miranda's constitutionality were resolved by the fact that this Court consistently applied the Miranda rule to the states. If Miranda was not a constitutional decision, then it could not be applied to state court convictions. See id., at 438. Further proof of Miranda's status was found in language from Miranda itself. See id., at 440.
Dickerson illuminated the landscape rather than changed it. The presence of exceptions to Miranda did not negate its constitutional status, and therefore survived the Dickerson decision. "These decisions illustrate the principle--not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule--but that no constitutional rule is immutable." Id., at 441. Because Miranda was so embedded in police practice and our culture, "the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now." Id., at 443. The fact that the Miranda presumption overprotects the Fifth Amendment was also left untouched. "The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his 'rights,' may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result." Id., at 444. Dickerson simply reaffirmed the status quo.
While Miranda extended the reach of the Fifth Amendment privilege into the interrogation room, it did not expand the scope of the right. The privilege against self-incrimination is still a trial right and therefore is only enforced through its exclusionary rule. Certain extreme forms of interrogation can support an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983, see infra, at 27-30, but they are not covered by the Fifth Amendment or the Miranda presumption or raised by the facts of this case.
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September 2002